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Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (the Act) governs the regula-
tion of hazardous air pollutants. l From 1970 to 1990, the statute 
required the United States Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) to regulate hazardous air pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollu-
tant basis.2 Environmental policy analysts generally acknowledge 
that this approach failed due to scientific uncertainties and unclear 
direction from Congress on how the EPA should balance the com-
peting concerns of cost and safety. In an effort to improve the 
Act's effectiveness, Congress passed the 1990 Amendments (the 
Amendments) to the Act,S which established a two-phased ap-
proach to regulation. First, subsection 112(d) requires the EPA to 
promulgate technology-based emission standards for categories 
and subcategories of industries that are major or area sources of 
189 specified hazardous air pollutants.4 Because Congress was con-
cerned that these controls would not eliminate all emissions posing 
unacceptable health risks to exposed populations, subsection 
112(f) then requires the EPA to determine for each category or 
subcategory of industries whether more stringent emission stan-
dards should be promulgated to control residual risks.5 
Given the previously slow pace of regulation, Congress was 
probably right to emphasize speed and scope, rather than strin-
gency and health, in requiring the EPA to promulgate national, 
1. 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). 
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(b)(I)(A)-(B) (1988). 
3. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(d)(I)-(2). The Amendments require that EPA set emissions 
standards based on "measures, processes, methods, systems, or techniques" then available 
for pollution reduction. [d. § 7412(d) (2). 
5. Id. § 7412(f). 
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uniform technology-based regulations for categories and subcat-
egories of industries. The residual risk provisions in subsection 
112 (f), however, provide only vague guidelines for the EPA to fol-
low in establishing health-based standards after the technology-
based approach is in place. In fact, the residual risk provisions 
adopt essentially the same approach to health-based regulation 
that failed in the pre-1990 version of the statute. Subsection 112(f) 
requires the EPA to examine the cancer risk of individual facilities 
in determining whether the agency must promulgate residual risk 
standards, but then requires the agency to issue such standards for 
a category or subcategory of industry rather than for the individual 
facilities.6 
This Article proposes establishing an "exceptions process" to 
exempt individual facilities from both the categorical technology-
based standards in subsection 112(d) and the residual risk stan-
dards in subsection 112 (f). Under this approach, a firm could ap-
ply for a variance from either type of standard following a site-
specific risk assessment that demonstrates that (a) the costs of the 
standard are disproportionate to the benefits, and that (b) there is 
not an unacceptable risk to surrounding residents. At the same 
time, this approach would enable citizens to request a more strin-
gent standard for an individual facility upon proof that the existing 
standards inadequately control the health risks presented by the 
facility. 
On the one hand, an individualized approach would more ef-
fectively regulate hazardous air pollutants. The current residual 
risk regulations provide insufficient protection in several important 
areas. Subsection 112(f) fails to address the risks of excessive con-
centrations of certain pollutants (hot-spots), our inability to com-
pare carcinogens and non-carcinogens, indirect and multimedia 
impacts, and potentially disparate impacts on diverse exposed sub-
populations.7 While more stringent national standards might be 
6. See id. § 7412(f) (2). 
7. Scientists are beginning to chart genetic differences in human cancer susceptibj}. 
ity. See Alon Rosenthal et al .• Legislating Acceptable Cancer Risk from Exposure 10 Toxic Chrnti-
cals, 19 ECOLOGYLQ. 269. 289 n.l04 (1992). However. e\'en \\;thoutscientific C\;dence of 
genetic cancer-risk differences. occupational exposure to airborne carcinogens increases 
cancer risks for groups such as farmworkers and pesticide applicators. 
In addition. the EPA has recently targeted the issue of environmentlljustice in light of 
evidence that facilities emitting airborne toxics are more likely to be found in minority. 
than in white neighborhoods even when income differences are taken into accounL Ste 
Stephen c.jones, EPA Targets 'EnvironmenlalRacism~ NAT'L LJ •• Aug. 9,1993, at 28, 34, 36. 
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helpful in addressing some of these issues, many of these problems 
are essentially local in nature and require site-specific solutions. 
On the other hand, industry often argues that technology-based 
regulation frequently imposes requirements that are unnecessary 
and inefficient at specific facilities.s Other pollution control stat-
utes contain some limited exceptions for certain categories of pol-
luters.9 In contrast, the Clean Air Act provides no variance 
procedure from subsection 112(d)'s technology-based emission 
standards for sources of hazardous air pollutants. Moreover, the 
residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) do not provide any ex-
emptions for industry, even where the technology-based emission 
standards for a category of sources exceeds the level necessary to 
achieve subsection 112 (f) 's health-based standards at a particular 
source. 
Even if the reader agrees that subsection 112(f) suffers from 
both over- and under-regulation, the difficult question of how to 
implement a better approach remains. Commentators disagree 
about whether exceptions from national, uniform environmental 
standards promote efficiency or simply encourage political manip-
ulation.1o The use of an exceptions process for sources of toxic 
pollutants is likely to be especially controversial, but both fairness 
and efficiency arguments support establishing a variance process 
for sources of air toxics. Because any exceptions process includes a 
risk of abuse,11 policymakers should encourage public participa-
tion to protect against biased decisionmaking. 
While Congress could simply allow the EPA to grant exceptions 
on an ad hoc basis, congressional standards regarding appropriate 
exceptions would more readily achieve public approval. Two con-
tradictory yet related issues must be addressed. On the one hand, 
a statute must provide sufficient guidance to the EPA regarding the 
appropriate level of stringency for regulating specific hazardous air 
pollutants. On the other hand, there is insufficient information 
8. See generally AMoco/U.S. E.P.A., YORKTOWN POLLUTION PREVENTION PROJECT, PRO. 
JECT SUMMARY (1992) [hereinafter AMoco]. Industry has suggested site-specific controls as 
a way to reduce uniform national requirements. Industry Cemvinces EPA to Seek Comment on 
Plan for Site-Specific Benzene Cemtrois, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1911 (Nov. 27, 1992). 
9. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (k) (1988) (innovative technology variance for two years); 
Id. § 131l(n) (fundamentally different factors variance). 
10. See infra notes 236-50 and accompanying text. 
11. See, e.g., EPA v. National Crushed Stone Ass'n, 449 U.S. 64, 75-81 (1980) (criticiz-
ing variances as potential tool of political influence); Howard Latin, Ideal Vmus Real Regula-
tory Efficiency: Implementatiem of Uniform Standards and "Fine-Tuning" Regulatory Reforms, 37 
STAN. L. REv. 1267, 1316 (1985) [hereinafter Latin, "Fine-Tuning1. 
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about many risks, and pollutant risks are often difficult, if not im-
possible, to compare. 
The EPA needs significant discretion in order to exercise its 
technical expertise to address complicated risks. The EPA, how-
ever, also needs clearer congressional guidance to provide the 
agency vnth greater legitimacy and a better understanding of pub-
lic priorities. This Article therefore proposes a "fuzzy bright line" 
statute that combines significant delegation to the EPA with flexi-
ble, but clear, standards. This proposal represents a compromise 
between those favoring congressional micromanagement of the 
EPA, and those wishing to delegate most decisions to the agency's 
expertise. In particular, this Article disagrees with the argument 
that the priority-setting and screening approach in section 112 (f) 
will lead to more effective pollution control than legislating 
residual risk standards.12 
The "fuzzy bright line" approach proposed in this Article may 
be the best legislative approach. Given the serious criticisms this 
Article raises concerning the inaccuracies of risk assessment, how-
ever, the "fuzzy bright line" approach may appear irresponsible. 
One possible solution to this problem is to promote increased pub-
lic participation in policy-making at the local level. 
II. REsIDUAL RISK AND THE 1990 AMENDMENTS 
Subsection A will discuss the original version of section 112, 
which regulated hazardous air pollutants on a pollutant-by-pollu-
tant basis, and will describe how the 1990 Amendments shifted the 
regulatory focus from individual pollutants to sources of hazardous 
air pollutants. This subsection closely examines the limitations of 
the residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) (2)(A) of the 
amended Act. 
A The Original Clean Air Act and the 1990 Amendments 
1. Pre-1990 Regulation of Air Toxies. 
Section 112 of the 1970 Clean Air Act required the EPA to set 
health-based emission standards, rather than technology-based 
standards, for hazardous air pollutants. Congress intended these 
standards to provide "an ample margin of safety to protect the pub-
12. See, e.g., Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 275-76 (bright lines may undennine 
scientific progress), 323-27 (discussing bright lines for "screening" and "priority setting"), 
344, 360-61 (bright lines create inefficiency). 
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lic health" from that air pollutant.13 Because "most hazardous air 
pollutants ... are non threshold pollutants, for which scientists can-
not determine a no-observed-effect level of exposure,"14 the only 
absolutely safe level of emissions is zero. Yet the ambiguous "ample 
margin of safety" language does not guide the agency to standards 
that are absolutely safe. 15 Nor does it clarify whether EPA may con-
sider technological constraints or economic considerations in craft-
ing an emissions standard.16 The "ample margin of safety" 
language proved counterproductive because the EPA was reluctant 
to effectively shut down entire industries by listing pollutants, 
where such listing would require zero emission standards.17 This 
proved especially true when the costs of industry shutdowns were 
far greater than the benefits from pollutant regulation. IS As a re-
sult, between 1970 and 1988 the agency listed only eight hazardous 
air pollutants and promulgated standards for only some sources of 
seven types of hazardous air pollutants.19 
13. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(I)(B). 
14. Janet L McQuaid, Note, Risk Assessment of Hazardous Air Pollutants Under the EPA :s 
Final Benzene Rules and tile CleanAiT Act Amendments of 1990,70 TEX. L. REv. 427, 430 (1991); 
see NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1153 n.l (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en bane) ("With the exception 
of mercury, every pollutant the Administrator has listed or intends to list under § 112 is a 
non·threshold carcinogen."); William A. Wichers et aI., Regulation of Hazardous Air Pollu-
tants Under tile New Clean Air Act: Technology-Based Standards at Last, 22 EnvtI. L. Rep. (EnvtI. 
L Inst.) 10,717, 10,718 (1992). 
15. See Wichers et a1., supra note 14, at 10,718; McQuaid, supra note 14, at 430-31. 
The st,ltUtOry phrase "ample margin of safety" suggested that an emission standard be set 
at a very protective level because of the difference between this standard and the standard 
in § 109(b)(l) setting primary ambient air quality standards based "on an adequate margin 
of safety." Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (1) (B) (1970) ("ample margin of safety") tvith 42 
U.S.C. § 7409 (b) (1) (1988) (emphasis supplied). See Khristine L. Hall, The Control of Toxic 
Pollutants Under tile Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REv. 
609, 629-30 (1978) (referencing CAA § 112, and comparing the meaning of an "ample" 
versus an "adequate" margin of safety); Wichers et. a1., supra note 14, at 10,718 n.12. 
16. The most likely explanation for § 112's ambiguity is that, to the extent Congress 
actually considered the implications of its "ample margin of safety" language, it deliber-
ately excluded cost and feasibility as factors for EPA to consider in setting emissions stan-
dards. SeeJohn P. Dwyer, Tile Pathology oJSymbolic Legislation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 237-41 
(1990); see also Wichers et aI., supra note 14, at 10,718. 
17. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 255; McQuaid, supra note 14, at 431. 
18. See Clean Air Act (Part 2): Hearings before tile Subcomm. on Health and Environment of 
tile House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 737 (1981) (statement of 
WaIter C. Barber, Jr., Director, Office of Quality Planning and Standards, EPA, "[T]he 
Agency has been reluctant to list chemicals without some assurance that adverse effects 
could actually occur and can be prevented by control strategies."); Dwyer, supra note 16, at 
260; Wichers et a1., supra note 14, at 10,718. 
19. See Dwyer. supra note 16, at 252, 261-62, 267-69; Wichers et al., supra note 14, at 
10,718-19; Gary E. Marchant & Dawn P. Danzeisen, Comment, "Acceptable" Risk for Hazard-
ous Air Pollutants, 13 HARv. ENVIL. L. REv. 535, 536-37 (1989); McQuaid, supra note 14, at 
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Some commentators argue that the old section 112 was bound 
to fail because Congress intentionally created a program that was 
"more symbolic than functional. "20 The Act failed to address the 
administrative and political constraints that would prevent the EPA 
from implementing the statutory provisions.21 Thus, the combina-
tion of insufficient information and overly strict regulation 
doomed the original emissions reduction program.22 
Following the Clean Air Act's enactment in 1970, the EPA grad-
ually developed a nvo-fold strategy to address the problems created 
by the "ample margin of safety" criterion. First, the EPA delayed 
listing pollutants. Second, the EPA construed the language of sec-
tion 112 to permit consideration of economic and technological 
factors when developing emission standards.23 Environmentalists 
strongly opposed the EPA's interpretation, claiming that the origi-
431. In part, the EPA did not wish to list a substance and to promulgate emission stan-
dards until the agency had compiled sophisticated studies that could "ithstand litigation 
from regulated industries. However, this quest for greater certainty made it difficult, if not 
impossible for the EPA to meet the six-month deadlines for proposing and promulgating 
emission standards following listing. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 237-39; Wichers et aI., 
supra note 14, at 10,718-19. 
20. Dwyer, supra note 16, at 233. 
21. See id. & passim. Professor Dwyer has argued that the legislators who enacted the 
old § 112 reaped political benefits from voting for "an ample margin of safety- and left the 
EPA and the courts with the unpalatable task of balancing health against jobs. Id. at 246-
49; Kevin J. Worthen, The Last Shall Be FITSt, and the First Last: Ruminalions on the Past, Presml 
and Future Course of Government Regulation of Hazardous Pollulants, 1989 B.Y.U. L REv. 1113, 
1142 (discussing symbolic nature of statutes that do not consider cost of regulation); ge 
also McQuaid, supra note 14, at 432-33. 
22. Some commentators target the lack of sufficient information as explaining the 
failure of health-based regulation. See generally Latin, ·Fi~Tuning.· supra note 11, at 1328-
31; see also John S. Applegate, Worst Things First: Risk, InJannalion, and Rrgulalory Slrudure in 
Toxic Substances C0ntr04 9 YALEJ. ON REG. 277, 282 n.15 (1992) [hereinafter Applegate, 
Worst Things] ("[TJhe precise effects of toxic substances on human health and the emiron-
ment cannot be stated with any certainty."). Others explain the under-regulation of haz-
ardous air pollutants and other toxies by the EPA as the paradox of O\'Cr-regulation-that 
excessive stringency results in under-regulation because regulators are un\\illing to impose 
irrationally tight controls. See CAss R. SUNSTEIN, AFr£R ntE RIeHTS REv0WT10N: REcoNCElV-
ING ntE REGUlATORY STATE 91-92, 106-07 (l990);joHN MENDELOFF, R.EcULATlNC SAFEn,: AN 
ECONOMIC AND POUTICAL ANAL'\'SIS OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFEtY AND HEALTH Poucv (1979). 
23. Dwyer, supra note 16, at 235,251-52. While the EPA was initially hesitant to admit 
that it was relying on economic and technological factors in issuing standards, the agency 
was more forthright about its use of economic factors in the proposed and final emission 
standards for vinyl chloride. 1d. at 252-53; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants; Standard for Vinyl Chloride, 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560 (1976) [hereinafter Standard 
for Vinyl Chloride]; National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants; Proposed 
Standard for Vmyl Chloride, 40 Fed. Reg. 59,532 (1975) [hereinafter Proposed Standard 
for Vinyl Chloride]. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 270 1994
270 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:263 
nal section 112 required a zero-risk approach.24 Nevertheless, the 
EPA's apparently less stringent technology-based approach may 
have been more effective than the symbolic (but unworkable) "am-
ple margin of safety" standard.25 
In a unanimous en banc decision, the D.C. Circuit in Vinyl Chlo-
ride,26 struck down the EPA's attempt to apply a technology-based 
policy to section 112. That court also rejected, however, the Natu-
ral Resources Defense Council's argument that the agency should 
focus only on health considerations when setting emission stan-
dards for air toxieS.27 The Vinyl Chloride court required the EPA to 
undertake a two-step procedure for setting emissions standards for 
hazardous air pollutants. First, the agency must determine what 
constitutes an "acceptable risk to health" based exclusively on 
health considerations. The court emphasized that while it did not 
equate "safe" with "risk-free" or even free from uncertainty, "the 
Administrator cannot under any circumstances consider cost and 
technological feasibility at this stage of the analysis. "28 Second, the 
EPA has the discretion to set a stricter emission standard to provide 
an ample margin of safety. In taking such action the agency may 
consider the limitations of scientific knowledge, as well as costs and 
technological feasibility.29 In the wake of Vinyl Chloride, the EPA 
promulgated final emissions standards for several benzene and ra-
24. SeeJohn D. Graham, The Failure of Agency-Forcing: The Regulation of Airborne Carci1lCJo 
gens Under Section 112 of the C/eanAirAct, 35 DUKE LJ. 100, 131 (1985); Wichers et aI., supra 
note 14, at 10,719. 
25. See Latin, "Fine-Tuning," supra note 11, at 1309 ("In sum, the original harm-based 
approach for regulation of toxic water pollutants proved ineffective and has largely been 
replaced by technology-based standards that are more easily implemented. Experience 
with regulation of hazardous air pollutants has been quite similar."); see also Sanford E. 
Gaines, Science, Politics, and the Management of Toxic Risks Through Law, 30 jURIMETRICSj. 271, 
300 (1990) ("Technology-based standards have many theoretical advantages over the nom-
inally pure health-based approach now embodied in section 112."). 
26. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
27. The court acknowledged its obligation to defer to the EPA's reasonable interpre-
tation of a statute. The court concluded, however, that in applying the technology-based 
formulation set out in the vinyl chloride emission standards, the EPA administrator had 
not "exercised his expertise to determine an acceptable risk to health" but had "substituted 
technological feasibility for health as the primary consideration under Section 112." ld. at 
1163; see also Chevron, U.S.A. V. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 84243 (1984) (courts must defer to 
agency's construction of statute if statute is ambiguous and agency's construction is 
reasonable) . 
28. NRDC V. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1165. 
29. Id. at 1164-66. The court's analysis is confusing because the decision excludes 
nonhealth factors from the determination of what constitutes acceptable risk, but includes 
them for judging whether a standard provides the requisite "ample margin of safety." See 
Gaines, supra note 25, at 293-94. 
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dionuclide categories. Notably, the agency employed an historical 
risk survey to set a "presumptive level" of acceptability for the maxi-
mum individual cancer risk at one-in-10,OOO.5o 
2. 1990 Amendments. 
The controversy over the Act's health-based "ample margin of 
safety" language and the agency's delay in issuing emission stan-
dards for individual pollutants based on that language led Con-
gress to overhaul section 112 of the Act in the 1990 Amendments. 
Under the current version of the statute, regulation of hazardous 
air pollutants will take place in two stages. 
First, the EPA must promulgate uniform, national technology-
based31 emission standards for categories or subcategories of major 
sources32 and area sources53 of hazardous air pollutants.54 Con-
gress specified 189 substances that are to be considered "hazardous 
air pollutants" for purposes of the Act 55 In the second phase of 
regulation, the EPA is required to promulgate more stringent emis-
sions standards for those categories of sources for which the tech-
nology-based standards have proven to be insufficiently protective 
of human health or the environment 36 An important question is 
what type of criteria should the EPA employ to determine whether 
technology-based emission standards are sufficiently protective. 
3. Residual Risk Provisions. 
One possible objection to this Article's proposal is that it is pre-
mature to discuss how to improve the residual risk provisions until 
the National Academy of Sciences, the Risk Assessment and Man-
agement Commission, and the EPA have had an opportunity to 
prepare reports on the agency's risk assessment methods relating 
30. NRDC v. EPA, 824 F.2d at 1164-66. Bul S£l McQuaid. supra note 14. at 437 (criti-
cizing use of historical survey data as inappropriate guide for setting current standards). 
31. In a technology-based system of regulation. an agency sets standards based not on 
the health effects of pollutants, but on the pollution-control capabilities of technology. 
John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: fnJormaIum, &gvlalO7J Poli9, and Toxic 
Substances Conlro~ 91 CoLUM. L. REv. 261, 268 n.28 (1991) [hereinafter Applegate, Perils]. 
32. A major source is one that emits either ten tons per year of any single air toxic or 
twenty-five tons per year of any combination of air toxies. 42 U.s.c. § 7412(a)(I). 
33. An area source is defined as "any stationary source ••• that is not a major source.-
fd. § 7412(a) (2). Dry cleaners fall into this category. 
34. fd. § 7412(d). 
35. fd. § 7412(b). Congress' list includes the eight hazardous air pollutants identified 
by the EPA prior to 1989. fd. 
36. [d. § 7412{f). 
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to hazardous air pollutants. The very questions that section 112 
requires that these reports address, however, suggest that an excep-
tions process is necessary to address a number of complex risk is-
sues at individual sites, although these reports will undoubtedly 
raise technical issues beyond the scope of those discussed in this 
Article. This Article's prediction that the residual risk regulations 
will inadequately address noncancer effects is already being borne 
out by the Academy's draft report, issued on January 19, 1994, 
which was unable to provide a full evaluation of such impacts be-
cause of time constraints. It is important to understand what issues 
Congress wanted these reports to address and why any nationally 
uniform residual risk regulations are unlikely to address the con-
cerns raised by this Article. 
a. EPA's Report. 
By November 15, 1996, after consulting with the Surgeon Gen-
eral and providing opportunity for public comment, the EPA must 
report to Congress on: (1) methods for measuring the residual 
risks remaining after application of the technology-based emission 
standards; (2) the public health impact of such remaining risks 
and the costs associated with any "technologically and commer-
cially available" methods of reducing such risks; (3) the actual 
health effects caused by these residual emissions with respect to 
persons living in the vicinity of such emissions, in light of any un-
certainties in risk assessment methodology; and (4) the agency's 
recommendations for addressing the remaining risks.37 
b. National Academy of Sciences' Report. 
To address the policy questions surrounding the issues of 
residual risk, Congress ordered the National Academy of Sciences 
to conduct an independent study of the EPA's risk assessment 
methods relating to hazardous air pollutants. Subsection 
112(0) (1) requires the EPA and the Academy to enter into an 
agreement to conduct a review of the agency's present risk assess-
ment methodology for carcinogens and to recommend improve-
ments.3S Specifically, Congress requested that the Academy 
consider the techniques used for "estimating and describing the 
carcinogenic potency to humans of hazardous air pollutants" and 
for estimating the exposure of various individuals, including "hypo-
37. Id. § 7412(f) (1). 
38. Id. § 7412(0)(1). 
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thetical and actual maximally exposed individuals," to hazardous 
air pollutants.39 In addition, Congress mandated that the Academy 
evaluate" [t] 0 the extent practicable" the methodology for assessing 
the risk of "adverse human health effects other than cancer for 
which safe thresholds of exposure may not exist, including, but not 
limited to, inheritable genetic mutations, birth defects, and repro-
ductive dysfunctions. "40 The Academy is to submit its report to the 
relevant Senate and House committees, the EPA, and the Risk As-
sessment and Management Commission (the Commission) estab-
lished by section 303 of the Amendments:n 
OnJanuary 19, 1994, the Academy's Committee on Risk Assess-
ment of Hazardous Air Pollutants issued a draft report pursuant to 
subsection 112 (0), entitled Science and Judgment in Risk Assessment.42 
The report calls on the EPA to express more emphasis on uncer-
tainties in the agency's risk assessments, and to devote more atten-
tion to chemical risks when there are multiple routes of exposure, 
multiple chemicals, and multiple possible adverse health effects.4s 
Members of the Executive Committee of the agency's Science Advi-
sory Board have criticized the Academy report for failing to evalu-
ate noncancer effects because of time limitations.44 These 
members argued that the Academy or EPA should examine immu-
nological, respiratory, reproductive, and neurological problems.45 
Richard Thomas, director of toxicology and risk assessment at the 
Academy, vnil soon begin a project to look at reproductive and de-
velopmental risk assessment. 46 
The limited scope of the Academy's report suggests the difficul-
ties that the EPA 'will have in developing national uniform residual 
risk emission standards for risks other than cancer. An exceptions 
process would provide the agency with the flexibility to impose ad-
39. Id. § 7412{o) (2). 
40. Id. § 7412{o) (3). This last provision regarding non cancer health effects is nota-
ble because, as will be discussed below, § 112(f) (2){A)'s residual risk pro\isions are 
mandatory only with respect to cancer risks. 
41. Id. § 7412{o)(4). 
42. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, ScIENCE AND JUDCMENT IN RIsK Ass£S&IEh'T 
(Draft 1994); Toxic Substances: Report Backs EPA Risk As.smment Mtlhods, Offm 70 Suggestions 
for Improvements, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1699 aan. 28, 1994) [hereinafter &port Badts EPA). 
43. Report Backs EPA, supra note 42, at 1699. 
44. Air PoUulion: Report on the HealJh Effects of Toxic PoUutants Should Address Non-amccr 
Problems, SAB Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1720 (Feb. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Non<ancCT 
Problems]. 
45. Id. 
46. Id. 
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ditional requirements at individual sites where noncancer effects 
are especially worrisome. 
Prior to the promulgation of any residual risk standard under 
subsection 112(f), the EPA must consider, but need not adopt, the 
Academy's recommendations. In addition, the Administrator must 
publish revised Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessment or a 
detailed explanation of the reasons why any recommendation in 
the Academy's report will not be implemented.47 
c. Risk Assessment and Management Commission Report. 
Subsection 303(a) of the Amendments established the Commis-
sion and assigned it the task of making a "full investigation of the 
policy implications and appropriate uses of risk assessment and risk 
management in regulatory programs under various federal laws to 
prevent cancer and other chronic human health effects which may 
result from exposure to hazardous substances. "48 Many of the fac-
tors that Congress required the Commission to consider, such as 
noncancer chronic health effects, the "existence of synergistic or 
antagonistic effects among hazardous substances," the "existence 
of unquantified direct or indirect effects on human health in risk 
assessment studies," and the "use of site-specific actual exposure 
information in setting emission standards," were ignored in the 
agency's pre-1990 regulation of hazardous air pollutants.49 
d. Residual Risk Standards. 
If Congress does not enact new legislation based on scientific 
reports of the adequacy of risk assessment, then the Administrator 
must determine for each category or subcategory whether addi-
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(0)(7). The publication of such revised Guidelines shall be con· 
sidered a final agency action for purposes of judicial review pursuant to § 307 of the Act. 
fd. 
48. fd. § 7412. Section 303 of the Amendments, which is referred to in § 112(0)(4) 
of the Act, is set out as a note to § 112. fd. § 7412 (Historical and Statutory Notes). 
49. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 303, 104 Stat. 2399, 
2575. Subsection 303(b)(l) mandates that the Commission consider the Academy report 
in evaluating the use and limitations of risk assessment in establishing emission or effiuent 
standards for hazardous substances that present a risk of carcinogenic effects or other 
chronic health effects. Subsection 303(b) (2) requires the Commission to consider the 
most appropriate methods for measuring and describing cancer risks or risks of other 
chronic health effects from hazardous substances considering various factors including 
"such alternative approaches as the lifetime risk of cancer or other effects to the individual 
or individuals most exposed to emissions from a source or sources on both an actual and 
worst case basis." 
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tional, more stringent residual risk requirements are needed to 
provide "an ample margin of safety to protect public health" or to 
protect against "an adverse environmental effect "so Senate bills 
816 and 1630 each would have required the EPA to promulgate 
emission standards eliminating lifetime cancer risks to the most ex-
posed individual greater than one-in-a-million.51 In addition, both 
bills would have required the agency to close facilities that could 
not meet an interim one-in-10,000 standard for reducing all life-
time cancer risk. This one-in-10,OOO standard allowed for limited 
extensions but no exceptions.52 The final version of the Amend-
ments incorporated a one-in-one-million standard as the threshold 
for triggering further regulatory consideration and eliminated the 
mandatory one-in-10,OOO standard.53 
With regard to carcinogens, Section 112 (f) (2) (A) specifically 
defines the crucial phrase, "an ample margin of safety to protect 
the public health," to require the Administrator to promulgate a 
second phase of emission standards if technology-based controls 
do not reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the most exposed in-
dividual to less than one-in-one-million.54 The technology-based 
emission standards for each source category or subcategory are 
simple, uniform, national regulation. However, the residual risk 
provisions require the EPA to consider each category or subcat-
egory in light of a site-specific exposure assessment of the cancer 
risk at each individual major source. The EPA must then promul-
gate residual risk standards for categories and subcategories of 
50. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(f) (2) (A). The residual risk standard apparently must be at least 
as protective of the most exposed individual as the EPA's post-VinJI Chltnide policy, since 
the statute references the pre-1990 "ample margin of safety" definition. Id. 
5!. Senate Bill 816 stated this standard as "a standard which eliminates a1llifetime 
risks of carcinogenic effects greater than one in one million to the individual in the popu-
lation who is most exposed to emissions of a pollutant (or stream of pollutants) from a 
source in the category or subcategory." S. 816, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989) (proposed 
amendment to CAA § 112(f) (1»; Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 323-24. Senate Bill 1630 
adopted essentially the same test. See S. REP. No. 228, 10lst Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1990), 
reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.GAN. 3385, 3533 (discussing Section 301 of S. 1630, which re-
tained the two-tiered one-in-a-million and one-in-IO,OOO approaches). 
52. See S. 816, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. § 2 (1989) (proposed Amendment to CAA 
§§ 112(f) (1){A)(i)(1)-(2); S. REP. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 148 (1989), rtprinltd in 
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3385, 3533 (discussing interim one-in-10,OOO standard). 
53. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f) (2) (A); Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 326. 
54. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f) (2) (A); see also 136 CoNG. RE.c. S16,928 (dailyed. Oct. 27, 
1990) (statement of Sen. Durenberger) (combined hazardous emissions ofan entire major 
source are used in determining ample margin of safety); id. at £3711 (daily ed. No\·. 2, 
1990) (extension of remarks by Sen. Rowland) (ample margin of safety at least as protec-
tive as benzene regulations). 
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sources, however, rather than individual facilities.55 The text of the 
statute does not require that the residual risk standard for a cate-
gory be set at a level that would force the highest risk source in that 
category to achieve the one-in-one-million benchmark, but merely 
mandates an additional round of regulation.56 The statute, how-
ever, does not specify what risk requirements the agency must use 
in the second phase of standards, nor do the provisions provide 
any guidance on how to address risks from noncarcinogenic 
substances. 
Subsection 112(f) (2)(b) states that the amended section 112 
does not repudiate the EPA's pre-1990 interpretation of "an ample 
margin of safety" contained in the benzene rulemaking.57 In the 
benzene rulemaking, the EPA did not apply a one-in-one-million 
standard to the maximally exposed individual, but instead deter-
mined that a one-in-ten-thousand risk to the maximally exposed 
individual from a particular chemical was presumptively accepta-
ble.58 The agency also stated that as many people as possible 
should be protected from a one-in-one-million risk.59 In addition, 
the agency would look at other health and risk factors. 6o 
55. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2). 
56. See id § 7412(f) (2)(A); Wichers et aI., supra note 14, at 10,729. 
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2) (B). In the wake of Vinyl Chloride, the EPA issued final 
emission standards for several benzene and radionuclide categories, and, most notably, 
used a historical risk survey to set the "presumptive level" of maximum acceptable individ-
ual risk at one-in-l0,000. See National Emission Standards for Haz.'udous Air Pollut.mts 
(NESHAP); Benzene Emissions from Maleic Anhydride Plants, Ethyl Benzene Styrene 
Plants, Benzene Storage Vessels, Benzene Equipment Leaks, and Coke By-Product Recov-
ery Plants, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,044, 38,04546 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Benzene Standards] 
(describing how EPA selected its method for setting emission standards for benzene and 
radionuclide categories) (codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.270-.277, .110-.112, .130-.139 (1991). 
58. See 1989 Benzene Standards, supra note 57, at 38,044-46 (establishing one in ten 
thousand presumptive risk level); NESHAP; Benzene Emissions From Chemical Manufac-
turing Process Vents, Industrial Solvent Use, Benzene Waste Operations, Benzene Transfer 
Operations, and Gasoline Marketing System, 54 Fed. Reg. 38,083, 38,089, 38,091 (1989) 
[hereinafter Proposed Benzene Emissions Rule] (applying one-in-IO,OOO presumptive stan-
dard to certain sources of benzene emissions and benzene transfer operations); Rosenthal 
et aI., supra note 7, at 304. 
59. See Proposed Benzene Emissions Rule, supra note 58, at 38,091 ("The majority of 
the people (greater than 99.9 percent) exposed to benzene emissions from this category 
would be exposed to risk levels lower than [one-in-one-million]."); Rosenthal et aI., supra 
note 7, at 304. 
60. These factors include: (1) the overall incidence of cancer or other serious health 
effects within the exposed population, (2) the number of persons exposed within each 
individual lifetime range (such as a 50-kilometer exposure radius around the emitting facil-
ities), (3) the science and policy assumptions and estimation uncertainties associated with 
the risk measures, (4) the weight of the scientific evidence for human health effects, (5) 
other quantified or unquantified health effects, and (6) the effects resulting from co-Ioca-
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Critics of the benzene rulemaking have argued that it allows the 
EPA to retain consideration of economic and technological factors 
while nominally complying "with Vinyl Chloride's two-pronged test. 51 
In setting a particular "ample margin of safety," the EPA stated that 
it would seek to set a lifetime cancer risk level for hazardous air 
emissions at no greater than one-in-one-million, but noted that ad-
ditional factors such as technological feasibility and the economic 
costs of control would be considered.52 
By not requiring a one-in-a-million or any other residual risk 
standard in section 112 (f), Congress essentially left the difficult 
task of defining an "ample margin of safety" to the EPA's discre-
tion.63 Furthermore, the Senate Bill does not provide any direc-
tion on how the agency should address harmful noncarcinogens.61 
This Article's proposal would require Congress to provide more 
specific guidance to the EPA on residual risk standards. 
B. Risk, Hot Spots, Environmental Justice, and Multimedia Pollution 
1. Factual Backdrop. 
There are significant problems with the residual risk provisions 
for hazardous air pollutants. There is considerable scientific un-
certainty about the actual risks of most hazardous air pollutants, 
and great disagreements ensue about how to assess what little we 
know about risk. Thus, a single risk standard on a single scale 
poses problems. For example, the one-in-one-million standard in 
subsection 112(f) is misleading; a risk range more accurately re-
flects our uncertainties about risk. In addition, it is important to 
consider noncancer risks and to recognize the absence of good 
measures for comparing chemicals that cause fundamentally differ-
ent diseases. Society's uncertainty about the risks that many chemi-
cals pose exacerbates the difficult problems of preventing "hot-
spots" and multimedia pollution. 
Even setting aside the pervasive uncertainties about the risks of 
many hazardous chemicals, industry arguments that national, uni-
tion of facilities and co--emission of pollutants. 1989 Benzene Standards, supra note 57, at 
38,045-46. 
61. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 276; McQuaid, supra note 14, at 439, 446. But if. 
Gaines, supra note 25, at 295 ("The proposals and final rules that EPA has published since 
the Vinyl Chloride decision show no signs of procedural subversion, but they do reveal the 
tortured nature of a health-factors-only analysis."). 
62. See 1989 Benzene Standards, supra note 57, at 38,046. 
63. See 'Wichers et al., supra note 14, at 10,729. 
64.. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying texL 
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form regulation is inefficient because it results in over-regulation at 
some sites have merit. The difficulty lies in allowing some flexibil-
ity for individual sites without undermining national standards and 
pollution-reduction goals. Public participation can reduce the po-
tential dangers of allowing exceptions to technology-based or 
residual risk standards for air toxics. 
a. Scientific Uncertainty 
There are two major questions that need to be addressed in 
assessing the residual risk provisions and the proposal in this Arti-
cle. First, can we properly assess the risk of cancer and other dis-
eases caused by toxic chemicals?65 Second, is our inability to assess 
the risk of cancer and other diseases fatal to the proposal or the 
residual risk provisions, or is the uncertainty of this risk assessment 
of the same magnitude as for all toxic pollution?66 
There is considerable scientific uncertainty about most toxic 
chemicals.67 Unfortunately, for non-threshold chemicals at the 
lowest levels of risk,68 there is no accurate method of risk quantifi-
cation.69 Former EPA Administrator William Ruckelshaus popular-
65. See generaUy Gaines, supra note 25, at 272-90 (discussing scientific, political and 
legal uncertainties of risk assessment). 
66. Because risk assessment involves predicting future events, there will always be an 
element of uncertainty. See Alyson C. Flournoy, Legislating Inaction: Asking The Wrong Ques-
tions in Protective Environmental Decisionmaking, 15 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 328 (1991) (sug-
gesting a sliding-scale standard of proof that would base the stringency of regulatory 
restrictions on the amount of evidence that a substance "causes" a risk of harm). Because 
of our relative uncertainty about the risk of most toxic chemicals, this Article suggests that 
the extent of public participation in permit decisions should depend on the riskiness of 
the trade-off. 
67. There is scientific uncertainty in part because scientific information about the 
toxic effects of many toxic substances is relatively scarce. 
68. The distinction between regulation of risk and regulation of harm, and therefore 
the unreasonable risk standard, exists because of the difficulties in proving actual harm in 
toxic torts cases. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 267-73. "Risk is an expression of 
uncertainty; it is easier to prove than actual harm. Regulation based on risk permits regu-
latory action based on ex ante collective danger rather than ex post individual injury, and 
also operates preventively to avert injury to the public as a whole." Id. at 273. Congress has 
used the term "unreasonable risk" in slightly different ways in several different environ-
mental statutes, each with its own regulatory structure, but all basically adopt "an unde-
fined, nonzero level of risk determined on an ad hoc basis by balancing both health 
considerations and nonhealth concerns such as technology, feasibility, and cost." Id. at 268, 
267-77; see Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22, at 284-85; Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, 
at 305 (the TSCA and FIFRA statutes both use unreasonable risk standards, but their risk 
assessment practices are considerably different). Risk-based standards generally either 
openly or secretly look at technological and economic feasibility as well. See Applegate, 
Perils, supra note 31, at 268. 
69. See generaUy Gary P. Rosenblum & Steven Lapp, The Use of Risk Index Systems to 
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ized the distinction benveen "risk assessment"-the use of scientific 
research to define the likelihood of harm as a result of exposure to 
a substance or situation, and "risk management"-the process of 
deciding a course of action upon determination of risk.70 Follow-
ing the recommendations of a 1983 report of the National Re-
search Council,71 the EPA divides risk assessment into four stages: 
(1) hazard identification;72 (2) dose-response assessment;73 (3) ex-
posure assessment;74 and (4) risk characterization.75 Despite the 
Evaluate Risk, in RISK AssESSMENT IN NATIONAL PRiORfIY SETIlNG 190, 19()'93 Games J. 
Bonin & Donald E. Stevensen, eds., 1989); Applegate, nmt Things, supra note 22, at 325 
n.252. Some have suggested that society may never have precise knowledge that below a 
particular threshold of exposure a carcinogen may be safe, although it is ob\iously difficult 
to predict the limits of future scientific advances. In NRDC v. EPA. 824 F.2d 1146, 1165 
(D.C. Gir. 1987) (en bane) (Vinyl Chloride),Judge Bork stated that Congress in § 112 of the 
Clean Air Act had recognized that the "determination of what is 'safe' \\ill ahJ:ays be 
marked by scientific uncertainty and thus exhorted the Administrator to set emission stan-
dards that will provide an 'ample margin' of safety." Id. 
70. William Ruckelshaus, Risk in a Free Society, 14 Envtl. 1.. Rep. (Envtl. 1.. Inst.) 10,190 
(1984); see Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 27()'71. 
71. See generally NATIONAL REsEARCH CoUNCIL, RIsK AssESSMENT IN THE FEDERAL Gov-
ERNMENT: MANAGING THE PROCESS (1983); Rosenthal et al .• supra note 7. at 279-95; Mary 
Jean Sawey et al., Notes from the Field: The Potential Heahh Bentjils oJ ConlToUing Hazardous Air 
Pollutants, 1 VII.L. ENVIL. 1..J. 473, 479 (1990). 
72. Hazard identification involves a study of the weight of scientific evidence to deter-
mine whether or not a chemical or mixture poses a risk of adverse health effects to human 
beings. See Guidelines for Carcinogenic Risk Assessments, 51 Fed. Reg. 33,992. 33.994-
34,000 [hereinafter EPA Guidelines]; Rosenthal et al •• supra note 7. at 279-85. 
73. Dose-response assessment involves a study of the quantitative relationship be-
tween the amount of exposure to a chemical and the incidence or se\'Crity of resulting 
illness. It often involves extrapolating from evidence of cancer in animals from high expo-
sures in the laboratory to lower doses to which humans are exposed in the environment. 
See Rosenthal et al .• supra note 7. at 285-90. 
74. Exposure assessment involves a study of the number of people exposed to the 
chemical and their exposure profiles in terms of concentration. frequency, and duration. 
See EPA Guidelines. supra note 72, at 33.998; Guidelines for Exposure Assessment. 57 Fed. 
Reg. 22888 (1992) [hereinafter Exposure Assessment]; Rosenthal etal .• supra note 7, at 290-
93. A distinction needs to be made between risk assessments that examine the general 
health impacts of a chemical and site-specific exposure assessments that examine the hypo-
thetical or actual impacts of a particular source's emissions on the surrounding popula-
tion. Even if our generalized knowledge concerning a chemical is limited. it is still possible 
to acquire additional information about the impact from that chemical at a specific source. 
The use of site-specific exposure assessments is not intended to replace the need for addi-
tional testing of chemicals, however. See generally Applegate. Pails, supra note 31. at 261 
(calling for additional testing of toxic chemicals pursuant to Toxic Substances Control 
Act); Mary 1.. Lyndon, Informatwn.Economics and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws 10 Product 
and Use Data, 87 MICH. 1.. REv. 1795 (1989). 
75. Risk characterization involves calculating a summary of the o\'erall magnitude of 
health risk attributable to exposure to the chemical. including some discussion of the de-
gree of scientific uncertainty about the risk. See Rosenthal et al .• supra note 7, at 293-95. 
Generally. the assessor will multiply the cancer potency factor, which is usually expressed in 
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limitations of risk assessment, an entire consulting industry has de-
veloped to produce such studies.76 
To scientifically determine the health benefits of the Amend-
ments, society needs good risk assessments for each of the 189 
listed pollutants and a solid understanding of the synergistic effects 
of various combinations of these pollutants.77 Unfortunately, this 
ideal analytical strategy cannot be implemented with available ex-
posure and toxicity data. Therefore, it is not possible to produce a 
scientifically reliable estimate of section 112's potential health 
benefits.7s 
Science can provide useful information, but ultimately society 
must decide how to assess that information and to what extent it is 
worth acquiring information in light of relevant costs. 
b. Expert and Public Approaches to Risk Management. 
There are two common but opposing approaches to discussing 
risk management issues: the "expert" approach,79 which tends to 
emphasize formal benefit-cost analysis,SO and the "public" ap-
units of increased lifetime probability of cancer per kilogram of body weight per day of 
exposure, times estimated exposure, which is expressed in units of milligrams of carcino-
gen per kilogram of body weight per day. Id. at 293. The calculation leads to an estimate of 
the increase in the lifetime probability of cancer from the particular level of exposure. Id. 
76. See Sawey et aI., supra note 71, at 479; see generally JOHN D. GRAHAM ET AL., IN 
SEARCH OF SAFE1Y: CHEMICALS AND CANCER RISK (1988). 
77. See Sawey et al., supra note 71, at 482. 
78. Id. 
79. Some commentators have argued that "experts" tend to focus simply on the ex-
pected annual fatalities, or "body count," caused by a chemical, whereas the lay person Is 
often also concerned with additional factors. See generally Clayton P. Gillette & James E. 
Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 1027, 1071-85 (1990) (contrasting expert 
and public perceptions of risk); see also W. Kip VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS 44 (1992) (discuss-
ing difference between individuals incurring risk of nuclear power involuntarily versus coal 
miners cognizant of risks and who receive wage premiums for those risks): Donald T. 
Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of EnviTfJ1lmen-
tal Law Reform, 10 YALE]. ON REG. 369, 418-19 (1993) [hereinafter Hornstein, Politics of 
Environmental Law Refonn] (risk-based conceptualizations tend to undervalue subjective at-
tributes of risk that concern public); Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A 
Nonnative Critique of Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 CoLUM. L. REv. 562, 564, 584-615 (1992) 
[hereinafter Hornstein, A Nonnative Critique] (contrasting expert and public perceptions of 
risk). 
80. See generaUy Dwyer, supra note 16, at 248 (arguing explicit cost consideration over-
emphasizes the costs, which are more easily quantifiable, and underemphasizes health con-
cerns, which are difficult to quantify); Sidney A. Shapiro & Thomas O. McGarity, Not So 
Paradoxical: The Rationale fOT Technology-Based Regulation, 41 DUKE L.]. 729, 731-36, 741 (ar-
guing benefit-cost analysis is often based upon questionable assumptions and highly uncer-
tain information, fails to consider many benefits of health and safety regulation, masks 
distributional issues, underestimates the value of lives, and undercompensates workers), 
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proach,81 which advocates a nontechnocratic and more diverse def-
inition of relevant issues. 
The extent to which section 112 of the Act favors either the 
public or expert definition of risk will play an important role in the 
character of EPA regulation. The one-in-one-million residual risk 
standard in subsection 112(f) (2) (A) is a classic "body count" mea-
sure of environmental progress.82 The technology-based emissions 
standards in subsection 112(d) are not directly based on the 
number of expected fatalities, but reflect a narrow, technocratic 
approach to standard setting that is more reflective of the expert 
approach.83 On°the other hand, subsection 112(d)(2) allows the 
EPA to consider "any non-air quality health and environmental im-
pacts and energy requirements,"S4 and subsection 112(f) (2) (A) al-
lows the agency to set more stringent standards than the "ample 
margin of safety" test used before 1990, based upon "energy, safety, 
and other relevant factors .... "85 These two provisions, especially 
the phrase "other relevant factors," would appear to allow the EPA 
to adopt a more "public" definition of risk if the agency were so 
inclined. Because section 112 does not exclusively rely upon either 
the expert or public definitions of risk, the EPA has at least some 
discretion in which approach or combination of approaches to 
take. Subsection II.C and Sections ill and IV of this Article will 
address whether the EPA ought to have such discretion or whether 
Congress should provide more guidance on how the agency should 
manage risk. 
c. Carcinogens and Noncarcinogens. 
Carcinogenicity as a Flawed Metric. The one-in-one-million stan-
dard in subsection 112(f) is misleading because society cannot pre-
cisely assess cancer risks and therefore a risk range is more 
appropriate. The cancer risk assessments used by EPA have impor-
The bias toward overemphasizing costs may be exacerbated by informational biases be-
cause industry generally has the best information about the costs and feasibility of pollu-
tion controls. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 2480 Critics of the expert approach and offormal 
cost-benefit analysis suggest that the analytical methods of the technical approach may 
make it risk-preferring, in contrast to the public's risk aversion. Sa Gillette &: Krier, supra 
note 79, at 1060-61. 
81. See generally Gillette &: Krier, supra note 79, at 1071-85; Hornstein, A Norma/we 
Critique, supra note 79, at 584-615. 
82. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2)(A). 
83. See generally id. § 7412(d). 
84. Id. § 7412 (d) (2). 
85. Id. § 7412(f) (2)(A). 
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tant shortcomings. Some of the weaknesses are inherent in the in-
adequate state of environmental science while others are 
correctable with available data or alternative modeling proce-
dures.86 When hard data are lacking, the EPA may create a grossly 
inflated upper bound for actual cancer risk from specific pollu-
tants. Alternatively, EPA may create too Iowa bound despite con-
servative assumptions.87 In addition, the EPA's methods 
inadequately account for the possibility of synergistic and antago-
nistic effects of various pollutants,88 and the possibility of extra-
sensitive subpopulations for carcinogenic exposures.89 The EPA 
has used carcinogenicity as a common metric, but that single mea-
surement cannot provide scientific answers on what is an accepta-
ble cancer risk to diverse exposed subpopulations (such as 
children) or how to make tradeoffs between a pesticide that may 
present comparatively greater risks to consumers as opposed to 
lesser risks to farmworkers and applicators than would the most 
likely chemical replacement.9o Even if t:\vo different chemicals 
cause the same disease, they may produce effects that are more 
concentrated in time or space. Proponents of a "public" definition 
of risk would argue that even chemicals that cause the same disease 
cannot always be compared on a single scale based upon expected 
fatalities.91 In addition, there are often substantial differences in 
the weight of scientific evidence supporting whether a particular 
86. See GRAHAM ET AL., supra note 76, at 160. 
87. [d. at 149, 161. For example, an implicit assumption in the EPA method is that 
the amount of toxic pollutant or its toxic metabolites that reaches a target cell is propor-
tional to the amount of the pollutant inhaled, the so-called "administered dose." [d. at 
161. For some chemicals, pharmacokinetic data are now available that contradict this as-
sumption. [d. The EPA is beginning to use such data. [d. "Incorporation of new 
pharmacokinetic data could lead to either higher or lower risk estimates than EPA would 
normally report depending upon the specific chemica!." [d. at 162. New mechanistic dat., 
about the biological mechanisms of tumor formation in animals may lead to higher or 
lower estimates of cancer risk in human beings than does the EPA's traditional practice of 
simply extrapolating responses from rodents to human beings. [d. 
88. See id. at 163; &part Backs EPA, supra note 42, at 1699. 
89. See &pm Backs EPA, supra note 42, at 1699. 
90. See Hornstein, Politics of Environmental Law Refonn, supra note 79, at 441. 
91. For example, pesticide A may cause about 10 extra cancers a year while B has a 5 
percent chance of causing 100 extra cancers annually and a 95 percent chance of causing 
none. The "expert" approach would rate B to be half as harmful as A based upon the 
expected number of cancers, but the lay person might argue it is more important to avoid 
the worst case result and therefore might prefer A despite the likelihood that A will cause 
more deaths. See Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1083-84; Albert]. Nicholas & Richard]. 
Zeckhauser, The Perils of Prudence: How Conservative Risk Assessments Distm Regulation, REGu. 
lATlON, Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 13, 22·24; see also Hornstein, A Nonnative Critique, supra note 79, 
at 595-96 (providing similar example). Thus, whether it is acceptable to trade two units of 
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substance is carcinogenic.92 Thus, Congress needs to direct the 
EPA to adopt a more complex approach to assessing residual can-
cer risks. 
Noncarcinogens and the Lack oj Adequate Data. The residual risk 
provisions are seriously flawed because they do not consider non-
cancer risks. Congress' reluctance to address noncancer issues is 
understandable in light of the complexities associated with assess-
ing such risks and comparing them 'with cancer risks, but non-
cancer risks are too important to ignore. 
There are substantial uncertainties about the comparability of 
chemicals that cause different diseases, especially carcinogens and 
noncarcinogens.93 Noncancer effects range from subtle to 
B for one unit of A depends upon whether one accepts the expert model of risk or belieo.'eS 
that the lay person correctly senses that risk depends upon a number of complex factors. 
92. When assessing whether a chemical is a carcinogen, EPA scientists place each 
compound into one of the following five categories based on the weight of the evidence: 
(A) carcinogenic to humans: (B) probably carcinogenic to humans; (C) possibly carcino-
genic to humans: (D) not classifiable as to human carcinogenicity; (E) eo.idence of non-
carcinogenicity for humans. EPA Guidelines, supra note 72, at 33,994-34.000: Rosenthal et 
al .• supra note 7, at 282-83. In the early reductions rule. the EPA classified all Group A 
carcinogens as high-risk, and also placed some Group B and C chemicals on that list based 
upon a two-tiered analysis that examined both carcinogenic and noncarcinogenic health 
effects as well as exposure modeling. Compliance Extensions for Early Reductions, 57 Fed. 
Reg. 61,983 (1992) (to be codified at 40 G.F.R. pt. 63) [hereinafter Early Reductions Rule). 
A number of commentators argued that the EPA should adjust the weighting factor system 
used in the agency's risk index for averaging to reflect the weight of scientific C'tidence. leI. 
at 61,983. In the final rule, the EPA assigned a lower weight to Group C carcinogens. but 
rejected weighing Group B chemicals lower than Group A ones because there is solid eo.i-
dence of animal carcinogenicity for Group B chemicals, and the absence of conclusive 
human data "most likely" reflects the difficulty of obtaining quality epidemiologic data. !d. 
There are good reasons to argue, however, that at least some Group B chemicals that cause 
cancer in animals may not cause cancer in human beings and therefore should be 
weighted lower than Group A chemicals. Some critics of the EPA argue that agency scien-
tists give undue emphasis to positive evidence of carcinogenicity from long.tenn animal 
bioassays and do not include other types of scientific C'tidence that could change the 
weight of evidence classification. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 284. Because the 
EPA guidelines on hazard identification require that a finding of animal carcinogenicity be 
taken as possible or probable evidence of human carcinogenic potential, the EPA has diffi-
culty responding to new scientific data which suggest that some animal carcinogens do not 
pose risks to human beings. leI. For example, a number of h)'drocarbon compounds. in-
cluding unleaded gasoline, have been found to cause tumors in the kidneys of male rats. 
but recent scientific research suggests that the biological mechanism responsible may be 
unique to male rats and have no relevance to human beings. leI. at 284-85. The use of 
these tumors as a basis for human risk assessment is a source of ongoing contro\'ersy in the 
risk assessment community. leI. at 285. 
93. As a general matter, scientists simply do not have good measures for comparing 
carcinogens with noncarcinogens. See Witnesses oppose Avmzging, Trading Provisions in HON 
Proposal at Public Hearing in Louisiana, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 3045 (Mar. 26, 1993) [hereinaf-
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deadly.94 How can society compare the risks from chemicals that 
present risks of such noncancer "endpoints" as birth defects, repro-
ductive failure, acute poisonings, and neurological defects?95 
Although cancer risks currently dominate risk assessment and man-
agement agendas, concern for other health risks probably will in-
crease in the decades ahead.96 The EPA is beginning to study 
noncancer impacts, but this effort has been hampered by a lack of 
available data.97 
Emissions Averaging of Carcinogens and Noncarcinogens: Comparing 
the Incomparable. Unfortunately, at the end of the Bush administra-
tion, as part of its emissions averaging regulations for the early re-
ductions program, the EPA developed a risk index based upon 
arbitrary assumptions about the comparability of harm from car-
cinogens and noncarcinogens, in effect allowing increased emis-
sions of carcinogens to be offset by noncarcinogens.98 Two days 
ter Witnesses]. In the rule for the early reductions program, the EPA admitted: "For the 
carcinogens, the cancer potency factor is a straightfonvard measure of relative toxicity and 
was used in conjunction with the weight of evidence classification to develop the weighting 
factors. For the noncarcinogens, however, there is not a comparable measure of toxicity 
that can be used consistently for pollutants with different health effects." Early Reductions 
Rule, supra note 92, at 61,984. In the proposed rule for the synthetic organic chemical 
manufacturing industry, the agency conceded: "The EPA is not able at this time to quantify 
the noncancer effects so that they can be combined with the cancer health effects for the 
HON." Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufac-
turing Industry and Seven Other Processes, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,608 (1992) (to be codified at 
40 C.F.R pt. 63) (proposed Dec. 31,1992) [hereinafter Proposed HON]. 
94. U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, A STRATEGY TO REDUCE RIsKS TO Punuc H~TH 
FROM AIR TaXIes 1-9 (June 1985). 
95. Hornstein, Politics of Environmental Law Refqrm, supra note 79, at 441. 
96. While federal agencies are beginning to use quantitative risk assessment to assess 
such noncancer health effects as kidney damage, neurobehavioral deficits, and develop-
mental and reproductive effects, risk assessors still calculate and report cancer risks more 
frequently than non cancer risks. Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 271. In its major 1990 study, 
CANCER RISK FROM OUTDOOR EXPOSURE TO AIR TOXles, the EPA included the Executive 
Summary from a separate noncancer study as appendix C of the report. 
97. See II AIR TaXIes, supra note 94, at C74 to C75. The agency has stated, however, 
that, even though it cannot quantify the magnitude of noncancer risks, "ambient air con-
centrations of many pollutants may significantly contribute to potential noncancer health 
risks associated with environmental exposure." I AIR TaXIes, supra note 94, at C72. The 
National Academy of Sciences' most recent report on risk assessment of hazardous air 
pollutants was unable to review noncancer effects. 
98. See Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61,980-83; see also NESHAP for Source 
Categories: Proposed Regulations Governing Compliance Extensions for Early Reductions 
of Hazardous Air Pollutants, 56 Fed. Reg. 27,338 (1991) [hereafter Proposed Early Reduc-
tions]. The early reduction program allows an emission source a six-year waiver of require-
ments to meet the maximum achievable technology standards required by 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(d) if the source voluntarily reduces its hazardous air emissions by 90 percent or its 
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later, the agency also put fonvard a similar emissions averaging ap-
proach in the proposed national emission standard for hazardous 
air pollutants emitted by the synthetic organic chemical manufac-
turing industry.99 
The final rule published on April 22, 1994 for the synthetic or-
ganic manufacturing industry, however, significantly changed the 
emissions averaging proposal.100 It will be useful to examine both 
hazardous particulate emissions by 95 percent on or before January I, 1994. Sit: id. 
§ 7412(i} (5); David P. Novello &: RobertJ. MartineauJr., BtUer Earlier Than lAter: EPA ~ Air 
Toxies 'Early Reductions' Program, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 401 (July 2, 1993); Air Pollution: Pr0po-
sal on Hazardous Organic Emissions, Final Early Reduction Rules lsrud. by EPA, 23 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1707 (Nov. 6, 1992) [hereinafter Proposalj. As partofits regulations concerning the 
early reductions program, the EPA adopted a weighted emissions trading scheme in which 
a source can offset increases in high-risk hazardous air pollutants by larger \'Olume de-
creases in low-risk hazardous air pollutants based upon a risk index that assigns weighting 
factors to each of 47 different pollutants. See generally Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, 
at 61,980-85. Environmentalists have attacked the EPA's risk index because they contend it 
is impossible to compare on a single risk index different hazardous air pollutants, espe-
cially noncarcinogens that cause different diseases. S«, e.g., Witnesses, supra note 93, at 
3045 (statements by Natural Resources Defense Council auorney David Driesen and other 
environmentalists). In the early reductions regulations, the EPA made a number of ques-
tionable simplifying assumptions including assuming that most so-called "high.risk- non-
carcinogens have the same weighting factor of 10 assigned to 19 high-risk carcinogens and 
that other noncarcinogens and carcinogens not on the agency's high·risk list have a weight 
of one for trading purposes. See Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61,970, 61,983-84; 
Proposed Early Reductions, supra, at 27,354055. In the final rule, after considerable criti-
cism of the agency's approach to assigning weighting factors to both carcinogens and non-
carcinogens, the EPA increased the weighting factor from 10 to 100 for three 
noncarcinogens: for mercury because of its persistence in the environment and potential 
for bioaccumulation, and acrolein and 2-chloroacetophenone to provide an adequate mar-
gin of safety from adverse health impacts. Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61,970, 
61,983. The EPA failed to address adequately e\'en the body count comparisons between 
carcinogens and noncarcinogens, let alone more difficult questions such as whether it is 
appropriate to equate deaths from carcinogens with deaths from other diseases or how to 
compare chemicals causing long-term chronic illnesses with those causing deaths in the 
short-term. 
The Clinton Administration's EPA has clearly taken a diffcrent approach to emissions 
averaging of hazardous air pollutants and comparing carcinogens and noncarcinogens 
than the Bush Administration. In the proposcd rulc governing plant modifications, the 
EPA now implicitly criticizes the weighting approach adopted in the early reductions rule 
arguing that this approach "was not intendcd to SCl"\'e as a precedent for other programs-
and specifically states that "the weighting factors of onc and 10 for non<arcinogens, which 
were based upon a broad policy decision for the early reductions program, are inadequate 
for describing the differences in potency or scverity bctwcen pollutants for purposes of 
offset comparisons under § 112(g). The actual difference in potency between the non-
carcinogens could span many orders of magnitude.- Hazardous Air Pollutants: Proposed 
Regulations Governing Constructed, Reconstructed or Modified Major Sources, 59 Fed. 
Reg. 15,504, 15,563 (Apr. 1, 1994). 
99. See Proposed HON, supra note 93, at 62,631. 
100. Final HON Rule Could Cut Toxic Emissions From Chemical Manufacturing By 90 %, 24 
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the proposals considered by the EPA as well as the final rule. 
The Clinton Administration's EPA reopened public comment 
on the standard for the synthetic organic chemical manufacturing 
industry, and requested comment on five possible changes in the 
emissions averaging pOlicy.lOl One possible change would have re-
quired facilities considering averaging to demonstrate that it would 
not result in increased risk; such an individualized risk assessment 
would be similar to this Article's proposal for sources seeking a va-
riance from technology-based standards.lo2 The risk assessment 
policies developed for approving emissions averaging would likely 
prove helpful in developing regulations based on this Article's pro-
posal. Because "many states have and use their own risk assessment 
policies and tools, these states and local agencies would be author-
ized under this possible change to utilize not only the EPA gui-
dance, but also any procedures approved by their own agencies, for 
analyzing the risk equivalence of the compliance scenarios with 
and without averaging."103 The EPA requested comment on 
whether identifying all the hazardous air pollutants in the emis-
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1883, 1883 (Mar. 4, 1994) [hereinafter Final HON Rule). The final rule 
was published just as this Article was sent to the printer. National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Source Categories; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants from 
the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry and Other Processes Subject to 
the Negotiated Regulation for Equipment Leaks, 59 Fed. Reg. 19,402 (April 22, 1994) 
[hereinafter Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule). The final rule will be addressed in an 
abbreviated discussion. 
101. The first possible change would have given states the authority to omit the emis-
sions averaging provisions without having to go through the § 112(1) rule delegation pro-
cess, even if the state's statutory provisions do not grant the state authority to elect 
requirements that are more stringent than the federal standards. See NESHAP: Organic 
Hazardous Air Pollutants From the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturing Industry 
and Seven Other Processes, 58 Fed. Reg. 53,478 (1993) [hereinafter Reopening Public 
Comment); Comment Sought on Fwe Possible Changes To Emissions Averaging Policy in HON 
Proposal, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1172 (Oct. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Five Possible Changes). The 
second possible change would have required those facilities considering an averaging plan 
to demonstrate it would not result in a greater risk than trying to comply without averag-
ing. The third possible change involved the compliance period for emissions averaging; 
the fourth would have limited the number of emission points allowed in an average. and 
the fifth would have addressed the effect of missing monitoring data or parameter ex-
ceedances on averaging. Reopening Public Comment, supra, at 53,479. 
102. Reopening Public Comment, supra note 101, at 53,479. To aid in the implemen-
tation of this requirement, the EPA considered publishing guidance setting forth examples 
of what would constitute an adequate risk equivalency demonstration and requested public 
comment on whether such guidance would be useful or necessary to implement the risk 
demonstration requirement. ld. The decision to approve or disapprove any particular 
averaging plan would rest with the agency implementing the emission standard, in most 
cases a state or local air pollution control agency. ld. at 53,480. 
103. ld. 
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sions streams would pose difficulties for sources. Predictably, in-
dustry opposed giving states more discretion in determining the 
conditions for emissions averaging, arguing that the EPA should 
use uniform federal standards to facilitate emissions averaging.104 
On November 29, 1993, Mary Nichols, EPA assistant administra-
tor for air and radiation, stated that a majority of states are ex-
pected to prohibit emissions averaging of air toxies and that the 
Clinton Administration would not force such averaging. lOS In 
states allowing emissions averaging, Nichols indicated that the the 
procedures would be carefully controlled, especially because syn-
thetic organic chemical manufacturing facilities tend to be concen-
trated near low-income communities.lo6 She acknowledged that 
industry has legitimate concerns about uniformity, but argued that 
"a chemical facility situated in a large field in a rural area has a 
'quite different impact from one sitting in a complex in the middle 
of a large urban area' and should be treated differently."lo7 
On March 1, 1994, EPA Administrator Carol M. Browner an-
nounced that the EPA would soon issue a final rule on hazardous 
air emissions from chemical manufacturing plants, and on April 
22, 1994, the agency published the rule in the Federal Register.10S 
The final rule limits averaging to emission points 'within the syn-
thetic chemical manufacturing source category and also restricts 
the number of points to twenty or twenty-five among which averag-
ing may be conducted.lOO Most importantly, facilities choosing to 
average their emissions would have to perform a risk assessment to 
ensure that a net overall reduction in hazardous air emissions is 
achieved and that public health and the environment are pro-
tectedYo The risk assessment required to justify emission averag-
104. Plan to Give States Discrelion on Averaging oj Toxic Emissions Mttls Indush] opposi-
tion, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1464, 1464-65 (Dec. 3, 1993). 
105. StatesExpected to Avoid Averogingon Air Toxics, Agtncy 's Air ChiifSays, 24 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 1474, 1474 (Dec. 3, 1993). 
106. Id. The EPA has recently become concerned about the potentially disparate 
impacts of toxic pollution on low-income and especially minority neighborhoods. 
107. Id. at 1475. 
108. Rnal HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule, 
supra note 100. A discount factor of 10% is required in calculating credits for emissions 
averages in the final rule. An exception is provided for reductions accomplished by the 
use of pollution prevention measures. For pollution pre,·ention measures full credit \\ith 
no discounting is allowed. 
109. Rnal HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule, 
supra note 100, at 19,408. 
110. Rnal HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883; Organic Hazardous Air Pollutants Rule, 
supra note 100, at 19,408. 
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ing would be similar in many respects to the risk assessment 
proposed in this article to obtain an exception and therefore the 
adoption of a risk assessment requirement for emission averaging 
in one major industry suggests that this Article's proposal would be 
feasible for at least some industries. Some environmentalists, how-
ever, continue to criticize emission averaging. Although states are 
not required to adopt averaging, environmentalists fear that the 
chemical industry will pressure states to adopt averaging. I II 
Noncarcinogens and the Legislative History of the 1990 Amendments. 
There is some evidence in the legislative history of the Amend-
ments and in the statute itself that Congress intended to treat car-
cinogens and noncarcinogens differently. Section 301 of Senate 
Bill 1630, in addition to requiring EPA to promulgate residual risk 
standards for carcinogens, would have amended section 112 of the 
Act "to promulgate a second round of standards for hazardous pol-
lutants other than carcinogens where [technology-based] standards do 
not reduce emissions to a level below the 'safe' threshold (the 'no 
observable effects level' with an ample margin of safety), if a 
threshold can be identified .... "112 
The Amendments created a new subsection 112(g), which al-
lows a source to avoid classification as a modified source if in-
creases in one hazardous air pollutant are offset "by an equal or 
greater decrease in the quantity of emissions of another hazardous 
air pollutant (or pollutants) from such source which is deemed 
more hazardous, pursuant to guidance issued by the Administrator 
under subparagraph (B)."113 Notably, the statute requires that 
Ill. Final HON Rule, supra note 100, at 1883-84. 
112. S. REp. No. 228, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 149 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
3385, 3534 (emphasis supplied). 
113. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g) (1) (A). "The offset program applies only to modifications, 
and not to the construction or reconstruction of new sources." Henry A. Waxman, An 
Overview of the Clean Air Amendments of 1990,21 ENVrL. L. 1721, 178().81 n.269 (1991). In 
this article, Representative Waxman argues, "When EPA promulgates its regulations, it 
should require that the offsetting reductions occur within that same unit as the emission 
increase. For purposes of§ 112 (g) (1), 'source' should be interpreted to refer to the 'unit,' 
not the entire facility." [d. One must ask to what extent Representative Waxman's views are 
authoritative; presumably a law review article counts less than actual remarks before 
Congress. 
Subsection 112 (g) (1) (B) requires the EPA to publish guidance within 18 months after 
November IS, 1990, the enactment date of the Amendments, which deadline the agency 
failed to meet, regarding the implementation of this subsection. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(g) (1) (B). 
The EPA has issued a proposed rule on plant modifications that would impose strin-
gent controls if a plant exceeded de minimis levels set forth in the rule. See generally Hazard-
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such EPA guidance consider the relative hazard to human health 
resulting from the emissions of" each" of the 189 hazardous air pol-
lutants listed in subsection 112 (b).ll" Further, subsection 
112 (g) (1) (B) states that the guidance shall not authorize offsets 
between pollutants where the increased pollutant "causes adverse 
effects to human health for which no safety threshold for eh-posure 
can be determined unless there are corresponding decreases in 
such types of pollutant(s) ."115 This provision's reference to types of 
pollutants might be read to preclude offsetting increases in emis-
sions of a carcinogen with decreases in non-carcinogens.11G 
The residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) (2) (A) require 
the EPA to promulgate a second round of standards if the technol-
ogy-based standards in subsection 112 (d) "do not reduce lifetime 
excess cancer risks to the individual most exposed to emissions from 
a source in the category or subcategory to less than one in one 
million,"117 but do not specifically address noncancer risks. us Sec-
ous Air Pollutants: Proposed Regulations Governing Constructed, Reconstructed, or 
Modified Major Sources, 59 Fed. Reg. 15,504 (Apr. I, 1994) [hereinafter Proposed Regma. 
tions];Proposed Rule on Plant Modijicalwns Sets De Minimis Levels thal Trigger MACT. 24 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 1915 (Mar. 11, 1994) [hereinafter Proposed Rule on Plant Modificalions]. In addi-
tion, the proposed rule would allow increases in one pollutant to be offset by a decrease in 
another "more hazardous" substance, a form ofinterpollutant trading that may prove to be 
very contentious. Proposed Rule on Plant ModijicalWns, supra. at 1916. The proposed rule 
discusses a number of different approaches to weighting different types of chemicals for 
offsetting purposes, and taking into account noncancer effects. Proposed Regulations, 
supra, at 15,548-63. The proposed rule implicitly criticizes the weighting approach 
adopted in the early reductions rule and strongly suggests that the Clinton Administra-
tion's EPA has taken a different approach to emissions averaging of hazardous air pollu-
tants and comparing carcinogens and noncarcinogens than the Bush Administration. Ste 
id. at 15,563. 
114. 42 u.s.c. § 7412(g)(1)(B) (emphasis supplied). 
115. fd. (emphasis supplied). 
116. One commentator has suggested that, because of the provision's reference to 
types of pollutants, it may preclude offsetting increases in emissions of a carcinogen \\ith 
decreases in non-carcinogens. Russell S. Frye, Corporrm Cautions in the lmplcnmlalion of Air 
Toxies Provisions, in IMPLEMENTING THE 1990 Cu:AN AlR Ac:r: THE RACE fOR REGUlATIONS 
295,301 (1991) (ALI-ABA Course No. 661, 1991). The EPA recently published a proposed 
rule discussing a number of approaches to comparing different chemicals for offsetting 
purposes. Proposed Regulations, supra note 113, at 15,548-63. 
117. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(f) (2)(A). 
118. Subsections 112(f) (2)(B) and 112(d)(4) authorize the EPA to apply a different 
approach than the two phases of technolog)'-based and then residual risk regulation for 
the small number of chemicals for which the EPA had already promulgated health stan-
dards based on the ample margin of safety language in effect prior to 1990. Sa id. 
§§ 7412 (d) (4), 7412(f) (2) (B). Mercury is one noncarcinogen affected by these pro\isions. 
but most noncarcinogens or carcinogens are unaffected. Sa40 C.F.R. § 61.52 (1993) (mer-
cury emission standard). 
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tion IV of this Article will discuss how Congress might provide gui-
dance to the EPA on how to regulate noncarcinogens. 
d. "Hot-Spots." 
Both marketable permit systems and technology-based forms of 
regulation are usually designed to reduce aggregate pollution or 
risk without forcing a particular level of control at any given facility 
or locationY9 Consequently, "hot-spots," relatively high concen-
trations of particular pollutants, may accumulate in small areas 
within the larger pollution control region.120 Some pollutants do 
not have significant site-specific impacts, but others create local-
ized pollution problems around the emitting source.121 
The Amendments do not adequately address this problem. 
The EPA will promulgate subsection 112(f) residual risk standards 
for categories or subcategories of industries rather than individual 
sources.122 The one-in-one-million screening standard in subsec-
tion 112(f) (2) places some limits on "hot-spots," but residual risk 
requirements only address the overall cancer risks of a source's 
combined emissions of hazardous air pollutants, and do not mea-
sure the impact of specific pollutants on particular population 
groups living around an individual source, including noncarci-
nogenic chemicals. 
A more specific program is needed to address "hot-spots." Site-
specific exposure assessments are one way to identify "hot-spot" 
problems at a particular facility. Of course, such assessments will 
require standards for deciding when a particular pollutant poses 
119. See Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 
STAN. L. REv. 1333, 1350 (1985). 
120. See generaUy California Air Toxics "Hot Spots" Information and Assessment Act of 
1987, CAL. HEALTH & SAFElY CODE §§ 44300-44384 (West Supp. 1994). 
121. Some air pollutants do not have significant site-specific impacts; for example, 
volatile organic compounds that can contribute to the formation of ozone. See RICHARD A. 
LIROFF, REFORMING AIR POllUTION REGULATION: THE TOIL AND TROUBLE OF EPA's BUDDLE 
590 n.* (1986). Nonindustrial sources playa major role. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra 
note 119, at 1356 n.53 (citing E. IiAEMISEGGER, THE AIR TOXIC PRODLEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES: AN ANALYSIS OF CANCER RISKS FOR SELECTED POLLUTANTS (EPA-450/1-85-001 
(1985»; AIR TOXICS, supra note 94. In addition, carbon monoxide can create "hot-spots" 
in or near tunnels and also around major intersections where motor vehicle traffic is heavi-
est. Henry A. Waxman et aI., Roadmap to Title I of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990: 
Bringing Blue Skies Back to Americas Cities, 21 ENVrL. L. 1843, 1902 (1991). 
122. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2). Residual risk emission standards are issued for catego-
ries and subcategories ofindustries even though the one-in-one-million screening criterion 
for triggering the issuance of such standards is based upon individual plants within the 
category or subcategory. Id. 
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excessive risk. In addition, public participation may be especially 
important when a "hot-spot" problem threatens people living in 
the vicinity of a plant. 
e. EnvironmentalJustice Concerns. 
In recent years, there has been enormous controversy about 
whether "locally undesirable land uses" such as toxic waste landfills 
or sources of air toxies are disproportionately located in poor and 
minority neighborhoods.123 For example, there is evidence that 
synthetic organic chemical manufacturing plants tend to be con-
centrated in poor neighborhoods.124 While there is significant evi-
dence of disproportionate siting, the evidence does not establish 
whether the siting process itself, rather than market forces such as 
residential mobility, cause the disparity.l25 Furthermore, method-
ological problems with existing studies call into question their va-
123. See generally Vicki Been. What!f Fairness Got To Do With It? Environmental Justia and 
tlzesitingoJLocally UruksirahleLAnd Uses. 78 CoRNEll. 1.. REv. 1001. 1002~3 (1993). There is 
also evidence that cleanups occur more quickly and fines against polluters are higher in 
predominantly white areas. Poor Blacks Hope 10 Halt Planl.s: EPA to Investigate AlkgatitmS that 
Rights were Vwlated, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER. Dec. 20. 1993. atAS [hereinafter Poor BlacJu]. On 
February 11. 1994. President Clinton signed Executive Order 12898. which requires gO\" 
ernment agencies to develop policies to ensure that! (1) minorities and low·income popu-
lations have access to public information related to the human health and em;ronment; 
(2) agencies conduct activities related to the health and environment in a manner that 
does not discriminate against low-income and minority populations; and (3) agencies con-
sider disproportionate health effects in conducting research and coUecting data. Sa gener-
ally Federal Actions to Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-
Income Populations. Exec. Order No. 12.898. 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994). This Article's 
proposal would require firms seeking exceptions from national standards to address em;' 
ronmental justice issues and would also allow citizens to raise these issues when a firm 
applies for a permit to emit hazardous air pollutants. 
A full discussion of whether environmental racism exists, and of possible legal reme-
dies, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
124. Stales Expected 10 Avoid Averaging on Air Toxies, Agmq!f Air ChiLJ SaJs. supra note 
105, at 1474. 
125. Been. supra note 123. at 1014. Professor Been recently published an article ex-
amining empirical evidence for the market dynamics hypothesis. Vicki Been. Locally Unck-
sirable LAnd Uses in Minority NeirJWorhoods: Dispropartionale Siting or Marna Dynamics?, 103 
YALE LJ. 1383 (1994). 'While her evidence is inconclusive. two reports funded by business 
interests have challenged claims that plants specializing in the treatment, storage, and dis-
posal of hazardous waste are more apt to be found in minority neighborhoods; a study by 
University of Massachusetts researchers using Census tracts concluded that such facilities 
are more likely to be found in working-class. white neighborhoods than in minority com-
munities. Two RepOTts Dispute Claims that Siting oj Commmial Fadlilics Discriminatory. 24 Env't 
Rep. (BNA) 2100, 21O~1 (Apr. 15. 1994). This Article's proposal for an "exceptions pro-
cess" is designed to reduce the risk to exposed populations regardless of whether the initial 
siting process was discriminatory. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 292 1994
292 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:263 
lidity.126 In any case, the justice concerns need to be considered in 
any proposal for amending the Clean Air Act's section 112, since 
such amendments will have a greater impact on low-income 
communities. 
Residual risk standards under subsection 112 (f) do not specifi-
cally address siting issues.127 An important question is to what ex-
tent residual risk standards should take into account issues such as 
potentially disparate impacts on poor people and minorities. At 
least in theory, particular subpopulations may be disparately af-
fected by certain toxic substances.128 The more difficult question is 
whether the air toxics program should seek to reduce the tendency 
of plants to locate in poor and minority neighborhoods. This Arti-
cle proposes an increase in the level of agency scrutiny. An in-
creased burden should be applied to an applicant when a variance 
is sought for a facility located in a "poor" or "minority" neighbor-
hood.129 This Article will not, however, directly attempt the far 
more socially complex task of forcing new sources to locate, or ex-
isting sources to relocate, in non-minority or relatively wealthy 
neighborhoods. ISO Site-specific exposure assessments could deter-
mine who is being affected by a facility's emissions of air toxies and 
would be more precise than current research defining minority 
neighborhoods in terms of census tracts or zip codes. This Arti-
cle's proposal would indirectly address distributional inequities by 
126. Been, supra note 123, at 1014-15 ("some studies define neighborhood as broadly 
as a municipality, while others use census tracts or zip code areas, and some draw concen-
tric circles around LULUs [Locally Undesirable Land Uses].") (citations omitted). 
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(1). 
128. Taking into account the fact that Mrican-Americans have statistically poorer 
health than whites raises difficult questions about whether equality of treatment or equality 
of results is required. See Been, supra note 123, at 1035. This Article's proposal would 
emphasize examples where there is scientific evidence, for example, that Mrican-Ameri-
cans are disproportionately affected by a specific chemical or disease rather than simple 
statistical differences among groups in their overall health. 
129. For example, the EPA is currently investigating plans to build a hazardous waste 
incinerator in Carville, Louisiana because there are already ten hazardous facilities in a six-
mile area, the population is predominantly minority, and toxic emissions around Carville 
are more than three times the state average. POIJT Blacks, supra note 123, at A8. Dan Borne, 
president of the Louisiana Chemical Association, argues that there was no intent on the 
part of industry to discriminate against minorities, but that industry had located in this 
area because of the availability of natural gas, the Mississippi River for transportation, and 
large acreage at a reasonable price. Id. 
130. Such a relocation program raises complex issues about defining a "fair" siting 
process and perhaps even more complex questions about how to achieve such fairness 
when fair siting proposals run counter to the free-market ideology of the United States. See 
generally Been, supra note 123, at 1008-09, 1015-85. 
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providing technical assistance grants to citizen groups to enable 
them to challenge agency standards or industry variance 
applications. 
f. Multimedia and Indirect Effects. 
The residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) (2) do not ad-
dress potential multimedia and indirect impacts. These omissions 
are not surprising because both problems have virtually been ig-
nored until recently. In the past the EPA has largely approached 
each medium problem separately: air, water, pesticides and land 
disposal.l Sl For example, rulemaking normally originates in the 
four media program offices, which are sometimes referred to as 
the "lead offices,» under the four assistant administrators with 
rulemaking responsibility. Until recently single-medium program 
offices did not spend much time thinking about the effects of their 
regulations on media that are regulated by other program of-
fices. lS2 In large part, Congress in the past enacted statutes requir-
ing the agency to focus on each medium separately. ISS The 
National Environmental Policy Act and Toxic Substances Control 
Act in theory are supposed to bring an integrated approach to en-
vironmental management, but they have had little real impact on 
the EPA's media policies.lM 
131. See generally Laxshman Guruswamy, Integrating Thoughlu!ays: &opming of the En-
vironmental Mind, 1989 WIS. L REv. 463, 467-69, 476-79, 488-92, 516; Inttgrattd Pollution 
Control: A Symposium, 22 ENVIL. L 1 (1992). 
132. See Thomas O. McGarity, TheInUmalStruclrmoJEPA Ru/mwking. 54 LAw & CoN-
TEMP. PROBS. 57, 70, 85-86 (1991). 
133. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 467, 471, 476-79, 49()'92 (media stat-
utes generally do not consider multimedia impacts). 
134. Read literally, the National Environmental Protection Act would appear to re-
quire the EPA to consider multimedia impacts when the agency issues rules ha\ing a signif-
icant impact on the environment See Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 477-78, 49()'92. But 
Congress has provided major exceptions and courts have largely accepted the argument 
that certain provisions in the media statutes are the "Cunctional equh-alent- of an assess-
ment. 33 U.S.C. § 1371(c)(1) (Clean Water Act exempts EPA from impact assessments 
except for municipal waste water treatment grants and permits Cor discharges by new 
sources); 15 U.S.G. § 793(c) (1) (Clean Air Act generally exempts EPA Crom en\ironmenL.-u 
impact requirements). Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 381, 384-85 
(D.G. Gir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974) (holding § III oC Clean Air Act consti-
tuted a functional equivalent of impact statement and therefore exempted EPA Crom 
NEPA; strict Act timetables another consideration); Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 477-79, 
484-87, 491-92. 
Professor Guruswamy argues that the Toxic Substances Control Act could be used to 
move towards the administrative implementation of an integrated approach. See grnaallJ 
Guruswamy, supra note 131, at 522-30. 
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A number of commentators have argued in general for an inte-
grated approach to pollution control that would tackle problems 
on a multimedia basis because controls on air pollutants often sim-
ply result in the discharge of these chemicals into sewers or land-
fills without reducing the overall number of harmful substances 
released into the environment.135 Little research has been done 
regarding the potential multimedia impacts of air toxics, but the 
Amoco-EPA study discussed below in Subsection III.B.2.e suggests 
that regulatory policies should take a more multimedia approach 
in addressing the risks from hazardous air pollutants. For instance, 
let us suppose that production changes necessary to reduce emis-
sions of hazardous air pollutants below the one-in-one-million 
threshold result in more sludge for landfills or the discharge of 
more water effluent. There is nothing in the residual risk provi-
sions to address these types of issues. Nor is it clear that the one-in-
one-million standard adequately considers the impact of hazardous 
air pollutants on other media. For example, there is no require-
ment for a risk assessment to determine the indirect impacts of 
emissions that enter the food chain and are eventually ingested by 
humans. 
Partly in response to controversy over an incinerator in East Liv-
erpool, Ohio, the Clinton administration imposed new restrictions 
on hazardous waste incinerators, including requiring a site-specific 
risk assessment prior to issuing combustion permits. IS6 EPA head 
Carol Browner has promised to increase "public participation" in 
the approval process, a policy this Article believes should be ap-
plied in general to sources of hazardous air pollutants. IS7 The EPA 
will require full risk assessments, including assessment of the risk of 
indirect exposure to emissions through the ingestion of chemicals 
that reach the food chain, as part of all new hazardous waste incin-
erator permits and also includes industrial furnaces and boilers 
that bum the waste as a fuel. 138 Some EPA regional offices are 
135. See generally Guruswamy, supra note 13I. 
136. See EPA Draft Strategy for Combustion of Hazardous Waste in Incinerator and 
Boilers; Interim Final Guidance on Waste Minimization for Hazardous Waste Generators 
(May 18,1993), reprinted in 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 157,160 (May 21,1993) [hereinafter EPA 
Draft Strategy] (site-specific risk assessments); Timothy Noah, EPA Unveils Plans to Curb 
Incinerators of Hazardous Waste by Blocking Growth, WALL ST.]., May 19, 1993, at 86; Tempo-
rary CaPacity Freeze' Announced By EPA On New Hazardous Waste Incinerators, 24 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 131 (May 21, 1993) [hereinafter Temporary Capacity Freeze1, 
137. Noah, supra note 136, at B6. 
138. See EPA Draft Strategy, supra note 136; Pennit for $120 Million Incinerator Requires 
Risk Ass=ment, Tight Controls, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 243 Uune 4, 1993) (In response to new 
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currently conducting indirect risk assessment 159 The EPA has re-
leased a draft addendum updating its approach to indirect risk as-
sessment. 140 Don R Clay, who served as EPA assistant 
administrator for solid waste and emergency response during the 
Bush administration, has predicted that the Clinton administration 
will expand the use of indirect risk assessment in future rulemak-
ing and has observed that such a policy would "add another two to 
three orders of magnitude of increased risk."141 
The EPA has recently proposed strict paper-industry regula-
tions that combine air and water requirements for the first time 
rather than addressing them separately.142 The so-called cluster 
rule takes what the EPA terms an "ecosystem-wide" approach to 
reduce and prevent discharges of dioxin and other toxic pollu-
tants.l43 According to the EPA, the rule will "virtually eliminate" all 
dioxin discharges into rivers and other surface waters, and will cut 
toxic air emissions by roughly 70%.144 Industry has argued that the 
proposed rule is too costly and will force some older plants to 
EPA guidelines, Texas Water Commission ordered firm to cany out comprehensi\'e assess-
ment of risk posed by the facility as well as risk from potential indirect routes of exposure); 
'Temporary Capacity Freae~ supra note 136, at 131; Use oJ IndiTta IWk Assessmml LiklJ in 
Future Rule-Making. Former Official Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 262 Uune II, 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Former Official Says]. 
139. Officials from Regions I, IV, and V are conducting indirect risk assessments on 
selected hazardous waste combustion facilities seeking final permits or permit modifica-
tions. Hazardous Waste: Indirect IWk Assessments Gel Coopmuion From Facilities Despite Conams 
Over Timing, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1724, 1724 (Feb. 4, 1994). It is not clear whether the 
other seven EPA regions also are collecting data for the indirect risk assessments. ItL 
140. In November, 1993, the EPA released a draft addendum to the 1990 Methodol-
ogy for Assessing Health Risks Associated with Indirect Exposure to Combustor Emissions. 
Id. The Science Advisory Board's Human Exposure Committee is re\ie\\ing the draft ad-
dendum and has drafted a letter to EPA Administrator Browner expressing serious con-
cerns. Id.; Hazardous Waste: Indirect IWk Assessmenl Draft Addendum Calkd Dtjicimt in SAn 
Letter to Browner, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1723 (Feb. 4, 1994) (Human Exposure Committee 
stated draft addendum relies too much on default data, with little validation, lacks informa-
tion on the occurrences and effects of upset e\'ents such as natural disasters or accidents, 
does not consider cumulative impacts from existing facilities in addition to the impacts 
from a single plant, and should look at regional impacts beyond 50 kilometers from the 
facility boundary). Industry and state officials have argued that the EPA should signifi-
cantly modify its draft guidance before the agency makes indirect risk assessments a permit 
requirement. Hazardous Waste: Draft Guidance on Indirect IWk Assl!SS11ll7lu NwJ.s Changrs. In-
dustry, State Officials Say, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1892 (Mar. 4, 1994). 
141. Use oJ Indirect IWk Assessmenl Likely in Future Ruk-Making. Former Official Says, 24 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 262 Uune 11, 1993). 
142. Timothy Noah, EPA Seeks Stria Paper-Industry Rules Aimed at Culting Dioxin, Air 
PoUution, WAll. ST. j., Nov. 2, 1993, at A24. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. 
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close.I45 On the other hand, environmental groups have criticized 
the proposal because it does not totally eliminate use of chlorine 
from the papermaking process.I46 The use of a combined rule is 
intended to make regulatory actions less burdensome to 
industry. 147 
Section 112 does not provide any answers on how the EPA 
should take into account multimedia and indirect risk factors in 
regulating hazardous air pollutants, although subsection 112 (d) (2) 
allows the EPA to consider "any non-air quality health and environ-
mental impacts and energy requirements .... "148 The residual risk 
provisions in subsection 112 (f) (2) (A) will eventually require the 
EPA to examine the excess cancer impacts of air emissions from 
each major source after technology-based controls are in place, but 
the statute does not explain whether the EPA may consider only 
direct impacts of air emissions in calculating excess cancer risks or 
must consider multimedia or indirect impacts beyond generally au-
thorizing the administrator to consider "safety" and "other relevant 
factors."149 Under Chevron ~ deference principle, the EPA probably 
could simply ignore the multimedia and indirect impacts of 
sources of air toxics if it chooses to do so, but such an approach is 
at odds with its stated goal of placing increasing emphasis on mul-
timedia impacts.I5o This Article's proposal would require firms 
seeking a variance to address multimedia and indirect impacts, and 
allow interested citizens to request more stringent regulation of a 
source or a source category if there is evidence of significant mul-
timedia or indirect impacts. Eventually, the EPA should consider 
developing "cluster" or combined rules for as many industries as 
possible. 
145. Id. 
146. Id. When used as a bleaching agent, chlorine is converted into dioxin and other 
potentially toxic chemicals. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2}. 
149. Id. § 7412(f) (2)(A). 
150. The EPA is currently making some efforts to use existing legislation to address 
integrated, multimedia concerns. See Thomas L. Adams Jr. & M. Elizabeth Cox, The Envi-
ronmental SheU Game and the Need for Codification, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,367, 
10,368-69 (1990); Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 330-32 (advocating a wider role for the 
Toxic Substances Control Act in information development). 
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2. Technology-Based PoUution Control Standards 
a. Economic Criticisms of Technology-Based Standards. 
In a technology-based system of regulation, an agency sets stan-
dards based not on health effects, but on the control capacity of 
current or expected technology, or by mandating the use of a par-
ticular technology or process.I51 A number of economists and 
legal scholars have argued that technology-based pollution control 
standards are inefficient because they are typically uniform across 
an entire industry. This approach does not take into account the 
actual impacts of specific sources on ambient air or water quality, 
impacts which vary 'widely depending upon the source's loca-
tion.I52 There is good reason to believe that the technology-based 
standards in subsection 112 will be inefficient among different in-
dustries because the top 12% of plants in pollution control effec-
tiveness in one industry may be vastly different from the top 12% in 
another industry. Some industries, therefore, are likely to bear 
higher compliance costs without regard to their ability to reduce 
pollution or the actual impact of their pollution upon surrounding 
populations.I5s 
Moreover, technology-based statutes and regulations usually fail 
to promote technological improvements because industry often 
lacks any incentive to go beyond the technology specified in the 
EPA's reguIations.154 The one-in-one-million residual risk standard 
151. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 268 n.28. 1£ an industrial process or 
product generates some nontrivial risk, technology-based regulations generally require the 
responsible plant or industry to install whatever technology is a\..ulable to reduce or elimi-
nate this risk, as long as the costs of doing so will not cause a shutdown of the plant or 
industry. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1335. 
152. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1334-40 (arguing technolog)'-based reg-
ulation is inefficient compared to market·based); Note, Ttchnology-BasedEmWion and Efflu, 
ent Standards and the Achieuement of Ambient Environmental Objedives, 91 YALE L.J. 792, 794-98 
(1982) (arguing technology-based standards are inefficient in achieving ambient standards 
because they fail to take into account geographical differences in air or water quality or 
cost differences among individual firms and fail to promote any important non-cconomic 
goals). 
153. See 42 U.S.c. § 7412(d)(3)(A). The Administrator has the authority to set a 
standard higher than that achieved by the best performing 12% of the existing sources and 
theoretically could address interindustry disparities. Id. § 7412(d) (3). Based upon the ex-
perience of the Clean Water Act, however, the Administrator is unlikely to force technol-
ogy in industries that have lagged behind others in pollution control efforts. One solution 
would be to allow trading between firms in different industries, but this Article rejects that 
solution because of difficulties in comparing risks in a trading scheme and instead pro-
poses individual variances to achieve greater efficiency while protecting the public health. 
154. Richard B. Stewart, RegulaJion. ImlOVation, and Administrative Law: A Ccmuptual 
HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 298 1994
298 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:263 
does, in theory, require the EPA to issue standards that may pro-
mote technological improvements needed to achieve "an ample 
margin of safety." The dismal failure of the pre-1990 health-based 
regulations, however, raises serious questions about whether the 
EPA will actually issue residual risk standards that are so stringent 
they force firms to shut down unless the firms adopt cutting-edge 
technology. 155 
Many critics of technology-based regulation advocate market-
based solutions,156 and some have suggested the use of trading 
schemes similar to the EPA's risk index for emissions averaging of 
air toxiCS.157 
b. Defenders of Technology-Based Standards. 
Skeptics have argued that proponents of market-based systems 
are overly optimistic about the ease with which government can set 
accurate charges, define property rights, or establish market mech-
anisms.I5S A number of academics contend that technology-based 
emission or effluent standards are the most practical solution to 
pollution control in light of pervasive uncertainties about the im-
pact of chemicals on human health and the environment. 159 Some 
advocate technology-based systems because they may be less infor-
mation-intensive.I60 Others argue that EPA officials have some-
Framework, 69 CAL. L. REv. 1256, 1284 (1981) [hereinafter Stewart, Innooation); Note, supra 
note 152, at 799. 
155. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f); McQuaid, supra note 14, at 459 (predicting that 
Congress will rescind the residual risk program because of its potential expense and lim· 
ited benefits). 
156. Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1341·51 (advocating transferable mar· 
ketable permits); William F. Pedersen, Jr., Turning the Tide on Water Quality, 15 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 69, 82-84 (1988); Note, supra note 152, at 811·12 (advocating zoned marketable per· 
mit scheme). 
157. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 119, at 1360-61 n.62 (suggesting "mutual 
fund" approach to control related pollutants through permits based upon weighted aver· 
age of volume and risk "where appropriate"); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental 
Risks Through Economic Incentives, 13 CoLUM. J. ENVIL. L. 153, 161·62 (1988) (arguing in 
favor of trading schemes for toxies, although conceding it may not yet be feasible to do so 
for pesticides and other chemicals that presently elude workable quantification), 
158. See Applegate, Wcmt Things, supra note 22, at 288 n,45; Guruswamy, supra note 
131, at 501-07; Joel A. Mintz, Economic Reform of Environmmtal Protection: A Brief Comment on 
a Recent Debate, 15 HARv. ENVIL. L. REv. 149, 158, 161 (1991). 
159. See gmerally Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1267·75, 1331·32 & passim 
(arguing uniform, technology·based standards work better than market-based or other 
"finc-tuning" schemes because of limited information about the risks of chemicals and 
ecological systems); see also Mintz, supra note 158, at 149-64 (discussing debate between 
advocates of market-based regulation and technology-based regulation). 
160. Thomas O. McGarity, Media-Quality, Technology, and Cost-Benefit Balancing Strate-
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times advocated market-based measures to weaken environmental 
regulations, especially during the Reagan administration. IGI 
c. Technology-Based Standards Are Inefficient. 
There is considerable evidence that technology-based pollution 
control standards are inefficient. A recent EPA/Amoco joint study 
of an Amoco refinery in Yorktown, Virginia suggests that uniform 
pollution control standards, including technology-based ap-
proaches, are inefficient because the EPA's standards are often 
based on obsolete information, ignore multimedia pollution 
problems and do not provide industry with incentives to reduce 
pollution at lower COSt.162 In addition, the EPA's experience with 
Section 307 of the Clean Water Act addressing water toxies suggests 
that technology-based controls can achieve a certain degree of pol-
lution reduction, but must be supplemented with individual con-
trol strategy techniques that address individual "hot-spots" and 
examine a source's impact on 'water quality.l63 
Professor Gaines has suggested that it will be much more diffi-
cult to determine technology-based approaches for air toxies than 
for the treatment of 'water toxies.l64 The EPA is already behind 
schedule in issuing subsection 112(d) technology-based standards 
for various categories and classes of industry.l65 Professor Gaines 
observes that the complexities of regulating air toxies will increase 
when the second phase of residual risk controls goes into effect. l66 
Ultimately, he concludes that there are no easy answers to regulat-
ing air toxies. This Article generally concurs with that conclusion, 
but proposes some possible solutions to the problem. 
gies for Health and Environmental Regulalwn, uw & CoNTEMP. PROns. 159, 20lHlS (1983); see 
also Applegate, Perils, supra note 31, at 268. 
161. SeeLatin, GFine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1271-72; if. Guruswamy, supra note 131, 
at 503. 
162. See infra notes 299-307 and accompanying teXL 
163. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(1) (1988); Oliver Houck, TkRLgulalion ofToxicPolllllants Under 
the Clean Water Act. 21 Env't L Rep. (Envtl. L InsL) 10,528, 10,53642, 10,547-49 (1991); 
Pedersen, supra note 156, at 70-73 & passim. 
164. Gaines, supra note 25, at 302-03. 
165. As of the fall of 1993, the EPA had issued only two final rules for technolog)'-
based emission standards for categories or subcategories of major sources of air toxies: one 
for dry cleaners, and the other for steel mills' coke ovens. John H. Cushman,Jr., Siaies and 
Government Lag in Meeting Clean Air Law, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1993, at A18. In the spring of 
1994, the agency issued a final rule governing the toxic emissions of the chemical indusuy, 
a rule that is expected to eliminate one billion tons of toxic emissions a year. Ste supra 
notes 100, 108-11 and accompanying texL 
166. See Gaines, supra note 25, at 303. 
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C. Enactment of the Proposal 
1. Degree of Statutory Specificity. 
[Vol. 13:263 
This Article's proposed statute must be understood in light of 
the debate about congressional specificity in regulatory statutes. 
Commentators have made an important, if imperfect, distinction 
between "goals statutes," which announce goals and authorize dele-
gates to promulgate controls on conduct in furtherance of those 
goals, and "rules statutes," which demarcate permissible and imper-
missible conduct.167 Commentator advocacy between these two 
types of statutes corresponds to preferences for agency decision-
making versus congressional policy making.168 An advocate of 
technocratic regulation tends to favor goal-oriented statutes that 
grant discretion to the agency and would probably approve of the 
residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) because of the discre-
tion it provides the EPA Those who favor strong congressional 
control and are skeptical of agency expertise would likely favor 
strict rules-oriented statutes. There is a middle ground as well. 169 
Commentators have disagreed about whether the Clean Air Act 
is a "rules" or "goals" statute.170 In the 1990 Amendments, Con-
gress moved away from the goals-oriented "ample margin of safety" 
language in section 112 of the Act and adopted detailed rules on 
the number of hazardous air pollutants and the stringency of tech-
nology. The second phase of residual risk standards may return to 
the failed policies of the pre-1990 version of the statute. l7l 
167. See Applegate, Wor.st Things, supra note 22, at 302 n.128 ("A rules statute sets out 
relatively specific standards of conduct for the regulated industry; a goals statute gives a 
general mandate to an agency, which the agency must translate into rules of conduct.")j 
David Schoenbrod, Goals Statutes or Rules Statutes: The Case of the Clean Air Act, 30 UCLA L. 
REv. 740 (1983). "Whether a statute works to define permissible conduct depends on the 
context." [d at 784. A plausible argument can be made that there is no real distinction 
between goals and rules because all rules need interpretation and all goals reflect some 
choices. [d. at 787. Schoenbrod, however, argues that there is a genuine distinction be-
tween a rules statute in which the legislature states what is permissible and impermissible 
in a range of situations and a goals statute in which the legislature deals solely with objec-
tives. [d. He concedes that the distinction is not a bright line and may change as society'S 
customs evolve. [d. at 788. 
168. See generally Applegate, Wor.st Things, supra note 22, at 289-304 (discussing tech-
nocratic regulatory tradition and its skeptics, including proponents of rules statutes). 
169. See id. at 328-331. 
170. Compare BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WIlJ.IAM T. HAssLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRn' AIR 10-
12 (1981) (criticizing the Clean Air Act as an example of overly specific post-New Deal 
legislation) with Schoenbrod, supra note 167, at 753, 766-67 (criticizing Clean Air Act legis-
lation as a goals statute). 
171. See supra notes 13-30 and accompanying text. 
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Neither goals nor rules statutes are a panacea for solving environ-
mental problems.172 Congress, however, could and should enact a 
statute that provides more guidance to the EPA on adopting 
residual risk standards. 
Another distinction used in discussing the degree of statutory 
specificity is the distinction between narrative and numerical tests. 
Existing environmental statutes regulating carcinogens contain pri-
marily narrative tests for priority-setting and standard setting.17S 
There are three major types of environmental narrative statutes:174 
(1) technology-based statutes that require the EPA to clean up the 
environment to the degree that is technologically achievable;175 (2) 
balancing statutes that require the EPA to balance the costs of con-
trol and health benefits; and (3) health or risk-based statutes that 
require the EPA to clean up the environment to a degree that as-
sures the protection of public health.176 Hybrid narrative statutes 
are either difficult to categorize or combine elements of each type 
172. Rules statutes may be counterproductive if they subject the details of adminutra-
tion to the constant supervision and second-guessing of congressional committees. Sa grn-
erally Michael Herz, Judicial Texlualism Meets Congrwional Miaomanagemmt: A Potential 
Collision in Clean Air Act InterpretaJion, 16 HARv. ENvn.. L. REv. 175 (1992) (arguing con-
gressional micro management and judicial textuali5m combine to produce deleterious re-
sults); Richard J. Lazarus, The Ntf1ected Q:lestian of Congrwional Ovmight oj EPA: Qpis 
Custodiet Ipsos Custodes (Who Shall Walch the Watchm Themsdves)7, 54 LAw S: ComaIP. 
PROBLEMS 205 (1991) (arguing congressional oversight committees interfere too much in 
EPA's work); David S. Broder S: Stephen Barr, HiU's Miaomanagrnzmt of Cabintl Blurs &po-
ration oj P(JVJCTS, WASH. Posr, July 25, 1993, at AI, A16 (dUcussing recent trend toward 
congressional involvement in departments' management functions). While thu Article ad-
vocates greater congressional scrutiny of the EPA's emwions averaging program for air 
toxics, it is also sensitive to preserving discretion on the part of the agency. In addition, 
rules statutes could stifle technological innovation if a statute mandates a particular tech-
nology. Matt Ridley, H(JVJ to S7TUJther Innovation, WALL ST.J.,June 9, 1993, at A12 (arguing 
EPA regulations on technology used to limit nitrogen oxide emwions delayed introduc-
tion of promising new technology). Furthermore, rules statutes may lead to other di5tor-
tions. On the other hand, goals statutes may allow the EPA or the Office of Management 
and Budget to ignore congressional intent. 
173. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 273. 
174. Id. at 296. 
175. Id. There is a distinction between statutes that require the EPA to base stan-
dards on what is currently achievable as opposed to technology-forcing statutes. St1NSTE.IN, 
supra note 22, at 627-28 n.85. Some commentators have argued that technolog)'"forcing 
statutes have not worked well because industry generally has more information than the 
EPA about what technologies are likely to be technologically feasible in the next fh·e or ten 
years, but that industry has little incentive to share such information \\ith the agency if the 
result will be higher compliance costs. See e.g., Stewart. Innovation. supra note 154, at 1282-
83, 1296-97, 1300-01. 
176. See supra notes 50-85 and accompanying text (di5cussing di5tinction between 
health and risk). . 
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of narrative statute.177 For example, the pre-1990 version of sec-
tion 112 was a classic health-based statute requiring the EPA to set 
emissions standards for air toxics that would protect the public 
with an "ample margin of safety. "17S The first phase of the Amend-
ments is clearly technology-based in nature. The second phase of 
residual risk standards requires a health-based approach in part, 
but also provides the EPA with enough discretion to allow implicit 
and perhaps even explicit balancing. In addition, the statute in-
cludes a numerical one-in-one-million screening standard, but pro-
vides no guidance on what the second round of emission standards 
might encompass. One might classify these residual risk provisions 
as a hybrid narrative statute. 
2. Agent)' Capture, Public Choice Theory, the Race-to-the-Bottom 
Rationale and an Exception Process. 
a. Agency Capture. 
An exception process may allow a regulated entity to "capture" 
an agency's decisionmaking process.179 Capture is less likely to oc-
cur when an agency is regulating several industries with competing 
or conflicting interests. ISO Some commentators have argued that 
the EPA as a whole is not captured. lSI In another article, this au-
177. Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 313-14. 
178. Despite the statute's health-based nature, critics have charged that the agency 
implicitly considered cost and technology before and perhaps even after the Vinyl Chloride 
decision. 
179. A leading administrative law treatise defines agency capture as follows: "An 
agency is captured when it favors the concerns of the industry it regulates, which is well-
represented by its trade groups and lawyers, over the interests of the general public, which 
is often unrepresented. RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw AND PROCESS 
§ 1.7.2 (2d ed. 1992). There is an enormous literature on the phenomenon of "agency 
capture" of regulators by regulated industry and commentators have sharply disagreed 
over to what extent such capture takes place among major federal agencies. See, e.g., 
MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGUlATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT CoMMISSION 74-95, 169-71 
(1955) (regulated industry tends to capture its regulators); Alfred C. Aman,Jr., Administra-
tive Equity: An Analysis of Exceptions Rules, 1982 DUKE LJ. 277, 326-28 ("The capture doctrine 
is inapposite, however, when the regulations involved cut across several industries."); Brad-
ford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agent)' Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL- LJ. 34,34-35,49-54 
(1993) [hereinafter Superfund Contractors] (capture more likely to occur in a single program 
even if agency as a whole remains uncaptured). But see Richard A. Posner, Theories of Eco-
nomic Regulation, 5 BELLJ. OF ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 335, 342 (1974) (capture theory unsatis-
factory because it lacks any theoretical foundation as to why the regulated industry should 
be the only interest group able to influence an agency). 
180. See generaUy Aman, supra note 179, at 327-28; Mank, Superfund Contractors, supra 
note 179, at 50-51. 
181. See Dwyer, supra note 16, at 309-10; RichardJ. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in 
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thor suggested that it may be easier for special interests to capture 
an agency's decision on a particular plant or program even if the 
agency as a whole remains uncaptured, and an individualized ex-
ceptions process might enhance the possibility of capture.182 
Whether an agency can be captured by a regulated firm de-
pends to a considerable extent upon whether countervailing inter-
est groups actively participate in the regulatory process. 
Proponents of agency capture theories generally assume that regu-
latory agencies begin serving particular private interests once the 
public interest that led to the formation of the agency dissipates. ISS 
Richard Posner has criticized the theoretical foundation of agency 
capture theories on the ground that they do not explain "why the 
regulated industry should be the only interest group able to influ-
ence the agency."184 Others have argued that there is strong evi-
dence that so-called "public interest groups" or countervailing 
interest groups in fact influence agency policies, especially where 
agencies regulate multiple industries.185 There is considerable evi-
dence that the public has retained interest in environmental issues 
the Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAw &: CoNTEMP. PROns. 311, 315-17 
(1991); see generally Mank, SuPeifund ConlTtzelon, supra note 179, at 34-35,49-54. 
182. See generally Mank, SuPeifund Conlracttm, supra note 179, at 34-35, 49-54 For ex-
ample, there is some evidence that "Superfund contractors- make too many policy deci-
sions because the EPA lacks sufficient experienced staff, however, the evidence of actual 
capture is tenuous. Id. at 80. In a case study of how local air quality management districts 
in California grant variances, the authors suggested that the large Bay Area [which includes 
San Francisco, Oakland and SanJose] and South Coast [Los Angeles and Orange County] 
Air Quality Management Districts were relatively immune to capture, but that the smaller 
Kern County Air Quality Management District "is viewed as being more susceptible to the 
economic interests of industry and the community.- Marc Melnick &: Elizabeth Willes, 
Comment, Watching the Candy Store: EPA Ouerfiling of Local Air Pollu#on Varianca, 20 Ecol.-
OGY L.Q. 207, 224 (1993). The Kern County District has recently joined a new unified 
district, the San Joaquin Valley Unified Air Quality Management District, and the authors 
of the case study suggest that " [t]his change has probably changed the regulato!}' climate in 
Kern County by bringing in a wider range of perspectives toward air pollution. The hear-
ing board will be drawn from a more diverse area and will be less susceptible to local 
pressure." Id. at 241 n.241. On the other hand. Professor Aman has argued that an excep-
tions process will not facilitate agency capture. 
183. See generally BERNS'IlUN, supra note 179. at 87-90; EMMETTE REDFORD, ADMINISTRA-
TION OF NATIONAL ECONOMIC CoNTROL 386 (1952); Aman. supra note 179. at 326-27 n.209; 
Mank, SUPeifund ContraclcTs, supra note 179. at 34 n.l. 50-52. 
184. Posner, supra note 179, at 342. Professors Gillette and Krier, however. suggest 
that some groups may have asymmetric access to the administrative process. S« grnaally 
Gillette &: Krier, supra note 79, at 1064-70. 
185. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRAC'i: WHAT GoVERNMENT ACENCIES Do AND WIN 
THEY Do IT 83-85 (1990) (arguing that since 19705 it has become rare to find an agency 
serving only a regulated industry's interests); Mank, Superfund Cort1racJms, supra note 179, at 
50-51. 
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and that the EPA on the whole has not been captured.18G Thus, 
even if an exceptions process could be abused by regulated firms 
bent upon capturing the air toxics program, effective measures to 
encourage public participation could defeat any such efforts. 187 
3. Public Choice Theory. 
Public choice theory assumes that each person is an egoistic, 
rational utility maximizer and that behavior based upon these as-
sumptions applies not just to market transactions, but also to non-
market political decisionmaking. I88 Public choice models often 
treat the legislative process as a micro economic system in which 
interest groups manipulate the political process to obtain "rents" in 
the form of tax relief, subsidies or favorable regulation in order to 
increase their wealth in excess of what the group could achieve in 
the marketplace without legislation.I89 On the other hand, propo-
nents of "civic republicanism" argue that politics can and ought to 
consist of deliberation reflecting the values of all citizens. They 
reject the central economic assumptions about human behavior in 
public choice theory, contending that individuals in many cases are 
willing to sacrifice private interests to the common good.1!JO 
Public choice theory would suggest that legislation affecting 
particular geographic areas would be dominated by legislators 
from that area and that local interests would tend to triumph over 
more diffuse national public interests. I91 Thus, it is important to 
186. See Mank, Superfund CantractOTS, supra note 179, at 50-51; see generally Dwyer, supra 
note 16, at 278,309-10; Lazarus, supra note 181, at 364-65; WILSON, supra note 185, at 83-85; 
see also Hornstein, A Nonnative Critique, supra note 79; Irma S. Russell, The Role of Public 
opinion, Public Interest Groups, and Political Parties in Creating and Implementing Environmental 
Policy, 23 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,665 (1993). . 
187. The presence of public interest groups can substantially increase the cost of lob-
bying expenditures by a firm that is trying to influence an agency and defeat attempts by a 
regulated firm to "capture" an agency. See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAlTII\VAlTE, RESPON. 
SIVE REGUlATION: TRANSCENDING TIlE DEREGUlATION DEBATE 71-86 (1992). 
188. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. 
L. REv. 873, 878 (1987). 
189. See id.; Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition 11mong Pressure Groups for Political 
Influence, 98 QJ. ECON. 371, 371-74 (1983);Jonathan Macey, Promoting Public.Regarding Leg· 
islation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest Group Mode~ 86 COLUM. L. REv. 223, 223-
24 (1986). 
190. See generally Hornstein, Politics, supra note 79, at 413; Frank Michelman, Law's 
Republic, 97 YAI.E LJ. 1493, 1513 (1988); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican justification for 
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REv. 1511, 1512 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Reviva~ 97 YAI.E LJ. 1539, 1548-49 (1988). 
191. See generally A1yson C. Flournoy, Beyond the ·Spotted Owl Problem": Learning From the 
Old·Growth Cantroversy, 17 HARv. ENVIl.. L. REv. 261, 305-06 (1993). 
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consider whether the capture of influential legislators by important 
industrial actors could result in congressional pressuring of the 
EPA to modify residual risk standards or to grant exceptions to the 
advantage of favored industries. Public participation, however, can 
overcome this tendency. For example, when environmental 
groups were able to capture national public attention about the 
spotted owl through the news media, lobbying pressure created by 
local interests seeking to cut old-growth forests was neutralized.192 
Accordingly, an exceptions process may be more vulnerable to spe-
cial interest lobbying of Congress than nationally uniform 
legislation. 
The public participation portion of this Article's proposal is 
designed to enhance the possibility of "republican civicism" in the 
exceptions' decisionmaking process and to lessen the tendencies 
of an exceptions process to allow regulated firms to obtain special 
favors from legislators or bureaucrats as the public choice model 
predicts. Furthermore, this Article's proposal would give Congress 
a greater role in establishing residual risk standards despite the 
possible criticism that Congress is really not representative of the 
public interest. 
a. States and the "Race-to-the-Bottom." 
In the context of a federalist scheme for air and water pollution 
control in which states play the primary role of regulating firms 
and in which the EPA plays a supervisory role, an expanded excep-
tions process would give states more discretion in making regula-
tory decisions. So long as a state's program meets certain 
minimum requirements, the Title V air permit statutory scheme 
assumes that states will make the initial decision about granting or 
revising a permit.I9S The EPA has issued a final rule pursuant to 
subsection 112(l) establishing procedures for the agency's approval 
of state air toxics rules or programs that are at least as stringent as 
applicable section 112 rules and even to allow states to enforce 
state rules in place of certain federal rules promulgated under sec-
tion 112 despite industry's call for uniform federal rules.194 
192. Id. at 305. 
193. See generally 42 U.S.G. §§ 7661-7661d. The EPA may object to any permit and 
citizens may petition the EPA to challenge any permit approval by the agency. Id. 
§ 7661d(b). 
194. See generally id. § 7412(1) (state can develop and submit to Administrator a § 112 
program that is at least as stringent as federal standards); Approval of State Programs and 
Delegation of Federal Authorities, 58 Fed. Reg. 62,262 (1993) (final rule to be promul-
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A number of commentators have argued that uniform, federal 
legislation is necessary to prevent states from engaging in a socially 
undesirable "race-to-the-bottom," relaxing their environmental 
standards to attract and retain industry.195 Professor Stewart has 
argued that public interest groups are more effective at the na-
tional level than the local level because there are higher transac-
tion costs for local groups to organize. There are economies of 
scale for national groups and donors to groups may be more will-
ing to give to national environmental causes.196 The problems aris-
ing from the relative ineffectiveness of local public interest groups 
could be ameliorated by having the federal government or industry 
provide financial assistance to such groups. Active local environ-
mental groups could alert the EPA to exercise its objection power 
over state-issued permits if state officials neglect environmental 
concerns to attract industry.197 Section IV of this Article proposes 
that the EPA or industry applicants for exceptions provide grants 
to groups raising bona fide challenges that need money to research 
critical issues related to an exception. 
b. Public Concerns and the Democratic Critique. 
Advocates of a "public" definition of risk belong to a larger 
school of thought that questions the very legitimacy of agencies 
making tradeoffs between health and cost. They contend that Con-
gress should make these fundamental policy decisions rather than 
agencies.198 For these commentators, quantification is undesirable 
gated in 40 C.F.R. Parts 9 and 63); Plan to Give States Discretion on Averaging of Toxic Emissions 
Meets Industry opposition, supra note 104, at 1465 (industry opposes allowing states too much 
flexibility in administering air toxies programs because of resulting inconsistencies and 
uncertainties). 
195. Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating InleTstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-the-
Bottom" Rationale fUT Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L REv. 1210, 121()"11 n.l 
(1992) (citing sources); Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice'! Problems of Federalism in 
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE LJ. 1196, 1212 
(1977). Recently, the "race-to-the-bottom" rationale has been questioned. See generally 
Revesz, supra. 
196. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice, supra note 195, at 1213-15. 
197. See 42 U.S.C. § 7661d(b)(2) (citizen can petition Administrator to object to 
state-issued permit). 
198. See generally Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22, at 289, 298-302 (discussing 
four critiques of technocratic agency decisionmaking: (1) the informational critique ar-
gues agencies lack sufficient good information to make "expert" decisions; (2) the legiti-
macy critique contends public participation values should trump tcchnocratic 
decisionmaking; (3) the rationalist critique argues in favor of clear statutes to guide agency 
discretion; and (4) the historical critique argues agencies tend to underrcgulate if givcn 
too much flexibility because it is easier not to make a decision). 
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because the determination of whether a particular risk is "reason-
able" or "unreasonable" is a fundamentally political decision rest-
ing on a broader set of values, many of which are not 
quantifiable.199 They believe that quantification is meaningful only 
to a limited extent where lives and deaths are involved.2°O Demo-
cratic critics of quantification usually want choices about who bears 
the risk of toxic substances to be made by Congress rather than an 
expert agency.201 Critics of technocratic decisionmaking often use 
legal techniques such as broadened standing, expanded participa-
tion in the decisional process, as well as citizen suits and petitions 
to guarantee broad citizen access to the regulatory process.202 
Some commentators however, argue that broad discretion to 
apply knowledge and technocratic expertise is better. They there-
fore want Congress to set only broad goals.20S Judge Stephen 
Breyer, among others, has argued that the public often overreacts 
to risks and that thus Congress is incapable of addressing risk com-
prehensively.204 In his view, greater knowledge and public aware-
ness do not necessarily lead to better regulation.205 Judge Breyer's 
solution is to create an elite reviewing body of civil servants within 
the executive branch to coordinate risk regulation.20G WhileJudge 
Breyer's assessment of how well the public and Congress have han-
dled risk assessment issues in the past has considerable merit, his 
199. See id. at 300 (discussing political critique of quantitative decisionmaking). 
200. See id. at 300-301: see generally Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1070-85: Gurus-
wamy, supra note un, at 504-09. 
201. See Applegate, lV013t Things, supra note 22, at 301-02 (discussing democratic crit-
ics of expert agencies and quantitative decisionmaking). 
202. See id. at 301-02; Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1104-05; Richard B. Stewart, 
The RefOT7TUllWn of American Administralive Law, 88 HARv. 1.. REv. 1667, 1676-81 (1975). 
203. See generally ACKERMAN & HAssLER, supra note 170, at 5-6 (Congress should pro-
vide only the "most general kinds of policy guidance" to free the agency to engage in 
rationalist decisionmaking processes); Dwyer, supra note 16, at 283 (arguing "that literal 
interpretation of symbolic legislation would be a mistake and that the Agency should be 
allowed to refonnulate symbolic legislation because rational policymaking involving \"Ola-
tile social issues is more likely to be done by an agency than by the legislature, particularly 
where statutes are difficult to amend and enacting symbolic legislation is an accepted 
means of doing business.") & passim; Lazarus, supra note 181, at 355 (finding that "wasted 
resources and misdirected priorities" are the result of the "combination of impossible stat-
utory mandates and increased judicial access"): see also Applegate, mmt Things, supra note 
22, at 296-98 (discussing rationalist models of regulation that emphasize agency discretion 
and congressional role limited to broad goal setting). 
204. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CiRCLE 33-42 (1993); Sam 
Kazman, Risk Regulation Run Amok, WAll. ST. J., Nov. 5, 1993, at A7 (book re\iew of Judge 
Breyer's Breaking the Vicious Circle). 
205. See generally BREYER, supra note 204, at 42-51; Kazman, supra note 204, at A7. 
206. See generally BREYER, supra note 204, at 59-80; Kazman, supra note 204, at A7. 
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solution, as well as those of many other technocrats, underplays the 
need for public participation and legitimacy. 
Advocates of a technocratic solution to risk regulation contend 
that bureaucratic agencies possess sufficient public legitimacy. 
Some commentators argue that agencies can allow broader partici-
pation by interested parties than Congress207 and that the Adminis-
trator of the EPA is more accountable than most members of 
Congress.208 The legitimacy arguments of technocrats are less con-
vincing than their criticisms of the inability of the public and Con-
gress to assess complex risk issues. 
Society is better offwhen Congress and the President enact leg-
islation that makes the hard political choices about how much risk 
is acceptable in light of relevant costs. Ultimately, how to regulate 
and to assess the comparative risk of chemicals causing different 
diseases is a political question that must be addressed through col-
lective risk preferences as expressed in the democratic process.209 
Critics of technocratic decisionmaking correctly observe that such 
an approach is information-intensive, leaves fundamental decisions 
to unelected officials, and does not always produce effective and 
efficient regulation.210 Because of the disagreements in the schol-
arly community between the expert and public definitions of risk, 
Congress should make the basic policy choices about which factors 
should be included in risk assessment and management of hazard-
ous air pollutants. Even though individual members of Congress 
in some ways are less accountable than the administrator of the 
EPA or the agency itself, Congress as a whole and the President are 
207. See Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1300 ("Agencies can develop better 
technical expertise, address a wider range of issues concurrently, allow broader participa· 
tion by interested parties, and respond more rapidly to new information than Congress 
ordinarily could."). 
208. See id. at 1300 n.165 (arguing supposed greater public accountability of Con· 
gress than agencies is largely a myth because few members of Congress know enough about 
air pollution issues to make informed decisions and therefore the real issue is whether 
Congress should delegate its authority to a few peers together with committee staff or 
administrative agencies subject to congressional oversight); Gaines, supra note 25, at 307·08 
(arguing that congressional committees or federal judges regularly scrutinize the actions of 
the EPA, and that "the administrator of the EPA is arguably more readily held to account, 
through the media and through public pressure on the president, than most legislators, 
whose individual actions are often obscured in secrecy and the relative anonymity of memo 
bership in a group of 535 people subject to inquisition only every two or six years."). 
209. See Hornstein, Politics of Environmental Law Refann, supra note 79, at 442: see gencr' 
aUy Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22 (Congress should give EPA specific directions 
for setting priorities and goals). 
210. See Applegate, Worst Things, supra note 22, at 281, 289-304. 
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more accountable when they enact legislation that provides clear 
direction for an agency's exercise of discretion. 
As a matter of general policy, Congress should encourage pub-
lic participation in significant environmental decisions because 
such involvement lessens the risk that the agency will be "captured" 
by special interest groupS.211 Furthermore, Congress should pro-
vide opportunities for public participation in risk assessment deci-
sions at individual sites because chemicals may have different 
impacts on diverse exposed subpopulation groups such as chil-
dren, minorities, consumers or workers. Because there are often 
disagreements about the impacts of toxic pollutants on a particular 
community, Congress should provide for significant public oppor-
tunities for comment on permit applications and trading approvals 
despite the potential for Not-In-My-Back-Yard opposition.212 Sec-
tion IV will show how this Article's proposal would allow potentially 
affected citizens more meaningful participation and opportunities 
to challenge proposed permits than the current system. 
III. "BRIGHT LINES" AND EXCEPTIONS 
A Bright Line Rules 
1. "Bright Lines" and Standard-8etting 
Legislators have increasingly considered using numerical risk 
levels, or "bright lines," as a means to reduce executive branch dis-
cretion and to gain greater congressional control over risk manage-
ment. 213 In 1989, Congress considered mandating an interim 
residual risk standard of one-in-ten-thousand and a final standard 
of one-in-a-million, but the enacted Amendments incorporated a 
"bright line" only as a screening and priority-setting device.214 
Congress has also considered enacting "bright lines" in legislation 
governing food safety and water quality standards.215 For example, 
211. See generally Mank, Superfund Canlroclars, supra note 179, at 5()'51 (strong public 
interest in environmental issues helps prevent capture of EPA); sa also Hornstein, Polilics oj 
Environmental Law Refonn, supra note 79, at 417-19,440-46 (discussing theory that emiron-
mental law reform results from "republican moments" of significant public im'Oln:ment). 
212. See generally Been, supra note 123, at 1001'{)9 & passim (discussing distributional 
consequences of siting locally undesirable land uses); Bradford C. Mank, The Two Headed 
Dragon of Siting and Cleaning Up HaztlT"tlgus Waste Dumps: Can Economic [nanlilla or Mediation 
Slay the Monster'!, 19 B.C. ENVI'L. AFF. L. REv. 239, 239, 272-85 (discussing "Not·In-My-Back-
Yard" problem and possible solutions). 
213. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 275. 
214. [d. 
215. [d. at 327-329. 
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a 1991 proposal in Congress sought to amend the Clean Water Act 
by limiting "the probability to not more than 1 in 1,000,000 that an 
individual with high exposure to dioxins in [state] waters will be 
diagnosed with cancer as a result of such exposure over a life-
time."216 New Jersey's 1984 Amendments217 to its Safe Drinking 
Water Act218 establish a one-in-one-million standard for persons in-
gesting dioxins for a lifetime.219 Mter the enactment through the 
voter initiative process of California's Proposition 65, the Safe 
Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986220 adopted 
regulations setting the level of significant risk for discharges into 
drinking water and other media at one-in-100,000 on a lifetime ba-
SiS.221 Wisconsin's surface water quality standards also employ a 
bright line, stating that "the incremental cancer risk from exposure 
to surface waters may not exceed 1 in 100,000."222 
The use of mandated numerical risk levels in prescribing the 
desired stringency of residual risk controls may create a misleading 
sense of legislative control and mask possible agency manipulation. 
Regulators can often plausibly manipulate modeling assumptions 
and interpret data to change risk estimates by factors of a thou-
sand or more.223 The dangers of manipulation are especially great 
when considerable scientific uncertainty surrounds an issue. Sub-
section 112(f) 's one-in-one-million standard is misleading because 
it suggests that the EPA can apply a clear metric to carcinogenicity 
when that is not the case. It is even more misleading to apply a 
numerical "bright line" approach to noncarcinogens causing dif-
ferent types of diseases or multimedia impacts when there is no 
scientific consensus. Whether any legislative metric is appropriate 
will be discussed below. 
2. ''Bright Lines" and Priority Setting. 
Some commentators have argued that legislative "bright lines" 
216. H.R. 2084, 102 Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (a) (1991) (proposed April 24, 1991); see Ro-
senthal et aI., supra note 7, at 328. 
217. Act of Jan. 9, 984, ch. 443, 1983 NJ. Laws 1801. 
218. NJ. Stat. Ann. §§ 58.12A·1 to -25 (1992). 
219. NJ. Stat. Ann. § 58.12A-13(b) (1992); Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 331. 
220. Cal. Health & Safety Code §§ 25249.5-.13 (1992); Kristen R. Stevens, Regulating 
Toxies at the State Leve~ Proposition 65's Warning Requirement, 9 STAN. ENVTL. LJ. 84 (1990). 
221. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 26, § 22-12703(b) (1992); Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 
331. 
222. Wis. Admin. Code § NR 105.09-.10 (1989); Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 332. 
223. See Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 360; see also Dwyer, supra note 16, at 276 
(discussing post-Vinyl Chlmide benzene standards). 
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can also be used as a priority-setting device to direct an agency to 
target for regulatory consideration those chemical exposures which 
exceed a bright line.224 In addition, Congress might require the 
EPA to initiate rulemaking, which is currently often a matter of 
agency discretion, if risk assessments suggest that the magnitude of 
a problem exceeds some specified numerical standard, or to re-
frain from rulemaking if the magnitude of the health problem is 
less than some specified bright line.225 According to Alon Rosen-
thal, George M. Gray and John D. Graham, "From a scientific per-
spective, the use of cancer risk estimates in priority-setting is less 
problematic than it is in standard setting. Risk assessment tech-
niques may establish relative risk with more certainty than they es-
tablish an absolute level of risk protection. "226 
Professor Applegate has argued that the Amendments to sec-
tion 112 essentially represent a form of priority-setting in which the 
agency must establish a schedule for action regarding listed chemi-
cals based upon stated criteria such as: known or anticipated ef-
fects, quantity and location of emissions, and efficiency of 
grouping categories by pollutants or technologies.227 While observ-
ing that the technology-based phase of regulation does not grant 
flexibility in standard setting in the way his priority-setting model 
of legislative control advocates, he maintains that Congress clearly 
recognized the value of trading stringency for speed and scope by 
enacting Amendments that defer regulation of the health-based 
level of "residual risk" in favor of quick risk reduction based upon 
the more easily determinable best available technology standard.228 
224. See Rosenthal et aL, supra note 7, at 329-30; sa gtnmJlLy Applegate, mmt Things, 
supra note 22, at 282 & passim (arguing that locus of legislative control should be mo\'Cd 
from standard setting stage of regulatory process to earlier priority·setting phase). 
225. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 330. 
226. Id. 
227. See Applegate, Wont Things, supra note 22, at 327. Professor Applegate has pro-
posed that Congress should provide broad parameters for agency action in particular 
cases, but should give specific directions to the agency for setting priorities and goals. Ste 
generally id., at 281-82. His plan would move the locus oflegislati\'e control from the stan-
dard setting state of the regulatory process to the earlier priority-setting phase. Id. at 282. 
"Specifically, EPA would have considerable discretion to target risks and to select 1C\'Cls of 
regulatory stringency, but its discretion would be constrained by a comprehensh'e plan for 
toxic risk reduction which the agency would adopt in accordance with congressional guide-
lines." Id. 
228. Id. at 327. He criticizes Congress, however, for exempting the section 112 prior-
ity-setting process from judicial review except for failure to set a schedule at all. Id.; ste 42 
U.S.c. § 7412 (e) (4) ("no action •.• shall be final agency action subject to judicial review.-
Congress has however carved out a § 7607 exception). 
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Applegate contends that the Amendments to section 112 demon-
strate that it is feasible to use priority-setting to direct agency ac-
tion. He recognizes, however, that there are several practical 
difficulties in implementing the scheme-"not the least of which is 
commensurability of toxic risks .... "229 
The use of priority-setting in the first phase of the statute, along 
with more specific rules on the number of air toxics and the strin-
gency of technology-based standards, may have been a wise move 
in light of the slow pace at which the EPA regulated hazardous air 
pollutants before 1990. The use of priority-setting and screening 
techniques in lieu of standard setting, however, went too far in the 
residual risk provisions of the statute. Congress should have given 
the EPA more guidance on the definition of what is an "ample 
margin of safety" in light of the controversies surrounding the use 
of that term prior to the enactment of the Amendments. 
Rosenthal, Gray, and Graham have argued that Congress wisely 
abandoned its attempt to establish bright line standards of one-in-
ten-thousand and one-in-a-million in the residual risk provisions of 
the statute and correctly adopted the one-in-a-million standard as 
merely a priority-setting and screening standard for initiating fur-
ther regulation.23o They contend that advocates of bright lines 
who see them as a way to guarantee particular policy outcomes 
should be wary because congressional participation in risk assess-
ment procedures can have unpredictable outcomes.231 For exam-
ple, they point out that one version of the Senate's Amendments 
would have required the EPA to protect the maximally exposed 
individual near a factory rather than a hypothetical maximally ex-
posed individual-a change that could have reduced estimated ex-
posures by a factor of 100 at some sources.232 They argue that 
"bright lines" do not guarantee outcomes and that risk assessment 
techniques can be manipulated by agencies to change policy 
results.233 
While "bright line" standards can be arbitrary and are subject to 
manipulation, the residual risk provisions currently leave too much 
discretion in the hands of the EPA. The only guidance the statute 
provides as far as how the EPA must set a second round of emis-
229. See Applegate, Wtmt Things, supra note 22, at 327-28. 
230. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 275, 323-27, 330, 360.61. 
231. ld. at 344. 
232. ld. 
233. ld. at 344, 360.61. 
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sions standards, is that the agency has the authority to adopt the 
approach in its 1989 Benzene standards. Commentators have criti-
cized these standards for giving the agency too much discretion to 
consider cost and technological factors. In addition, the statute 
fails to address adequately the risks of noncarcinogens, multimedia 
and indirect impacts, and disparate impacts on diverse e>..-posed 
subpopulations. Thus, this Article disagrees with the argument 
that the priority-setting and screening nature of the residual risk 
provisions are adequate. 
Even if Congress chooses to retain a priority-setting approach 
that allows the EPA to determine the appropriate emission stan-
dard and ample margin of safety for a particular chemical or cate-
gory or subcategory of industry if the excess cancer risk exceeds 
one-in-one-million, Congress should at the very least identify the 
reduction of noncarcinogenic risks as a priority for the EPA to con-
sider when it issues emission standards under subsection 112(f)'s 
residual risk program. 
B. Exceptions and Flexible Regulation 
1. Exceptions and Technology-Based Regulation. 
This Article argues that the technology-based controls for air 
toxies in subsection 112(d) are a good place to start, but that the 
residual risk provisions in subsection 112(f) should be used to pro-
vide exceptions234 from the technology-based standards. both to 
provide additional protection and to lower standards where they 
are too costly and their relaxation will not endanger the public 
health. Market-based solutions are inappropriate because we lack 
sufficient information to compare chemicals that cause different 
diseases. 
Subsection m.B will examine whether an "exception process" 
should be created to allow variances for individual firms from the 
technology-based and residual risk variances in section 112.255 
234. Commentators often cite the implementation problems, expenses, and inconsis-
tencies associated with an "exceptions" or "waiver" policy. See grnmzlJy Colin Diver, The 
optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 70-71 n. 31 (1983); Latin, MFint-
Tuning", supra note 11, at 1324 n. 286; Stewart, Innovation, supra note 154, at 1319 n.195. 
This Article acknowledges the dangers ofttying to attempt regulatory solutions that are too 
complicated, costly and potentially counter-producti\·e. The Amoco-EPA study and the ex-
perience with using technology-based controls to reduce water toxies suggests, howC\'Cr, 
that society must experiment with bold, new regulatory initiatives to tackle such issues as 
multimedia pollution, "hot-spots," and environmental racism. 
235. Another approach would be to set standards entirely through individual adjudi-
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While strong arguments can be made against allowing an excep-
tions process for toxic chemicals, this Article's proposal for an ex-
ceptions process for sources of air toxics seeks to benefit both 
industry and public safety. 
a. The Case for Exceptions. 
Some scholars have argued that even detailed rules fail to ac-
count for the full variety of situations to which they arguably ap-
ply.236 In particular, regulatory rules often leave too little room for 
individualized justice.237 Such rigid and highly specific provisions 
often characterize statutory rules as well as administrative ones.238 
Administrative agencies can tailor the application of statutory 
or administrative rules to special cases either through ad hoc, "dis-
pensatory" discretion, or through an "exceptions process" in which 
the agency considers applications for waivers, exemptions, or vari-
ances from a rule in a procedure that incorporates limited protec-
tions for applicants and other affected parties.239 
Without a variance option, many sources "would have a greater 
incentive to hide violations from inspection and regulation."24o It is 
important to encourage regulated firms to practice voluntary self-
disclosure because regulatory agencies usually lack the resources to 
detect all violations. Further, it is economically rational for regu-
lated firms to commit violations even where there is a significant 
risk of agency detection because these agencies rarely bring en-
cations when a source of air toxies seeks a permit, but a totally individualized process 
would create enormous administrative burdens. See E.!. du Pont Nemours & Co. v. Train, 
430 U.S. 112, 123-27, 132-35, 138 (1977); Stewart, Innwation, supra note 154, at 1265·66 
(distinguishing between standards that are applied uniformly to an entire category of in· 
dustry or processes and screening techniques applied through "hand·tailored" individual 
determinations); see generally Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11 (arguing in favor of uni· 
form standards and criticizing attempts to "fine-tune" statutes). The residual risk provi. 
sions in subsection 112(f) require screening assessments regarding excess cancer risk after 
technology·based are installed for individual sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f). 
236. See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUcnON TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 48-63 (1954); 
H.LA. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. REv. 593, 627·29 
(1958); Jeffrey M. Sellers, Regulatory Values and the Exceptions Process, 93 YALE L. J. 938 
(1983). 
237. See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF 
REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 25 (1982); Aman, supra note 179, at 288-92; Sellers, supra 
note 236, at 938. 
238. See Sellers, supra note 236, at 938 n.3, 941-42). 
239. Id. at 938 (advocating exceptions process). 
240. See Melnick & Willes, supra note 182, at 247; John T. Scholz, Cooperation, Deter· 
rence, and Ecology of Regulatory Enforcement, 18 LAw & Soc. REv. 179, 179-80 (1984) (contrast· 
ing deterrence-oriented enforcement strategy with "cooperative" enforcement strategy). 
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forcement actions against all violators. Even when they do, agen-
cies and courts are often unwilling to impose drastic sanctions that 
would force a firm to shut down.241 An exceptions process may 
convince some firms that the regulatory process is "fair" and that 
they should comply as a matter of civic responsibility.242 Thus, 
some commentators suggest that an exceptions process would pro-
mote a more cooperative regulatory environment that leads to 
more effective enforcement than an inflexible, deterrence-ori-
ented model of enforcement. 243 Exceptions might, therefore, fos-
ter a cooperative atmosphere where regulators work with a source 
to find solutions to reduce emissions.244 
This Article proposes an exceptions process for sources of air 
toxies regulated under subsection 112 of the Act. Commentators 
have distinguished between "hardship" exceptions, which in the 
regulatory context are usually based upon financial distress or tech-
nological infeasibility, and "fairness" exceptions, which may be 
based upon such grounds as equal protection, comparative fair-
ness, estoppel, or reasonableness as measured by a cost-benefit 
analysis.245 This Article will discuss both types of exceptions, using 
examples from the Clean Water Act. and will propose that sources 
of air toxies be allowed "fairness" exceptions where the cost of reg-
ulation is disproportionate to the ambient air quality benefits and 
the exception will not pose an unacceptable health risk, but will 
advise against "hardship" exceptions because of the health dangers 
of air toxies. 
b. The Case Against Exceptions. 
Numerous commentators have argued that allowing variances 
or exceptions to national, uniform standards can create implemen-
241. See generaUy Melnick & Willes. supra note 182. at 247-348. 
242. See generaUy id. at 248-49; BARDACH & KAGAN. supra note 237. at 7; Sellers. supra 
note 236. at 944-46. 
243. See id. at 248-49; see generally BARDACH & KAGAN. supra note 237. at 123-62; Kuru 
HAWKINS. ENVIRONMENT AND ENFORCEMENT: REGUlATION AND THE SoCtAL DEflNmON OF 
POLLUTION 105-55 (1984); Scholz, supra note 240. at 179-80. 
244. See generaUy BARDACH & KAGAN. supra note 237. at 144-49; Melnick & Willes. supra 
note 182. at 249. 
245. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470 U.s. 116. 
162 n.21 (1985) (Marshall,J.. dissenting); Aman. supra note 179. at 293-94; Martin Shapiro, 
AdministTativeDiscretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE 1..J. 1487, 1504 (1983); Peter Schuck, U71t71 
the Exception Becomes the Rule: RegulaUny Equity and the Fonnuialion oJ an EnttgJ Policy Through 
an Exceptions Process. 1984 DUKE 1..J. 163. 283-89. There are also policy exceptions that 
focus less on the individual characteristics of the petitioner and more on overall policy 
goals. See Aman. supra note 179. at 293-94. 
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tation problems, increase the expense of administration and result 
in inconsistencies among similarly situated regulated firms.246 Ad-
ministrators generally prefer uniform standards to more individual-
ized approaches because ignoring differences among firms reduces 
decisionmaking costs and may reduce strategic behavior by firms 
seeking special treatment from regional federal administrators, 
state or local officials, or pursuing costly litigation in order to ob-
tain a variance from uniform standards.247 Professor Howard Latin 
has argued, "the implementation of variances based on individual-
ized circumstances raises numerous problems: high decisionmak-
ing costs, frequent litigation, inconsistent results, persistent delays, 
increased opportunities for manipulative behavior by applicants or 
administrators, and inadequate participation."248 Perhaps for 
these reasons, courts now rarely require that "legislative" rules in-
clude waiver provisions.249 The case against exceptions and for 
uniform application may be especially strong where regulatory 
schemes further important national objectives such as health or 
safety or civil rights.250 
2. Air and Water Pollution Control Variances. 
a. Air Pollution Variances, Revisions and Extensions. 
It is useful to examine how Congress and the EPA have pro-
vided for exceptions as part of the current regime for air and water 
pollution control. For criteria air pollutants, variance applications 
from requirements in a state implementation plan251 are typically 
reviewed and initially determined at the state level,252 require rea-
246. Colin S. Diver, The optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 70-71 
n.31 (1983); Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note II, at 1324 n.286; Stewart, Innavation, supra 
note 154, at 1319 n.195 (arguing that waiver process involves high costs and is unlikely to 
promote innovative technology). 
247. See Stewart, Innavation, supra note 154, at 1266; see generally Latin, "Fine-Ttming," 
supra note 11. 
248. Latin, "Fine-tuning", supra note 11, at 1323. 
249. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L. REv. 
393, 419 (1981). 
250. Id. at 431-32; Sellers, supra note 236, at 955. 
251. To achieve the National Ambient Air Quality Standards for each criteria pollu-
tant within the statutory time limits, the Act requires each state to adopt and submit for 
EPA approval a State Implementation Plan specifying how state and local procedures and 
regulations will enable all areas in a state to achieve those standards. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a). 
For critical evaluation of this process, see William F. Pedersen, Jr., Why the Clean Air Act 
Works Badly, 129 U. PA. L. REv. 1059, 1078-88 (1981); Howard Latin, Regulatory Failure, 
Administrative Incentives, and the New Clean Air Act, 21 ENVTL. L. 1647, 1688-1715 (1991). 
252. States seeking to revise a plan must follow strict procedures similar to those nec-
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sonable notice and a public hearing,253 and then must be approved 
by the Administrator of the EPA as a revision to the plan.254 Sub-
section 112(i) provides several different types of extensions for 
sources of air toxies, but these exemptions merely postpone the 
inevitable and do not provide a permanent exception from appli-
cable technology-based emissions standards provided in subsection 
112 (d).255 
b. Clean Water Act Variances. 
E.ffluent limitations for point sources under the Clean Water 
Act are primarily based upon industry-wide technology-based stan-
dards.256 Similarly, subsection 112(d)'s technology-based emission 
limitations are promulgated for categories and subcategories of in-
dustry.257 Thus, the Clean Water Act may serve as a potential 
model for developing an exceptions process for sources of air 
toxies. 
c. Fundamentally Different Factors Variance. 
The Clean Water Act provides a far more complex series ofvari-
ances and modifications than the Clean Air Act. 258 Subsection 
essary for approval of the original plan. 42 U.S.c. § 7410(k), (I); 40 C.F.R. § 51.104 (1993); 
Melnick & Willes, supra note 182, at 213-14. 
253. 42 U.S.c. § 7410(1): 40 C.F.R. § 51.104. 
254. See 42 U.S.c. § 7410(1): 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.104, 51.105, 51.112 (1993). Sa grntmlJy 
Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975) (holding in dicta that 
proposed revisions cannot be approved by EPA if it would cause the pian to fail to ensure 
maintenance of the national standards). The 1990 Amendments repealed the n:'oision 
provisions discussed in Train, 42 U.S.c. § 7410 (a) (3), and added the somewhat more strin-
gent provisions in § 110(1), which state that "[t]he Administrator shall not approve a n:'oi-
sion of a plan if the revision would interfere with any applicable requirement concerning 
attainment and reasonable further progress (as defined in section 7501 of this title), or any 
other applicable requirement of this chapter." 42 U.S.c. § 7410(1). Until the EPA ap-
proves a plan revision, the federal government may still enforce the original pian C\-en 
though the variance may bar state or local enforcement. 40 C.F.R. § 51.105. General Mo-
tors Corp. v. United States, 496 U.S. 530, 540-41 (1990). 
255. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7412(i) (3) (compliance schedule for existing sources), (4) 
(Presidential exemption), (5) (early reductions), (6) (other reductions), (7) (extension 
for new sources), (8) (coke ovens). 
256. See generally 33 U.S.c. §§ 1311(b), 1314(b) (1988): E.!. du Pont de Nemours & 
Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (holding EPA may by rule set induslr),\ide efi)uent stan-
dards under Oean Water Act rather than set standards as part of the permit-issuance pro-
cess for individual plants). Under § 302 of the Oean Water Act, the Administrator of the 
EPA may impose more stringent water quality-based limitations on discharges if technol-
ogy-based standards are inadequate. 33 U.S.c. § 1312. 
257. See supra section ITA 
258. See William F. Ford, Jr., Third Circuit RerJinq, Fundamentally Dilftrtnt Fador Van-
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301 (l) of the Clean Water Act, however, limits exceptions for point 
sources discharging toxic pollutants to fundamentally different fac-
tors variances under subsection 301 (n).259 Adopted in 1987, sub-
section 301 (n) allows the Administrator, with the concurrence of 
the relevant state, to modify national effluent guidelines or cate-
gorical pretreatment standards, which govern sources that dis-
charge toxic pollutants into public1y-owned treatment works rather 
than directly into navigable waters. Congress or the EPA should 
consider establishing a fundamentally different factors variance for 
sources of air toxics. A broader exception process, however, is 
needed that takes into account a source's actual impact on ambi-
ent air quality. 
The Supreme Court in EPA v. National Crushed Stone, held that 
an individual firm's inability to comply with national effluent stan-
dards because of economic hardship, could not exempt that firm 
from meeting minimum industry-wide standards.260 From the stand-
point of economic theory, "hardship" exceptions are inadvisable 
because they reward a firm for being less efficient than other firms 
in an industry.261 Because of the health hazards of air toxics, sim-
ple financial distress should not relieve sources of air toxics from 
subsection 112(d)'s technology-based requirements or even the 
more stringent residual risk requirements. There should, there-
fore, be no "hardship" exceptions for producers of air toxics. 
Subsequent court decisions have established that fundamentally 
different factors variances may not be issued based upon the 
source's impact on water quality.262 Thus, a firm must demonstrate 
engineering and technical constraints or compliance costs from 
ames Under the Clean Water Act: Should They be Applicable to Toxic Pol/utants, 29 VILL. L REv. 
771, 784-88 (1984) (discussing several variance and modification provisions under Clean 
Water Act). 
259. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(l), (n). 
260. 449 U.S. 66, 72-85 (1980). In § 301 (c) of the Clean Water Act, Congress had 
established a procedure for granting individual sources a modification from the timetables 
for complying with more stringent "best available technology" effiuent standards, 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1311 (c), but there was evidence that Congress did not intend to allow similar modifica-
tions based upon an individual source's financial distress as a grounds for an exception 
from complying with the "best practicable technology currently available" standards that 
every firm had to meet or shut down. See National Crushed Stone, 449 U.S. at 73-84. 
261. From an economist's perspective, a variance for economic hardship (as opposed 
to a cost-benefit analysis) makes no sense. 
262. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council 470 U.S. 116, 132 
(1985); Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 671 F.2d 801 (4th Cir. 1982) (Appalachian 111); 
Crown Simpson Pulp Co. v. Costle, 642 F.2d 323, 326 (9th Cir.), ccrt. denied, 454 U.S. 1053 
(1981); Ford, supra note 258, at 791 n.89. 
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engineering, technical or raw material requirements that are fun-
damentally different from other firms.263 
There is an internal logic to excluding water quality factors 
from consideration in granting fundamentally different factors var-
iances.264 A source's actual impact on air quality, however, ought 
to be grounds for granting a "fairness" variance from subsection 
112 (d)'s technology-based standards or subsection 112(£)'s 
residual risk requirements.265 A fairness exception is appropriate 
where an individual firm's compliance with categorical standards 
would result in no significant environmental benefit. 266 A more 
difficult question arises where compliance results in some reduc-
tion in risk, but there are disproportionately high costs in relation-
ship to the benefits achieved. The issues surrounding a "fairness" 
exception for sources of air toxies will be discussed below. 
In Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Cou1Zci~267 the 
Supreme Court explained that a source of water toxies seeking a 
fundamentally different factors variance must prove that the EPA 
should have placed the firm in a separate subcategory during the 
rulemaking process.268 When this case was decided in 1985, sub-
section 301 (l) prohibited the Administrator from modifying any re-
quirement applicable to toxic pollutants and did not yet contain 
the exception for fundamentally different factors variances added 
in 1987.269 In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court held that 
there was no clear congressional intent indicating whether funda-
mentally different factors variances were precluded under subsec-
tion 30l(l) and that the EPA's interpretation that fundamentally 
263. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n 470 U.S., at 156 (Marshall. J •• dissenting); 40 C.F.R. 
§ 403.13(d)(5); Latin. "Fine-Tuning", supm note 11, at 1315-16. 
264. Appalachian Power Co., 671 F.2d at 809 ("Because receiving water quality is clearly 
excluded in the setting of generic BPT [best practicable technology] limitations. it must 
also be excluded in detennining whether to grant a variance from those general 
limitations.W ). 
265. See text accompanying notes 293-95. 
266. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n 470 U.S .• at 162 n. 21 (Marshall.J •• dissenting); Aman, 
supra note 179. at 311-12. 
267. 470 U.S. 116 (1985); Compare William Funk, The Exaptitm That A~ Ihe Ruk: 
HJF Variances Under the Clean n~ AcI, 13 B.C. ENvn.. AFF. 1.. REv. 1 (1985) (criticizing 
Chemical Mfrs. allowance of variances from toxic cffiucnt limitations. but arguing that case 
will have little significance) with Elaine Eichlin Henninger. Note. ChaniC41 ManuJadurm 
Association v. Nalural Resourre.s Defense Council, Inc.: Congrtssional AmbiguilJ Allows EPA ~ SaJd] 
Valve 10 Remain Open, 35 CATH. U. 1.. REv. 595 (1986) (arguing Supreme Court correctly 
deferred to EPA's statutoI)' interpretation allowing variances). 
268. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n.. 470 U.S. at 120-21. 
269. Compare 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (I) (1988) with 33 U.s.c. § 1311 (I) (1984). 
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different factors variances are not modifications as the term is used 
in subsection 301 (l) was permissible. The court also found that in 
the absence of clear congressional intent courts should defer to the 
agency's interpretation of the statute and held that such variances 
are therefore available to sources of toxic pollutants.27o 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the 
EPA's interpretation of subsection 301 (l) was inconsistent with the 
clear intent of Congress.271 He acknowledged that the EPA has the 
authority to establish a separate subcategory and effluent standards 
for a single source discharging water toxics that is fundamentally 
different from other sources in the original category or subcat-
egory, but disagreed with the EPA's position that revision of the 
standards through notice-and-comment rulemaking is substantially 
equivalent to granting an fundamentally different factors variance 
even if the procedure is somewhat different.272 Justice Marshall ar-
gued that "Congress attached great substantive significance to the 
method used for establishing pollution control requirements."273 
He contended that having individual states or the EPA evaluate a 
variance application for a single source was no substitute for evalu-
ating whether there are similarly situated dischargers that deserve 
their own subcategory.274 For example, the effluent standards for a 
group of similarly situated dischargers in a new subcategory might 
be significantly more stringent or more likely to spur technological 
innovation than those set for a single source granted a fundamen-
tally different factors variance.275 Even if the statutory revision pro-
cedure resulted in the creation of a subcategory with only one 
discharger, that procedure would at least establish that this dis-
charger is uniquely situated whereas a variance procedure sets indi-
vidual requirements even where there may be similarly situated 
dischargers.276 
In the concluding section of his dissent,Justice Marshall argued 
that Congress intended to prohibit any exceptions to the general 
rules for water toxics.277 He acknowledged that exceptions may 
270. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n, 470 U.S. at 125-34. 
271. Id. at 135-65. 
272. See id. at 153-54 (Marshall,j., dissenting). 
273. Id. at 154 (Marshal,]., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
274. Id at 156. 
275. Id. at 157. 
276. Id. at 158. 
277. Id. at 159-65. justices Blackmun and Stevens joined his dissent, but justice 
O'Connor "express[ed] no view as to Part IV of the dissent because I think it is not neces-
sary to the disposition of these cases." Id. at 165 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). 
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"mediate bet:\veen demands for comprehensive solutions on the 
one hand, and individualized application of law on the other."278 
He contended, however, that exceptions "are inappropriate where 
small errors could lead to irreversible or catastrophic results" and 
that Congress had clearly indicated that an exceptions process 
would interfere with controlling toxic pollution.279 Thus, funda-
mentally different factors variances are prohibited as any other 
type of "fairness" or "hardship" exception would be.280 On the 
other hand, revision of existing categories and creation of new sub-
categories are appropriate "because they are rules of general 
applicability."281 
"Fairness" exceptions are preferable on both on equity and effi-
ciency grounds. Prohibiting any exceptions and requiring revision 
of categories through the rulemaking process would provide more 
procedural and thus more substantive protections to the public, 
but the EPA's delays in promulgating technology-based rules pur-
suant to subsection 112(d) despite firm congressional deadlines 
suggests that rulemaking is too cumbersome. The majority in Chem-
ical MJrs. Ass'n agreed with the agency that the availability of "vari-
ances makes bearable the enormous burden faced by EPA in 
promulgating categories of sources and setting effiuent limita-
tions."282 The administrative convenience of an exception process 
out:\veighs the potential disadvantages suggested in Justice Mar-
shall's dissent as long as appropriate safeguards are in place: al-
lowing individual exceptions, but requiring a source in its variance 
application to discuss whether there are similarly situated sources 
and mandating that the EPA consider such information in deter-
mining whether to grant an individual exception and in setting the 
appropriate standard for that source. Furthermore, citizens would 
have the opportunity to challenge a source's assertion that it is 
uniquely situated and would have the opportunity to obtain gov-
ernment grants to investigate whether other sources are similarly 
situated. Nevertheless,Justice Marshall's dissent demonstrates that 
procedural differences can have substantive consequences. 
Despite the enormous litigation surrounding fundamentally dif-
278. Id. at 159 (citing Diver, Policy Making Paradigms, supra note 249). 
279. Id. at 159-61. 
280. See id. at 161-65. 
281. Id. at 165. 
282. Id. at 132. 
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ferent factors variances, the EPA has granted relatively few.283 The 
EPA should be able to grant exceptions not only for sources meet-
ing the criteria for such variances, but also where the cost of regu-
lation is clearly disproportionate to a source's actual impact on the 
environment and the exception will not pose an unacceptable 
health risk. 
d. Ambient Quality "Fairness" Exceptions. 
The Clean Water Act contains a water quality-related variance 
in subsection 316(a) for sources demonstrating that thermal efflu-
ent limitations are "more stringent than necessary to assure the 
pro[t]ection and propagation ofa balanced, indigenous population 
of shellfish, fish, and wildlife .... "284 Subsection 301 (h) authorizes 
a water quality-related exception for publicly owned treatment 
works whose discharges do not interfere with attainment of the na-
tional water quality goal in marine waters in recognition of the 
ocean's natural assimilative capacity.285 Professor Latin contends 
that the EPA has granted too many exemptions under both provi-
sions and that such exceptions produce negative overall policy re-
sults even if some sources genuinely deserve a variance.286 
The most interesting example of a water quality-related vari-
ance is contained in subsection 301 (g), which allows modifications 
for certain nonconventional pollutants.287 Nonconventional pollu-
tants are all pollutants that are not classified either as conventional 
or toxic pollutants.288 Nonconventional pollutants are sometimes 
referred to as "gray area" pollutants because some may be reclassi-
283. By 1984, the EPA had been granted a total of four fundamentally different fac-
tors variances to direct dischargers. and none to indirect dischargers. fd. at 124 n.12. 
284. 33 U.S.C. § 1326; Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1320-21 (criticizing 
wholesale exemptions EPA granted to thermal polluters). 
285. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(h); Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1321-22 (criticizing 
excessive number of marine water exceptions). 
286. See generaUy Latin, "Fine-Tuning", supra note 11, at 1320-23. Sometimes courts 
required the agency to read an exception in an expansive manner. See, e.g. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 656 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (rejecting EPA's nar-
row interpretation of Clean Water Act § 301 (h». 
287. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g). 
288. fd. § 1311 (b) (2) (F). Conventional pollutants are those which were traditionally 
regulated in discharges from publicly owned treatment works and include biochemical 
oxygen demand, suspended solids, fecal coliform, pH, oil, and grease. WILUAM MURRAY 
TABB & LINDA A. MALONE, ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 454 (1992). See generally 33 U.S.C. 
§§ 1311 (b)(2)(E); 1314(b)(4)(A)-(B). Toxic pollutants are listed pursuant to require-
ments set forth in section 307 of the Clean Water Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1317. 
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fied in the future as toxic pollutants.289 In 1987, Congress defined 
"nonconventional" to include ammonia, chlorine, color, iron, and 
total phenols, and also granted the EPA authority to list additional 
pollutants.29o 
Subsection 301(g) authorizes the EPA to grant a modification 
of "best available technology" requirements for direct dischargers 
of nonconventional pollutants that can demonstrate compliance 
with minimal technology- or water quality-based standards in sub-
sections 301 (b) (1) (A) or (C), that the modification will not result 
in any additional requirements on any other point or nonpoint 
source, and that the modification will not interfere 'with water qual-
ity-related standards.291 The petitioner must show that the modifi-
cation will not interfere with public drinking water supplies, 
recreational activities, or the protection and propagation of shell-
fish, fish, and wildlife.292 Furthermore, the owner or operator of 
the point source must demonstrate that the modification will not 
"pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment 
because of bioaccumulation, persistency in the environment, acute 
toxicity, chronic toxicity (including carcinogenicity, mutagenicity 
or teratogenicity), or synergistic propensities."293 
Congress should amend the Clean Air Act by establishing a fair-
ness exception system for sources of air toxics where a source can 
demonstrate that the cost of regulation disproportionately exceeds 
the public health benefits provided the source can satisfy air qual-
ity-related criteria similar to those for water quality in subsection 
301 (g) of the Clean Water Act 294 A major question is whether 
fairness exceptions to the Clean Air Act should be applied to toxic 
chemicals where great uncertainty exists of their health effects.295 
Congress clearly excluded water toxics from the subsection 301 (g) 
289. See generally JOHN E. BONINE & THOMAS O. McGARrlY, THE L\w OF ENvtRON!>I£N. 
TAL PROTECTION 269, 293, 322 (2d ed. 1992). 
290. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311 (g)(l) , (4). The version of§ 301 (g) adopted in 1977 had not 
listed any particular chemicals as nonconventionals. 33 U.S.c. § 1311(g) (1978). 
291. 33 U.S.c. § 1311(g)(2). Indirect dischargers into publicly o\\ned treatment 
works are ineligible for a § 301(g} modification. Koppers Co., Inc. \'. EPA, 767 F.2d 57 
(3rd Cir. 1985) (per curiam). 
292. 33 U.S.c. § 1311 (g)(2}(C). 
293. Id. 
294. This author would probably favor expanding subsection 301 (g) to include water 
toxies, but will not directly address whether the same arguments for fairness exceptions 
apply to water toxies. 
295. See supra notes 65-78 and accompanying texL 
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water quality-related variance program.296 Similarly, because sub-
section 112(d)'s technology-based emission standards "shall re-
quire the maximum degree of reduction in emissions of hazardous 
air pollutants subject to this section (including a prohibition on 
such emissions, when achievable) that the Administrator, taking 
into consideration the cost [and other factors], determines is 
achievable ... ", a strong argument can be made that sources of air 
toxics are not entitled to a variance even if their residual risk is far 
below one-in-one-million.297 
While fairness exceptions would pose some risk to the public 
health, applicants for exceptions would have to demonstrate on a 
site-specific basis that their pollution does not pose an unaccept-
able risk. Thus, this Article's proposed variance process would con-
tain far more safeguards than the Bush administration's trading 
scheme for sources in the early reductions program.298 The follow-
ing study demonstrates some powerful reasons for allowing more 
regulatory flexibility despite the risks of toxic chemicals. 
e. The Amoco-EPA Study: The Case for Flexible Regulation. 
A recent joint Amoco-EPA study of Amoco's Yorktown, Virginia 
refinery sought to assess how well current environmental regula-
tions and pollution control requirements work at an individual 
source through extensive monitoring of actual emissions. The 
study's findings demonstrated ways to reduce pollution at less cost 
than is possible following current regulatory techniques.299 The re-
296. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g)(4). 
297. See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(d)(2). There is no variance procedure from § 112's tech-
nology·based emission standards for individual sources of hazardous air pollutants. Under 
§ 112(c)(9), however, a source category would not be subject to technology-based Sian-
dards if no source in the category emits such hazardous pollutants in quantities that result 
in a lifetime cancer risk of one-in-one-miIIion to the most exposed individual and emissions 
from non-carcinogenic pollutants do not exceed air quality levels beyond those necessary 
to protect the public health with an ample margin of safety. This deletion provision ap-
plies only to whole source categories and not to individual sources. 
298. Possible changes to emission averaging policies may require sources engaged in 
"trading" of hazardous air pollutants to conduct risk assessments that would be similar in 
nature, although potentially more limited in scope, to the site-specific exposure assess-
ments proposed in this Article. See supra note 110 and accompanying text. 
299. See generally AMoco, supra note 8; see also Keith Schneider, Unbending Rtgulalions 
Incite M(JTJe to Alter Pollution Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1993, atAl, All (discussing Amoco/ 
EPA study); Caleb Solomon, Clearing the Air: What Rtally Pol/utes, WALL ST. j., March 29, 
1993, at AI, A6 (same). The project took two years, cost $ 2.3 million, and produced 
volumes of information on air, water and solid waste releases. AMoco supra note 8, at vi. 
The study faced difficult problems in identifying, sampling and monitoring emissions from 
thousands of valves, flanges, pump seals and tank vents. Id. at 1-4,1-5,1-16,1-17, B-1, B-2. 
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finery was spending $31 million to rebuild the refinery's waste-
water system to prevent benzene, an air toxic, from evaporating 
into the air, but no controls were required at marine loading docks 
that emitted far more pollution and could be controlled at far less 
cost-just $6 million.soo The regulation requiring the cleanup of 
benzene at refinery'S waste-'water treatment plants was based upon 
1959 benzene emissions estimates from pools of dirty water known 
as "separators" that the Yorktown study showed to be twenty times 
less than the 1959 study predicted.sol Under current law, however, 
there are no provisions that allow the EPA to exempt sources of 
hazardous air pollutants from nationwide, uniform technology-
based requirements even if alternative approaches to regulation 
might be more efficient or result in less pollution.302 In particular, 
the study pointed out that current administrative procedures dis-
courage a coordinated approach to multimedia releases, including 
the analysis of risks, benefits, and costs of managing residual pollu-
tants in different media.sos The study recommends that incentives 
be provided for conducting facility-wide assessments and develop-
ing multi-media release reduction strategies.304 The Amoco-EPA 
study raises important questions concerning the EPA's authority to 
exempt a particular facility from national pollution control stan-
dards if site-specific exposure modeling indicates there are alterna-
tive methods to reduce pollution at less cost or the e:lo..-pense of 
regulation is disproportionate to the risk posed by a pollutant or 
combination of pollutants. 
There are good policy reasons to favor variances from technol-
ogy-based standards despite Professor Latin's arguments and con-
gressional intent to establish subsection 112(d) standards as a 
minimum. Noncancer, multimedia and other potential impacts 
may not be addressed until industry has an incentive to conduct 
The EPA pointed out that samples were collected over a short period of time and therefore 
represent a "snapshot" of releases to the environment at that time. Because of both practi-
cal and perhaps inherent uncertainties in risk assessments, the study could not establish 
absolute risk levels or measure the ecological impact from airborne emissions, but focused 
on the more narrow issue of measuring relative changes in risk from current lC'o'els on 
human health effects indicated by changes in exposure to benzene. Id. at 1-1, 1-2, B-4. 
300. See AMoco supra note 8, at viii, 1-7, 1-11, 1-12; Solomon, supra note 299, at Al. 
A6. There was some disagreement between EPA and Amoco about some specific measure-
ments and results, but both agreed wastewater is a small contributor to total benzene re-
leases. AMoco, supra note 8, at 1-12. 
301. See Schneider, supra note 299, at All; Solomon, supra note 299. at A6. 
302. See AMoco supra, note 8, at ix, 1-12, 1-15, 1-16. 
303. Id. at ix, 1-18. 
304. Id. at 1-17, 1-18. 
HeinOnline -- 13 Stan. Envtl. L. J. 326 1994
326 STANFORD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 13:263 
site-specific facility-wide assessments and develop multi-media re-
lease reduction strategies. The EPA simply did not know about the 
importance of benzene emissions from loading docks at Amoco's 
Yorktown refinery until ajoint study was done.805 Mter this study, 
the EPA is considering new regulations to control benzene emis-
sions at loading docks, but those regulations will not take effect for 
a few years.806 Meanwhile, Amoco continues to spend huge 
amounts on controlling relatively small amounts of benzene emis-
sions from wastewater, but allows benzene emissions from its load-
ing docks to continue because there are no regulations.807 The 
Amoco-EPA study suggests that the whole approach to regulation 
needs to be framed in terms of tailoring regulations to individual 
plants. 
IV. LEGISLATING RESIDUAL RISK AND PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION STANDARDS 
A. "'When EPA Should Impose Mwe Restrictive Regulations on a 
Facility 
This Article proposes that Congress enact a "fuzzy bright line" 
statute for regulating residual risk that would: (1) require the elim-
ination of cancer risks greater than one-in-ten-thousand from any 
pollutant or combination of pollutants; (2) would presumptively 
allow industry variances from technology-based standards if cancer 
risks are less than one-in-one-million and there are no other signifi-
cant dangers from noncancer or multimedia risks, and (3) would 
allow the agency limited discretion in regulating risks between 
those figures in light of economic costs and technological feasibil-
ity. The proposed statute would require that the EPA or states hold 
formal public hearings and prepare more detailed administrative 
records than normally required for the Title V operating permit 
program if a source applies for a variance from technology-based 
standards. It would also allow the public to compel hearings on a 
source's permit application or reapplication if they present evi-
dence of significant risks from carcinogens, noncarcinogens, "hot-
spots," multimedia pollution, indirect effects, or potentially dispa-
rate impacts on diverse, exposed subpopulations. 
The proposal raises important questions such as about the ex-
305. See Solomon, supra note 299, at A6. 
306. Id. 
307. Id. 
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tent to which Congress should allow the EPA flexibility in exempt-
ing a source from technology-based standards if the source argues 
it can achieve other reductions. The incommensurability of many 
different types of risks suggests that Congress must define priorities 
and constrain the agency's discretion by establishing ranges in 
which the agency may operate. The difficult problems of assessing 
risk raises questions about what types of exposure assessments are 
appropriate to gather information. Must a source engage in actual 
monitoring or simply rely on models? Congress could establish a 
preference for actual monitoring, but give the agency some discre-
tion in allowing modeling. 
In addition to showing the shortcomings of the residual risk 
provisions of subsection 112 (f), this Article has argued that public 
participation in environmental decisionmaking is an important 
policy consideration. In this section, this Article will discuss haw the 
proposal would allow greater meaningful participation than the 
current system. This section will briefly discuss under what circum-
stances the EPA should impose additional procedures, including 
public hearings or site-specific exposure assessments, and espe-
cially more restrictive regulations on an individual facility when a 
citizen alleges that national standards do not adequately protect 
the public safety. It will also suggest how the EPA might imple-
ment an exceptions process that can impose more restrictive regu-
lations on some firms while also allowing more lenient variances 
from national standards in favor of other sources. 
In determining whether to impose additional procedural re-
quirements on a source when a citizen requests a public hearing or 
a site-specific risk assessment, the EPA should consider the cost of 
such procedures, but should err on the side of enhancing public 
participation. In determining whether to impose more stringent 
regulations on an individual source, the EPA should attempt to 
compare the costs and benefits of regulation but err on the side of 
public safety. The proposal would require the EPA or industry to 
fund technical assistance grants to allow citizens to substantiate se-
rious concerns about a facility's risk. 
This Article would allow the agency to consider rapidly escalat-
ing costs that fail the "knee-of-the-cuIVe"g08 benefit-cost test in de-
termining whether to grant a citizen's request for more restrictive 
regulation of a particular facility than required by national stan-
308. See infra note 320 {discussing "knee-of.the-curyc" test}. 
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dards.309 There are, however, important normative reasons to pre-
vent potential environmental and health-related harm even if such 
safeguards fail cost-benefit analysisSIO There are also reasons to 
believe that the tort system may be inadequate to compensate all 
potential victims.sll 
The ultimate goal of Congress was to achieve maximum reduc-
tions for each hazardous air pollutant. Even the residual risk stan-
dards do not require the EPA or a major source to consider the 
impact of individual pollutants. That omission would be fine if 
each chemical caused the same disease and affected each exposed 
subpopulation in the same way, but in fact different types of haz-
ardous air pollutants can cause different diseases and can have a 
greater or lesser impact on different subpopulations. Further-
more, there may be potential multiplicative or synergistic impacts 
from different chemicals which increase the risk of cancer or other 
diseases.312 Site-specific exposure assessments of individual pollu-
tants may produce benefits by producing information useful for 
other regulatory programs or helping to develop more flexible reg-
ulatory approaches better suited to addressing multimedia 
problems.sl3 This Article proposes to establish a presumption in 
309. See generally Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. EPA, 870 F.2d 177, 204-06 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(rejecting industry challenge that EPA regulations failed "knee of curve" test). 
310. Professors Shapiro and McGarity have argued that tough technology-based con-
trols should be used even if those controls may fail a cost-benefit test because, for norma-
tive reasons, they would prefer to prevent injuries to the extent feasible, rather than 
compensate for injuries after they occur. Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 80, at 751. They 
also maintain, however, that cost-benefit analysts underestimate the value of a life and that 
worker compensation systems pay workers less than the full economic value of their lives, 
as defined by economists. Id.; see also VISCUSI, supra note 79, at 17-18 (loss of earnings does 
not reflect full value of worker's life). Their arguments would apply even more powerfully 
to neighbors of plants using such substances because their exposure is involunt.'lry and 
because workers in at least some sense "volunteer" to work for a firm using high-risk chemi-
cals and generally receive wage premium for such work. See VISCUSI, supra note 79, at 44; 
Gillette & Krier, supra note 79, at 1071-86 (arguing that ordinary persons correctly consider 
voluntary versus involuntary distinction in assessing acceptability of risk). 
311. In another article, this author argued that firms using extremely hazardous 
materials may not fully internalize those costs because of the possibility of filing for bank-
ruptcy and that insurance requirements may not be adequate to force firms to internalize 
fully such costs. See Bradford C. Mank, Preventing Bhopal: "Dead Zones" and Toxic Death Risll 
Index Taxes, 53 OHIO STATE LJ. 761, 791-97 (1992). An even larger problem is the diffi-
culty of proving causation in toxic tort suits. See, e.g., Applegate, Perils, supra note 22 , at 272 
n.59; Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REv. 1219 (1987). 
312. In general, the EPA's risk assessment methods for hazardous air pollutants do 
not take into account the possibility of synergistic and antagonistic effects of various pollu-
tants. See Sawey et al., supra note 71, at 482. 
313. The recent Amoco-EPA study indicates that individualized risk assessments can 
yield benefits in identifying less expensive ways to achieve the same pollution reductions. 
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favor of more restrictive regulation of individual plants if a citizen 
can produce substantial evidence demonstrating that significant 
risks from individual pollutants exist at a facility that are not ad-
dressed by existing national regulation and that the costs of addi-
tional regulation are not disproportionate to the expected 
benefits. 
There are a variety of ways that Congress might develop a "fuzzy 
bright line" or risk range approach to regulation. This Article will 
distinguish between the use of noncarcinogenic risk and other fac-
tors as either comparison factors or consideration factors. The 
technology-based standards in the Clean Water Act distinguish be-
tween comparison factors that require the EPA to undertake a limited 
balancing test in which the cost of technology-based controls are 
compared against effluent reduction benefits, and consideration fac-
tors that the agency must simply "take into account. "314 In deter-
mining "best practicable technology currently available" under the 
Clean Water Act, the limited comparison factors balancing test re-
quires the EPA "to limit the application of technology only where 
the additional degree of effluent reduction is wlwUy out of proportion 
to the costs of achieving such marginal level of reduction for any 
class or category of sources."315 By contrast, "Congress did not 
mandate any particular structure's or weight for the many consid-
eration factors," but merely "left EPA with discretion to decide how 
to account for the consideration factors, and how much weight to 
give each factor."316 
This Article's proposal would require the EPA to undertake a 
comprehensive cost-benefit comparison test whenever possible to 
estimate the risk of granting an exception from national standards 
where a firm contends that the costs of regulation at one of its 
While the study was costly and difficult to perform, the EPA and Amoco identified ways to 
achieve greater pollution reductions for about $11 million than are being achieved at a 
cost of $41 million under current agency regulations. See AMOCO supra, note 8, at ,iii·ix, I-
ll, 1-23 (Table 1.3). 
314. For example, pursuant to § 304(b) (1) (B) of the Clean Water Act. the £PAmusl 
take into account both consideration and comparison factors in determining the best prac-
ticable technology currently available. 33 U.S.G. § 1314(b) (1) (B); Ste gmtralLJ Weyerhaeu-
ser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d lOll, 1045-47 (D.G. Gir. 1978). By contrast, in § 304(b)(2)(B) 
of the Clean Water Act all factors, including costs and benefits, are consideration factors, 
and no factors are separated out for comparison in determining the best available technol-
ogy economically achievable. 33 U.S.c. § 1314(b) (2) (B); n~'trlzaeustT, 590 F.2d at 1045. 
315. WIlj'erluzeuser, 590 F.2d at 1045 n.52 (quoting SENATOR MU5K1£, A WISUTIVE 
HlsroRY OF THE WATER POU.unON ComROL Ac:r AMENDMENTS OF 1972 170 (1973» (em-
phasis added by WIlj'erhaeuser court). 
316. fd. at 1045. 
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facilities are wholly disproportionate to health benefits achieved. 
On the other hand, the EPA would have to assess whether addi-
tional regulations proposed by a citizen for a plant are reasonably 
cost effective for the health benefits that would be gained. In some 
cases, the EPA may have to apply a "consideration approach" in 
which the agency simply takes into account health and cost factors 
where there is insufficient information 'with which to assess the 
risks of a chemical or the potential cost of reducing its emissions. 
Because of the great uncertainties about the risks posed by many 
hazardous air pollutants, this Article's proposal would allow the 
EPA to err on the side of conservative health assumptions in deter-
mining whether the costs of technology-based or residual risk stan-
dards are wholly disproportionate to the costs of regulation at a 
particular facility. 
Congress might set some limits on the agency's balancing of 
health and cost factors by specifying a list of factors that mayor 
may not be considered. For example, a statute could simply re-
quire the EPA to consider noncarcinogens, indirect and mul-
timedia impacts, impacts on diverse exposed subpopulations and 
other "public" risk considerations. The advantage of such an ap-
proach is that no attempt would be made to assign arbitrary 
weights to factors that are incommensurable. A simple "considera-
tion" factor approach, however, may not give the EPA enough con-
gressional guidance on how to weigh such factors. 
On the other hand, Congress could require the EPA to balance 
the cost and benefits of regulation within certain constraints. A 
statute might mandate that the marginal cost of a decision to pro-
tect public health fall within a range, for instance, of five to fifty 
million dollars per life saved, and establish criteria directing how 
agencies should set the level of expenditure in specific rulemaking 
contexts.317 For example, Congress might compel expenditures at 
the high end of the range if the maximum individual risk exceeded 
a specific value, such as one-in-ten-thousand.318 In the Superfund 
program, the EPA uses a "point of departure" approach in which 
risk managers seek to attain the smallest risk within the range, 
which places a burden of proof on those advocating a more permis-
sive risk within the risk range.319 Congress could place a higher 
317. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 336-38. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. at 319-20, 336-38; National Oil and Hazardous Substances Contingency Plan, 
55 Fed. Reg 8,666,8,715-18 (1990) [hereinafter Contingency Plan]. In an April 22, 1991 
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burden of proof on applicants to the extent their variance propos-
als may create risks in the upper portion of the risk range. Appli-
cants for variance proposals that have a greater overall excess 
cancer risk would face a proportionately higher requirement to 
prove that the variance would not disparately affect diverse sub-
populations, create "hot spots," cause non-carcinogenic diseases, or 
produce multi-media or indirect impacts. 
Furthermore, Congress might enact a statute that requires each 
source to reduce the risk of each noncarcinogen until "the ratio of 
incremental cost to incremental risk reduction exceeds a specified 
value."s2o The EPA would clearly have to exercise considerable 
technocratic discretion in assessing the costs and benefits, for ex-
ample, of regulating noncarcinogens or multimedia pollution. 
Nevertheless, the value specified in the statute would provide some 
congressional guidance to the agency. That value might be fairly 
arbitrary, but it would bear the imprimatur oflegislative legitimacy. 
That ratio might also constrain the EPA's consideration of costs 
within the "fuzzy bright line" risk levels for carcinogens. Public 
participation and judicial review could serve as limited checks in 
determining whether the EPA's choices in a given variance pro-
ceeding are arbitrary or capricious. 
A "fuzzy bright line" or risk range approach may encourage reg-
ulators to be more forthcoming about uncertainties in the risk as-
sessment approach than they would under a single number 
standard.s21 In addition, the use of a range that allows considera-
tion of competing interests 'within the discretionary range might 
encourage democratic dialogue about the realities of environmen-
tal decisionmaking.s22 On the other hand, the EPA may hesitate to 
assign costs and benefits to risks such as birth defects or neurologi-
Memorandum from Don R. Clay, Assistant Administrator Office of Solid Waste and Emer-
gency Response, to Directors of Regional Divisions, the EPA indicated a somewhat more 
lenient approach by allowing a "no action" record of decision where a baseline risk assess-
ment shows a risk less than one-in-10,OOO, but in some cases in which such an assessment 
has indicated risks in the higher part of the risk range the EPA has initiated remedial 
action to achieve a one-in·a-million remediation. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 319-20. 
The EPA is most likely to adopt a one-in-a-million approach when cleanup costs are low or 
when population density suggests potentially high incidence of disease. ld. at 320. 
320. See Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 347. The familiar notion of the knee-of.the-
curve, the point on the cost curve where costs begin to escalate dramatically. may pro\ide 
an attractive starting point for answering the difficult question of how much expense on 
risk reduction is "too much." See Shapiro & McGarity, supra note 80, at 743. 
321. Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 338. 
322. Id. at 356. 
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cal damage. Imperfect regulation of such risks, however, is better 
than none. 
B. "Fuzzy Bright Lines" 
1. Current Use of "Fuzzy Bright Lines. " 
Legislators could mandate minimal standards but specify a 
range of numeric values within which regulators could exercise dis-
cretion, so called "fuzzy bright lines."323 For example, a statute 
might permit an agency to set standards from lifetime cancer risk 
from carcinogens between one-in-ten-thousand and one-in-a-mil-
lion.324 During congressional discussions on the Amendments, a 
group of moderate Democrats, led by Representative Tauzi, advo-
cated such a risk range and referred to this approach informally as 
a "fuzzy bright line."325 Risk managers in several EPA program of-
fices already use such ranges to guide their decisions, without statu-
tory directives.326 In addition, the New Jersey Department of 
Environmental Protection's Division of Environmental Quality con-
siders risks less than one-in-a-million to be negligible, risks greater 
than one-in-ten-thousand to be unacceptable, and judges risks be-
tween these limits on a case-by-case basis.327 
A risk range allows government agencies to balance a number 
of factors when setting standards within the permissible range of 
risk.328 The disadvantage of the "fuzzy bright line" approach com-
pared to a "bright line" or "rules" requirement is that a risk range 
may give the agency as much discretion as a narrative standard 
such as an "ample margin of safety" and therefore allow residual 
risk to cluster at the high end of the risk range.329 Every type of 
statute can potentially be manipulated or ignored by an agency. 
The more discretionary a statute, however, the easier it is for a con-
323. Id. at 336-38, 361. 
324. Id. at 336. 
325. Id. at 336-37. 
326. Id. at 337. For example, EPA's Office of Solid Waste in selecting among cleanup 
alternatives for corrective actions at active waste sites seeks to reduce risks into the one-in-
10,000 to one-in-a-million range. Id. at 315-16; Corrective Action for Solid Waste Manage-
ment Units (SWMU's) at Hazardous Waste Facilities, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,798, 30,825-27 
(1990). The National Contingency Plan for the Superfund program states that remedies 
must generally reduce the threat from lifetime cancer risk to a highly exposed individual, a 
reasonable worst case, to within or below the range of one-in-l0,000 to one-in-a-million. 
Contingency Plan, supra note 319, at 8,718-23, 8,768. 
327. Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 337. 
328. Id. at 337. 
329. See id. 
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gressional oversight committee or court to point out flagrant 
abuses by an agency. To a certain extent, one must rely upon the 
good faith of an agency in carrying out the statute. If Congress 
desires to achieve a particular goal and wants the agency to carry 
out congressional wishes, it is wise for Congress to explicitly re-
quire that the agency make efforts to achieve that goal. 
2. Incommensurability and "Fuzzy Bright Lines. n 
a. Scientific Uncertainty. 
Cancer research cannot always specify the risk of a chemical 
even within a range of two orders of magnitude, a factor of 100.350 
The difficulties in assessing the true range of risk may be even 
greater under this Article's proposal to include a broader range of 
factors than carcinogenicity, such as noncarcinogens, indirect and 
multimedia effects, and impacts on diverse exposed subpopula-
tions. It is more difficult to establish even "fuzzy bright line" values 
for noncarcinogens that cause birth defects, reproductive failure, 
acute poisonings, neurological defects and other diseases. In fact, 
many argue that it is impossible to compare such chemicals with 
each other or 'with carcinogens. These scientific ambiguities raise 
profound questions as to whether there is any legislative metric 
that can address such problems. 
One simplistic solution to the problem of incommensurability 
would be to require that the EPA simply rank the relative risk of 
both carcinogen~ and noncarcinogens on a single risk index. The 
EPA has already done this for its emissions averaging scheme for 
the early reductions program. That risk index, however, is based 
on a series of arbitrary assumptions. There needs to be better sci-
entific evidence about both carcinogens and non carcinogens 
before an adequate risk index could be constructed, and even then 
there would be profound questions about commensurability.ssl 
330. fd. at 338. 
331. In another article, however, this author advocated a "toxic death risk index tax-
designed to force firms to internalize fully the costs of an accidental release despite the 
possibility of using the federal bankruptcy laws to avoid paying full costs. &e generally, 
Mank, Preventing Bhopal, supra note 311, at 762, 791-804. That article recognized that some 
risks, especially long·term ones, are too uncertain to quantify, but maintained that it might 
be possible to base a tax and risk index upon established risks, especially short·term ones. 
fd. The lack of adequate scientific evidence that plagued the EPA in constructing its risk 
index for the emissions averaging component of the early reductions program suggests 
that constructing a risk index that considers the risks of a l\ide variety of carcinogens and 
noncarcinogens is beyond present scientific knowledge. Risk indexes may be useful in 
prioritizing which risks the EPA or other agencies should study gil-en limited resources, but 
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Some environmentalists would undoubtedly favor legislation 
mandating rigorous emission standards for both carcinogens and 
noncarcinogens without any possibility of variances or tradeoffs be-
tween regulation of different types of chemicals. There are many 
reasons to support the "public" approach to risk assessment, espe-
cially its proponents' argument that chemicals causing different 
diseases are incommensurable. Nevertheless, the Amoco-EPA 
study suggests that agency expertise is limited, and that the public 
safety can be enhanced where industry has an incentive to increase 
regulation of certain chemicals or types of operations in exchange 
for more lenient regulation in other respects. In the absence of 
industry incentives and variances, Congress or the EPA may simply 
not regulate certain types of risk, such as those posed by noncarci-
nogens, and therefore the public safety may benefit from this Arti-
cle's proposal. 
At some point, tradeoffs must be made between acknowledging 
scientific uncertainty and providing legislative direction through a 
common metric. Public participation both through the legislative 
process and public hearings are means to legitimate those tradeoffs 
in a way that the exercise of agency discretion and expertise 
cannot. 
Another approach would give the EPA discretion to regulate 
noncarcinogens as the agency sees fit. Arguably, subsection 112(f) 
currently gives the EPA such discretion in determining what is an 
"ample margin of safety." The failure of that approach before 1990, 
however, raises serious concerns about how effectively the agency 
will address residual risk issues once technology-based controls are 
in place. 
This Article proposes an approach that would acknowledge the 
considerable uncertainty about the risks of many chemicals, and 
suggests that the EPA must exercise at least some discretion in eval-
uating risks at individual sites. On the other hand, Congress would 
establish a clear priority that the risks of noncarcinogens and other 
risk factors must be addressed in the EPA's residual risk program. 
b. Site-Specific Exposure Assessments. 
Site-specific exposure assessments are potentially explosive. 
The Amoco-EPA project took two years, and cost $ 2.3 million. 
risk indexes seem ilI-suited at present to selVe as the primary basis for regulating residual 
risk. See generally Applegate. Wtmt Things. supra note 22. at 325-27 & passim (discussing use 
of risk indexes to set priorities). 
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However, it produced volumes of information on air, water, and 
solid waste releases.332 In some cases, where a major source re-
quests significant regulatory variances or where a citizen group 
demonstrates substantial pollution problems, a detailed and site-
specific, facility-wide study similar to the Amoco-EPA study may be 
justified. In many cases, however, the potential risk will not justify 
such assessment. 
This Article suggests ways to reduce costs. First, the proposed 
statute could provide a formula or guidelines for determining if 
individualized risk-based assessments are too costly in a particular 
case. Congress through the statute or the EPA through the 
rulemaking process could set de minimis levels for triggering indi-
vidualized testing that would reduce the number of sources af-
fected by this Article's proposal.333 Second, the EPA might allow a 
variance even without a risk assessment if a source makes other 
substantial reductions not othenvise required by law that are 
clearly of more value with regards to public safety. 
An important issue is whether the Article's proposal should re-
quire actual monitoring of data from a source's emissions or simply 
rely on less expensive predictive models.334 In practice, risk asses-
sors usually use a combination of monitoring and models.sss Even 
when an agency knows a source's emissions, it is still necessary to 
make assumptions about how many people are actually ex-posed 
and at what concentrations.3SG While monitoring is generally pref-
332. AMoco supra note 8, at vi. 
333. Subsection 112(a)(5) defines "modification" to exclude de minimis changes. 42 
U.S.c. § 7412(a) (5). Congress, under this proposal, or the EPA through regulations could 
use the definition of de minimis found in that subsection or similar such measures to estab-
lish de minimis levels for determining when a source must conduct an indhidualizc:d risk 
assessment in order to justify a trade. 
334. The EPA generally uses predictive models, such as the Human Exposure Model, 
rather than direct measurements to calculate the exposure of the maximally exposed indi-
vidual. Rosenthal et aI., supra note 7, at 291. The agency normally assumes that exposure 
to a pollutant occurs over 70 years. Some commentators have criticized that assumption as 
overly conservative because no one spends her entire life outdoors at the fenceline of a 
factory, and because few factories produce the same products or C\'en exist for SC\'Cnty 
years. See Bernard Goldstein, The Maxit1Ullly Exposed Individual: An Inappropriate Ba.sis lor 
Public Health Decisionmaking, ENVIL. FORUM, Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 13. But sa Katherine Kauf-
man, In Defense althe Maxit1Ullly Exposed Individual, ENVIL. FORUM, Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 50. 
335. Assessors usually use a combination of direct ambient level measurements of a 
compound and, for known sources and emission rates, ambient level modeling. Rosenthal 
et aI., supra note 7, at 292. 
336. The population risk estimate is more difficult to quantify than the maximum 
individual risk because the assessor needs to know how many people are exposed to the 
contaminant, at what levels of concentration, and for what periods of time. Rosenthal et 
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erable,337 models have been extensively used to predict site-specific 
concentrations for both criteria and hazardous air pollutants.33s 
Some researchers have questioned the reliability of exposure as-
sessments based upon models. They argue that such models need 
to be validated by measurements of internal doses in persons or 
animals actually exposed.339 
Absent hard data, exposure assessments make assumptions 
about the amount of water the average person drinks, the amount 
of air that everyone in the population breathes, and about the pop-
ulation's food intake based upon market basket or national con-
sumption surveys.340 These assumptions usually do not account for 
the heterogeneity of the population, including gender differences, 
age differences, socioeconomic differences, and lifestyle differ-
ences.341 These shortcomings create uncertainties that sometimes 
produce large overestimates of exposure, especially for estimates of 
aI., supra note 7, at 291. While consumers and farm workers receive differing exposures 
and while toxic substances are more likely to situate in minority communities, risk assessors 
usually assume that a certain quantity of a carcinogen will produce the same increment.11 
increase in cancer risk for any person. See id. 
337. Researchers prefer detailed monitoring of a pollutant to modeling. Monitoring, 
however, is expensive, cumbersome, requires actual releases of toxic compounds into the 
environment and does not prove that a compound will behave similarly in other environ· 
ments. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 292; see generally NATIONAL REsEARCH COUNCIL, 
NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, HUMAN ExPOSURE AssESSMENT FOR AIRBORNE POLLUTANTS: 
ADVANCES AND OpPORTUNmES (1991). Still, monitoring may produce information other· 
wise impossible to attain and monitoring also helps prevent cheating by sources. See gener-
ally Clifford S. Russell, Monitoring and Enforcement, in PUBUC POUCIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION 245-72 (Paul R. Portneyed. 1990). There is general agreement that the EPA 
in the past has done a relatively poor job of monitoring air emissions. See generally Russell, 
supra (arguing that the EPA should conduct more and better ambient air quality monitor· 
ing to allow society to assess whether federal pollution control laws are effective). 
338. The EPA has stated that the technical basis for determining the impacts on 
human health and the environment from various sources of air pollution will be improved 
under a final rule issued by the agency on July 23, 1993 which will add new models and 
upgrade existing models. New, Upgraded Models Will Improve Basis for Determining Health Ef 
feets, EPA Says, 24 Env't Rep. (BNA) 515,515-16 Guly 23, 1993) [hereinafter New, Upgraded 
Models}. 
339. Exposure Assessments Based on Models Not Always Sound Predictors, Scientist Warns, 22 
Env't Rep. (BNA) 1949, 1949 (Dec. 6, 1991) (reporting speech by Larry Needham, chief of 
the Centers for Disease Control's Toxicology'S Branch). 
340. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 292·93. 
341. See id. at 293. The EPA is aware of, and attempts to account for, some variations 
in individual consumption. In light of Executive Order 12898, which requires federal 
agencies to consider environmental justice issues, EPA Administrator Browner has stated 
that the agency would evaluate fish consumption on Indian reservations, where fish may 
represent a larger portion of the daily diet than is reflected in federal standards. Pollution 
Exposure Targeted: Protection of Poor, Minorities Ordered, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Feb. 12, 1993, 
atA3. 
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the most exposed individuals.342 In other cases, serious underesti-
mates may result. 343 
This Article's proposal would expand on the existing residual 
risk provisions in subsection 112 (f) (2) (A), which already requires 
exposure assessments.344 The statute requires that the EPA deter-
mine whether excess cancer risks at individual major sources of air 
toxies exceed one-in-one-million for the most exposed individual 
after technology-based controls are installed.345 The statute, how-
ever, does not specify what method the agency may use to make 
that assessment.346 In addition, subsection 112(r) (7) (B) requires 
the EPA to issue regulations mandating that users of threshold 
amounts of certain listed hazardous substances prepare and imple-
ment a risk management plan that includes a hazard assessment to 
determine the potential impact of an accidental release of any 
listed substance.347 Neither statute, however, provides sufficient 
Congressional guidance to the EPA regarding what types of infor-
mation an exposure assessment should collect and how the agency 
should evaluate that information. 
Both monitoring actual emissions and modeling ambient levels 
can provide useful information. Because there are often complex 
technical considerations in determining the best approach for a 
certain situation, Congress should allow discretion.348 Neverthe-
less, Congress might establish a goal of monitoring actual emis-
sions whenever it is cost-effective.349 Variations in human exposure 
pose even greater problems for both congressional control and risk 
managers in the EPA A fuzzy bright line statute could require 
342. Neil C. Hawkins, Conservatism in Maximally Exposed Individual (MEl) Prtdidiue Ex· 
posure Assessments: A Fzrst-Cul Analysis, 14 REG. ToXlcolOC'l & PHAAMACOLOC\' 107, 116 
(1991) (exposure estimates often overestimate risk, especially for most exposed 
individual). 
343. See Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 293 (discussing impact of heterogeneity on 
exposure estimates). 
344.. 42 U.S.C. § 7412(f) (2)(A). 
345. Id. 
346. See id. 
347. 42 U.S.c. § 7412(r)(7)(B)(ii}; Risk Management Programs for Chemical Acci-
dent Release Prevention, 58 Fed. Reg. 54,190 (OCL 20, 1993). 
348. See generally Rosenthal et al., supra note 7, at 348-53 (arguing Congress lacks tech-
nical expertise to prescribe risk assessment techniques and that bright line rules might 
freeze scientific progress in risk assessment). 
349. A number of environmental statutes require monitoring, but they rarely require 
continuous monitoring. See, e.g. 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(b) (·continuous emissions monitoring 
need not be required if alternative methods arc available that provide sufficiently reliable 
and timely information for determining compliance."). 
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heightened attention to the problems of heterogeneity in propor-
tion to the overall risk from a pollutant or a source's overall 
emissions. 
3. Public Participation. 
In a major study sponsored by the Conservation Foundation, 
Richard Liroff has argued that public participation, especially by 
the Natural Resources Defense Council,350 has been vitally impor-
tant in alerting regulators to questionable calculations by indus-
tries proposing bubbles for criteria pollutants.35t Professor Latin 
has argued that lack of public participation is a major failing of 
most variance procedures for polluters as well as ordinary zoning 
variance matters.352 This Article contends that special measures 
are necessary to insure adequate public participation in the pro-
posed variance procedures for sources that contend that technol-
ogy-based regulation of hazardous air pollutants is unnecessarily 
strict. 
This Article proposes following the special measures enumer-
ated below to insure the adequate public participation needed to 
better regulate hazardous air pollutants. 
a. Right to a Public Hearing Established. 
EPA or a designated state agency should be mandated to grant 
and hold a public hearing upon request in the following instances: 
1) when a major source requests a variance from technology-based 
standards in subsection 112; 2) when a major source of hazardous 
air pollutants files a permit application; 3) a citizen group raises a 
substantial issue as to whether a major source's operations would 
pose substantial, carcinogenic, toxic (noncarcinogenic), multi-me-
350. Mary Nichols, fonnerly an attorney at the Natural Resources Defense Council, is 
currently the Assistant Administrator for Air and Radiation, the crucial position for estab-
lishing policies on air emissions. She may have a major impact in reevaluating the agency's 
emission averaging policies for air toxies. 
351. LIROFF, supra note 121, at xvii, 101. The amount of public participation involved 
in bubble applications for criteria pollutants depends in part on the types of procedures 
used. The state implementation plan revision process generally provides greater opportu-
nities for public participation than state generic regulations, although the EPA has tuken 
steps to narrow the gap. See Emissions Trading Policy Statement; General Principles for 
Creation, Banking and Use of Emission Reduction Credits, 51 Fed. Reg. 43,814, 43,816, 
43,824, 43,835 (1986) [hereinafter Emissions Trading Policy Statement] (EPA promises 
more oversight in state's public notice and comment process for generic bubble 
applications) . 
352. See Latin, "Fine-tuning", supra note 11, at 1323. 
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dia, or disparate "hot-spot" type impacts. A citizen group would 
not be able to challenge an agency's failure to grant or hold a pub-
lic hearing absent a showing that a source poses a substantial risk. 
In line with the Supreme Court's holding in Vermont Yankee Nuclear 
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Counci~ sss a citizen has some 
burden to articulate issues when demanding costly allocation of 
agency resources. A citizen may not simply raise a list of objections 
and demand action. 
b. Type of Hearing Required. 
EPA and state agencies may have legitimate reasons for encour-
aging more informal hearingss54 even if the applicable statute enti-
tles citizens to the right to a formal process; they may recognize 
that formal adjudicatory hearings can be costly and time consum-
ing. This article proposes a requirement for formal hearings where 
1) a source requests a variance from technology-based standards, 
2) the source's excess cancer risk exceeds one-in-one-million, or 3) 
there are other significant risk factors. 
The policy of encouraging citizens to elect informal hearings, 
can be achieved through creating a lower burden on citizens re-
questing such informal hearings. This lower burden would apply 
to the requirement of showing that a source poses a substantial risk 
even after technology-based standards were in place. 
This Article's proposal for formal public hearings where a 
source seeks a variance or a citizen raises substantial issues about 
the risks at an individual source would simply give citizens the same 
353. 435 u.s. 519 (1978). 
354. This Article's proposal must be understood in light of the operating permit rules 
that apply to public participation. The rules provide for a thirty·day public comment pe-
riod, and an opportunity for an informal public hearing, with the state providing notice of 
the hearing at least thirty days in advance. Operating Permit Program, 57 Fed. Reg. 32250, 
32309 (1992) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. Part 70.7(h). In contrast to the National Pollu-
tion Discharge Elimination System permit program, which requires fonnal adjudicatory 
hearings, See Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1977) (formal adjudicatory 
hearing under Administrative Procedure Act required for issuance of NPDES permit); Sea-
coast Anti-Pollution League v. Costle, 572 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978) (same); 1 FRANK GRAD, 
TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 3-234.6 to 3-237, an air permit hearing need not include 
trial-type procedures such as cross-examination of witnesses. Ste Operating Permit Pro-
gram, 56 Fed. Reg.21712, 21742-43 (1991): David P. Novello, 17Ie Nr:w Cltan Air Ad Dptrat-
ing Permit Program: EPA:S Final Rules, EnvtI. L. Rep (EnvtI L. InsL) 10,080, 10,089 (1993). 
Likewise, section 3008(h} of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act does not require 
formal "on the record" hearings. See Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.d 
1477 (D.C. Gir. 1989). Because formal adjudicatory hearings can be very expensh·e, most 
states will probably elect to hold informal hearings instead. Ste Novello, supra, at 10089. 
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rights as they have under the Clean Water Act's permit application 
process; however, these rights would be greater than those pro-
vided under the EPA's new rules for Clean Air Act permits. 
Clearly, the Bush administration sought less formal procedures for 
permit hearings under the Amendments as a way to reduce costs 
and to shorten hearings. While faster and cheaper hearings are 
appropriate when risks are relatively low, high risks demand formal 
hearings to allow for more careful consideration of scientific mod-
els and risk assessment assumptions. 
c. Regulations requiring states to prepare detailed fact sheets; 
grants for technical assistance. 
This Article argues that citizens who lack resources to research 
well grounded concerns about a sources hazardous air emissions, 
should not bear the full burden of developing issues without gov-
ernment assistance. This article proposes the following: (1) EPA 
must issue regulations requiring states to prepare a detailed fact 
sheet when a source seeks a variance, or when an interested citizen 
raises substantial risk issues and (2) EPA must provide grants for 
technical assistance to any group of individuals deemed threatened 
by significant exposure from a facility's toxic air emissions.3ss Such 
grants would encourage citizen access in the early stages of deci-
sion making. They would allow greater opportunities for citizens 
to challenge the substantive assumptions in an application, and not 
rely solely on the more common procedural challenges which seek 
to kill projects using delay tacticS.356 Congress adopted a similar 
policy to encourage public participation by citizens who may be 
affected by toxic releases from Superfund sites.357 Congress might 
355. There are several alternative models of citizen involvement including: a state-
funded public interest law firm; the Interstate Commerce Commission Office of Public 
Counsel; the California private attorney general program; the EPA's Ombudsman concept; 
institutionalized alternative dispute resolution; negotiated rule-making; citizens boards as 
regulatory agencies; and a local citizens advisory committee. See generally Bruce Comly 
French, MoreEJJective Citizen Participation in Environmental Decisionmaking, 24 U. TOL. L. REv. 
389, 391415 (1993). Providing funds to citizen groups so they can challenge applicant 
assumptions during permit hearings appears to be the most direct approach to correct 
informational biases that favor applicants. 
356. Id. at 390, 420 (arguing applicant should fund expense of information 
collection) . 
357. See 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (e); Ellison Folk, Public Participation in the Superfund Cleanup 
Process, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 173, 194-95 (1991). Both the General Accounting Office and the 
private National Commission on Superfund have recently issued reports suggesting how to 
improve community involvement in the superfund process that might prove helpful In 
designing a public participation for hazardous air pollutants. See generally NATIONAL COM. 
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even require industry applicants to fund technical grants to citizen 
groupS.358 
This Article's proposals for more public participation would re-
verse certain policies on operational tlexibilitf59 and minor permit 
MISSION ON SUPERFUND, FINAL CoNSENSUS REPoRT OF ruE NAnONAL CoMMISSION ON 
SUPERFUND 43-46 (Pre-publication draft Dec. 21, 1993) (arguing inflexible limits on techni-
cal assistance grants are inappropriate and grants should reflect site's complexity); AgenCJ 
Slwuld Solicit Public Input Earlier, Make InfonnalUm More Aaessihle, GAO Says, 24 Env't Rep. 
(BNA) 2096, 2096-97 (Apr. 15, 1994) (discussing GAO, EPA's CoMMUNIlY RElAnoNS 
CoULD BE MOREEFFECIlVE (Apr. 12, 1994) (arguing EPA's superfund community relations 
program is generally effective, but that agency should do more to increase public 
involvement) ). 
In the early reductions rule, the EPA adopted the one-in·ten·thousand presumptive 
risk benchmark used in the 1989 Benzene Standard, supra note 57. at 38.04546, and ar-
gued that the agency does not have to implement the one-in-million standard until 
residual risk provisions take effect. See Early Reductions Rule, supra note 92, at 61.981-82. 
The EPA could use this one-in-one-million standard to determine eligibility for grants. 
The Act does provide grants to air pollution control agencies. but providing assistance to 
citizen groups is a different issue. See 42 U.S.c. § 74.05 (grants to air pol\ution control 
agencies). The Amendments established reward provisions up to $10.000 for citizens who 
report violations of the Act that lead to a criminal conviction or civil penalty and this 
system may provide some incentives for citizens to report violations of permit limits. but 
would not address the larger issue of encouraging public participation in permit hearings. 
See 42 U.S.c. § 7413(f); Public Participation Prouision Could Tum Pmnilling Proass Into 
'Nzght71WTt, , Lawyer Says, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1283 (Aug. 28, 1992) (industry attorney com-
plains that rewards could result in overly zealous enforcement). 
358. See French, supra note 355. at 390. 420 (arguing applicant should fund expense 
of information collection). 
359. Section 502(b)(10) of the Act a1\ows certain facility changes \\ithout a permit 
revision if the changes "do not exceed the emissions allowable under the permit." 42 
U.S.c. § 7661a(b) (10). The congressional compromises used to reach agreement on this 
provision make its meaning "difficult, if not impossible to decipher." Novel\o, supra note 
354, at 10090. The EPA has taken a complex and somewhat confusing middle position 
between environmentalists and states on the one hand and industry on tlle other in inter-
preting the operational flexibility statute. The EPA rejected the \;ew that § 502(b) (10) is a 
mandate only to include alternate permitted scenarios in the permit because the agency 
contended that such a narrow interpretation would render the section Mmere surplusage or 
an unnecessary gloss on a source's obligation under section 502(a) to comply \\ith its per-
mit." Operating Permit Program, supra note 254. at 32,267. On the other hand. the 
agency disagreed with some industry commentators who contended that they could aver-
age "all emissions across the 'permitted facility' regardless of whether such averaging 
would be consistent with the underlying requirements of the Act." Id. For exantple. a facil-
ity could not average emissions if a state implementation plan set an emissions limit at each 
emissions unit at a facility, and averaging would result in a violation of any such emission 
limit. Id. The EPA stated that emissions averaging provisions often required careful re\iew 
to determine whether the trading plan meets all applicable requirements. and that the 
seven-day notice provision in § 502(b) (10) "is not a reasonable amount of time to conduct 
such a review." Id. On the other hand, the agency stated that "one policy goal of the Act is 
to encourage responsible emissions trading plans and to reduce tlle costs of meeting the 
Act's requirements." Id. Accordingly. tlle EPA promulgated implementing regulations for 
§ 502(b) (10) "designed to encourage emissions trading as extensively as possible consis-
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modifications36o adopted by the EPA during the Bush Administra-
tion.361 This Article's proposed technical assistance grants are espe-
[Vol. 13:263 
tent with the requirement that title V permits comply with the applicable requirements of 
the Act and the need to ensure a reasonable review of the emissions trading provisions 
established in a permitting process." Id. The regulations allow a source to trade emissions 
within the permitted facility to meet its state implementation plan limits, where the permit 
does not already provide for such emissions trading but the plan does. Id. (to be codified 
at 40 C.F.R § 70.4(b) (12) (ii». The regulations also require states to allow emissions trad-
ing where a source is under a federal emissions cap that is lower than any required under 
the state implementation plan or other requirements, but such a source would still have to 
comply with the plan. Id. at 32,268-69 (discussing 40 C.F.R § 7.4(b)(12(iii». The EPA 
observed, however, that no plan currently allows sources to opt into an emissions trade 
based upon a seven-day notice. Id. at 32268. The agency stated that it would encourage 
states to develop such provisions "as part ofits efforts to promote market·based regulation 
under the Act," and would issue final guidance by 1994. Id. at 32,268. 
360. One of the most controversial parts of the permit regulations are the provisions 
for minor permit modifications, which do not require public participation nor preclude a 
source from acting on its application for a modification. See Operating Permit Program, 
supra note 354, at 32,281-88. These two aspects of the proposed rule provoked a m'1ior 
battle between the EPA, led by then Administrator William K. Reilly, who believed that they 
were illegal, and the Council on Competitiveness, chaired by then Vice President Dan 
Quayle, which argued that the provisions were legal and would provide substantial savings 
to industry. White House, EPA Officials to Meet Soon to Rewrite Pennit Rule According 10 Bush 
Order, 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 428, 428-29 (May 29, 1992) [hereinafter While House]. The 
EPA's then General Counsel, Professor Donald Elliott, argued in an internal opinion, 
which was later leaked and inserted into the rulemaking docket as attachments to com-
ments by David Hawkins of the Natural Resources Defense Council, that the EPA's May 
1991 proposal was illegal, but the Department of justice sharply disagreed with Elliott's 
reasoning and defended the legality of the minor permit modifications. See Novello, supra 
note 354, at 10090-91;justice Department Opinion on Legality of Comment Provisions of 
Proposed Clean Air Act Regulations Related to Air Permitting Revisions Comment Period 
With Accompanying Memorandum, Memorandum for William K. Reilly, Administrator of 
EPA, from Barry M. Hartman, Acting Assistant General, Department of justice, May 27, 
1992, reprinted in 23 Env't Rep. (BNA) 624, 624-640 Uune 5, 1992). In the end, President 
Bush had to personally resolve this dispute and decided in favor of their legality despite the 
EPA's objections. Novello, supra note 354, at 10,091; White House, supra, at 428-29. 
Under the regulations, states may adopt minor modification provisions, under which a 
source need not obtain a permit revision if a change does not rise to the level of a modifi-
cation under any provision of Title I of the Act or involve significant changes to applicable 
requirements. See Operating Permit Program, supra note 354, at 32,280, 32,287-89 (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R § 70.7(e)(1), (e)(2)(i), (e)(4». A source may make its changes as 
soon as it files an application, and need not notify the public. See id. The EPA has 45 days 
to veto an application. [d. A state should issue or deny the revision within 90 days after 
receiving the application and need not request public comment or hold a public hearing. 
Id. 
361. A fundamental problem with the operational flexibility regulations is that they 
do not even discuss emissions averaging of air toxies, which are independent of any state 
implementation plan. Because of their hazardous nature, the EPA should exclude air tox-
ies from the seven-day notice requirements of § 502(b)(1O),s operational flexibility re-
quirements. Furthermore, the EPA should adopt regulations prohibiting the use of the 
operational flexibility provisions for sources seeking to average emissions of air toxies. 
This Article contends that the minor modification provisions are especially inappre-
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cially intended to assist citizens from poor or minority 
neighborhoods, who are disproportionately likely to live near un-
desirable land uses. The danger arises, however, that wealthier and 
better educated citizens will disproportionately take advantage of 
such grants to block the siting of facilities emitting air toxies and 
that such grants could exacerbate the tendency of such sources to 
locate in poor and minority neighborhoods.SG2 The most practical 
solution would require that the EPA monitor this issue and en-
courage applications from poor or minority groups. 
While this Article proposes that Congress or the EPA adopt the 
proposals for site-specific exposure assessments and expanded pub-
lic participation, states could choose to adopt such requirements if 
there is a lack of federalleadership.SGS 
v. CONCLUSION 
The residual risk provisions in subsection 112(£) of the Clean 
Air Act fail to: safeguard against "hot-spots, n adequately compare 
carcinogens and noncarcinogens, consider indirect or multimedia 
impacts, or protect all the different discrete population groups sur-
rounding a facility. At its core, subsection 112(£)'s residual risk 
provisions do not provide the agency with adequate guidance on 
priate for sources of air toxies because the definition of modification is more liberal under 
§ 112. Section 112(a)( 4)'s definition of modification for sources of air toxies excludes de 
minimis changes whereas § 111 (a)( 4)'s definition for sources of criteria pollutants applies 
to any physical change. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 7412{a)(4) (more than de minimis amount 
required) wi1h 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (a)(4). More importantly, § 112(g) allows a sourcc to usc 
offsetting of different air toxies to avoid being classified as a modified source, although one 
might read the provision to exclude trading among pollutants that cause different diseases. 
See 42 U.S.C. § 7412(g). Thus, it may be easier for sources of hazardous pollutants to qual-
ify for a minor permit modification than sources of criteria pollutants, an outcome that 
makes no sense given the greater toxicity of such chemicals. 
This Article argues that the EPA should exclude air toxies from the minor modifi~ 
tion provisions because there is a greater need for public comment on these more danger-
ous pollutants. If the EPA fails to make this change, states should exercise their discretion 
to impose such restrictions. See Novello, supra note 354, at 10,092 (states may adopt addi-
tional requirements). 
362. Commentators argue that Gfaimessw attains through "progn:ssh'c siting- i.e. ad-
vantaged neighborhoods to bear more of the burden of undesirablc local land uses. Sa 
Been, supra note 123, at 1047-52. It is difficult in a free-market society (or, indeed, any 
society) to force such equal allocation of society's burdens. A progn:ssh'c siting schemc 
might hurt everyone by making it difficult to site necessary but unpleasant facilities. Id. at 
1050-52. 
363. Under § 116 of the Act, states generally retain the authority to adopt more strin-
gent standards and § 112(l) implicitly recognizes provisions for adopting state programs to 
implement and enforce emissions standards for hazardous air pollutants. Sa grncrally 42 
U.S.c. §§ 7412(l), 7416. 
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how to adopt a second round of emissions standards if a source in a 
category poses an excess cancer risk greater than one-in-one-mil-
lion after technology-based controls are in place. For these rea-
sons, Congress needs to amend subsection 112(f) to rectify these 
deficiencies and to enact more comprehensive amendments to the 
residual risk statute. 
Congress should enact a statute allowing a source to obtain a 
variance from technology-based requirements where the risk is 
clearly low relative to the costs of compliance or where there are 
alternative methods to significantly reduce pollution in a cost effec-
tive manner. In turn, a source applying for a variance would be 
required to conduct a site-specific exposure assessment of each sig-
nificant pollutant emitted, with possible de minimis provisions or 
allowance for alternative risk assessment methods if the marginal 
cost exceeds a certain limit or the "knee-of-the-curve" test. 
In addition, private citizens would have the right to demand a 
public hearing on a source's permit application, as well as a site-
specific exposure assessment upon introduction of substantial evi-
dence of risk left unaddressed by the technology-based emission 
standards and existing residual risk emission standards. The EPA 
could provide technical assistance grants to help citizens develop 
the requisite substantial evidence of such risks. The EPA could im-
pose more stringent emission standards in response. 
This Article's proposal for more and less stringent individual-
ized emission standards for sources raises questions about nondele-
gation and due process issues. The proposed statute would use a 
"fuzzy bright line" or risk range approach to give clearer congres-
sional guidance to the EPA while at the same time preserving a 
considerable amount of the agency's technocratic discretion. The 
statute would provide a risk range of one-in-ten-thousand to one-in-
a-million. Risks greater than one-in-ten-thousand would be pre-
sumptively unacceptable. There would be a presumption in favor 
of a variance if a risk were clearly less than one-in-one-million and 
there are no other significant risk factors. There would be a 
greater burden on applicants to justify variances the higher a 
source fell in the range of risk. The higher the risk, the higher the 
burden on the applicant to address issues such as multimedia and 
indirect impacts, "hot-spots," noncarcinogens, and disparate im-
pacts on diverse exposed subpopulations. The EPA would have 
limited authority to consider cost in determining whether to ap-
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prove an application, but the statute would provide a range of per-
missible benefit-cost comparisons. 
Realistically, this Article's proposal has a better chance of being 
adopted if both environmentalists and industry recognize potential 
benefits from the plan and the need for compromise. It is time to 
adopt a statute that will address a broader range of risk issues than 
simply carcinogenicity. Furthermore, the Amoco-EPA study dem-
onstrates that it is time to take a more individualized and multi-
media oriented approach to pollution control despite the legiti-
mate concerns Professor Latin and others have raised about vari-
ances and individualized pollution control. 
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